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1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, in the light of the various crises, compensation of corporate top 
management received considerably more interest than usual. Not only the politics, the 
public and the media questioned the appropriateness of existing compensation 
arrangements, but also the shareholders of the firms. Oftentimes, the perception of 
nowadays compensation schemes is that CEOs are rewarded arbitrarily and that their pay is 
not connected to their performance.  Searching for the existence of this link is one of the 
two goals of this work. To get a more detailed insight of the relationship, this paper also 
analyses the effectiveness of certain components of compensation.  
The second aim is to validate which instruments of corporate governance are effective in 
aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the firm's shareholders. Since compensation is 
supposed to be one of these instruments, the second goal of my thesis is closely related to 
the first one. In financial literature the possibly deviating interests between the CEO and the 
shareholders is known as the principal agent conflict, or the problem of the separation of 
ownership and control. In theory, and oftentimes in reality too, managers possibly have 
different preferences than shareholders. In particular, they are prone to engage in self-
serving activities such as inefficient spending, empire building, extraction of perks etc., 
whereas the primary desire of the shareholders is that the value of their stake gets 
maximized. In order to prevent managers from departing too far from maximizing the value 
to shareholders, incentive and monitoring systems have been implemented. 
The fact that there are still numerous papers published that address the problems arising 
from the separation of ownership and control, illustrates that there is still no consensus 
about what instruments good corporate governance should involve and which play a less 
important role or could be omitted altogether. My thesis contributes to the literature in that 
it provides the reader with a broad overview of the different mechanisms developed to align 
shareholders’ and CEO’s interests, together with empirical evidence which of those are 
indeed positively related to firm performance. Due to its recent popularity my thesis focuses 
especially on the effectiveness of CEO compensation, both in total and of certain 
components. 
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The majority of the analysis is conducted in two subsamples (1993-2005 and 2006-2009), 
since the SEC changed the disclosure requirements concerning compensation in 2005, 
making an analysis over the whole range of years less representative. The estimates 
resulting from the analysis are not designed to make any claims concerning causality, 
however. Rather, evaluating the cause of the relationships is left to future research. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Next, section 2 familiarizes the reader 
with the theoretical background and what prior empirical evidence suggested. Afterwards, 
sections 3 and 4 describe the used methodology, expected relationships, and provide a 
detailed description of the data. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis, 
followed by the conclusion in section 6. In the end, section 7 gives some final remarks and 
outlines possible extensions for future research. The appendix provides the regression 
results of a selective set of alternative specifications. 
2 Literature review 
 
Ever since there were people manipulating goods and assets owned by another, the 
separation of ownership and control caused problems to those affected. Theoretically, there 
is no difference between a farmer cultivating the land owned by a nobleman in the medieval 
era, or a manager running a multi-million dollar company with a vast number of 
shareholders. Both relationships can be seen as principal-agent relationships with similar 
inherent problems. As soon as the individual in charge of control does not have to bear the 
whole cost of his actions (because his actions are not perfectly observable), an agency 
problem arises. Since those problems are omnipresent, there is extensive literature 
addressing this issue. One of the most influential papers addressing the problems arising 
from the so called principal-agent relationship is by Jensen and Meckling in 19761. In this 
section I will start by reviewing this basic paper. Afterwards, I will illustrate what has 
happened in related research so far by focusing on a set of selective papers. 
2.1 Defining the model 
An agency relationship is defined as “…a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
                                                      
1
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure” 
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which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent”2. The major 
problem within this relationship is the decision making authority. In theory (and often also in 
reality) individuals are value maximizers. That is, every individual strives towards maximizing 
his personal utility in terms of pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary wealth.  
2.1.1 The ideal solution 
If an individual has to bear the whole cost of his consumption of non-pecuniary income (e.g. 
is the owner-manager of a firm), he3 will choose to extract an amount of non-pecuniary 
wealth such that his personal utility is maximized. The graph below depicts this equilibrium 
in the case of an owner-manager4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
2
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure”, 
p. 308 
3
  I am referring to the CEO and managers as to be male just as a matter of convenience and not because I want 
to make any references about gender roles in the corporate environment. Henceforth, the terms "he" and 
"she" are used interchangeably. 
4
 Although agency problems can be found in many different interpersonal relationships (communities, 
universities, sports teams, etc.), this paper focuses solely on the relationship between a firm's equity-
shareholders and its management 
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In this graph 	denotes the value of the firm if the manager chooses not to consume any 
perquisites, and  denotes the highest possible level of perquisite5 consumption (at this 
point the firm's only purpose would be to generate non-pecuniary wealth for its owner). 
Therefore the line  represents the locus of all possible combinations. Its slope is equal to  
-1 since the cost of every dollar increase in non-pecuniary benefits reduces the firm value by 
the equivalent dollar, which is “…analogous to a budget constraint”6. 
                                                      
5
 The extraction of non-pecuniary wealth is not limited to the consumption of perquisites; it also involves 
activities such as shirking, inefficient spending or other “non-value-maximizing objectives such as sales growth, 
empire building, and employee welfare” (cf. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and 
market valuation”, p. 293); for the sake of readability I am referring to perquisites as synonym for the 
extraction of non-pecuniary wealth in every possible form 
6
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure”, 
p. 315 
 
Figure 1 “The ideal solution (without outside funding)” 
Derived from Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency cost and ownership 
structure” 
V … denotes firm value 
F … denotes the value of non-pecuniary wealth the agent will extract 
U … indifference curves 
A … the “ideal” solution: the equilibrium in which V and F are balanced such that it gives the owner-manager  
       the highest feasible utility 
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At the point  , a manager, eager to maximize his personal welfare, values an incremental 
increase in perquisites higher than an incremental loss in firm value, and therefore will move 
down the line towards point A, where the (personal) marginal cost in firm value is equal to 
the (personal) marginal benefit of perquisites. Therefore, point A resembles the ideal 
solution if the firm is owned by a single owner-manager. It should be recognized, that the 
slope of his utility function (U1) at this point is equal to the slope of  (i.e. -1). 
Summing that up, in the ideal solution firm value is equal to V* and the level of fringe 
benefits is equal to F*. 
2.1.2 Optimal solution 
In case the owner-manager wants to sell some fraction (1-α) of his ownership and remain as 
manager, a naïve buyer may be willing to pay (1-α)V*, the value of the acquired fraction of 
the current firm value V*. However, if his actions are not perfectly observable, the manager 
will not have to bear the whole $ cost of consuming perquisites anymore, but rather a dollar 
value equal to his fraction of ownership (α). Therefore, the slope of his budget constraint 
changes to –α (as depicted in fig. 2 – see below). This line has to pass point A, “… since he 
[the manager] can if he wishes have the same wealth and level of non-pecuniary 
consumption he consumed as full owner”7. Again he will maximize his personal wealth, 
ending up at point B (where the highest feasible utility function is tangent to his budget 
constraint), consuming non-pecuniary benefits of F0. The total costs of his consumption, 
however, remains unchanged, bringing firm value down to V0. This decrease in firm value 
affects the wealth of all owners depending on the fraction they are holding. Hence, in the 
new equilibrium the new owner would incur a fraction of the costs of consumption equal to 
(1-α)F0, and the rest would have to be borne by the manager. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
7
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure”, 
p. 317 
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Most investors are not that naïve however, so they will only be willing to pay an amount that 
is equal to the expected value of the firm, given the higher level of perquisites consumed by 
the manager. Through anticipating the agent’s behavior, investors force the manager 
towards a new equilibrium of pecuniary and non-pecuniary wealth which is at point C. At 
this point the managers utility function is again tangent to his budget constraint, at a point 
where it intersects the firm’s budget constraint. That the transaction has to occur at exactly 
this point can easily be explained. Consider the case that the tangency occurs left to C, 
where the owner-manager will receive payments that are lower than the claim is actually 
worth. On the opposite, if the tangency occurs at a point to the right of C, the owner-
 
Figure 2 “The optimal solution (with outside funding)” 
From Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency cost and ownership 
structure”, p.316 
V … denotes firm value 
F … denotes the value of non-pecuniary wealth the agent will extract 
U … indifference curves 
α ... the fractional ownership the agent retains after resorting to outside funds 
A … the “ideal” solution 
B … equilibrium with naïve investors 
C … the “optimal” solution if investors anticipate the agent’s change in behavior 
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manager will receive inappropriate high payments, leaving the new owners worse off. Since 
both participants in this transaction are assumed to be rational wealth maximizers, a 
transaction can only take place at point C. 
In this new equilibrium firm value is equal to V’ and the manager’s consumption of non-
pecuniary wealth is F’. If there is no monitoring and/or bonding allowed (see further down), 
the whole decrease in firm value V* - V’ (and therefore in wealth) has to be borne solely by 
the manager8. Firm value is decreasing by the same magnitude as the extraction of non-
pecuniary wealth is increasing. The manager’s welfare however (pecuniary + non-pecuniary 
wealth) is not decreasing by an amount equal to V* - V’. Rather it is decreasing by the 
distance between the intersects of the vertical axis and the utility functions U1 and U3, which 
is equal to V1 – V3. The magnitude of V1 – V3 is smaller than V* - V’, since part of the firm 
value decrease the manager incurs is compensated by the higher level of perquisite 
consumption (it is important to realize that this increase cannot compensate the manager 
thoroughly, since at this point he would value pecuniary wealth more than non-pecuniary 
wealth).  In the absence of monitoring and bonding activities, Jensen and Meckling define 
the manager’s total wealth reduction (V1 – V3) as “net agency cost”
9. Obviously a manager 
“…would sell such a claim only if the increment in welfare he achieves by using the cash 
amounting to (1-α)V’ for other things was worth more to him than this amount of wealth [V1 
– V3]”
10.  
Due to the selling of equity to investors, the manager is forced to increase his consumption 
of perquisites, since, if he chooses not to do so, he will get less for the claim than it is 
actually worth. The lower the fraction (α) the manager retains, the flatter gets the slope of 
his budget constraint, and, since investors will anticipate the behavior of appropriating “… 
larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites”11, the more expensive 
it will be to him to sell shares (in terms of incurred agency cost). Following this logic, the 
manager will keep on selling equity to investors as long as his increase in personal welfare 
                                                      
8
 for the proof cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and 
ownership structure”, p. 318,319 
9
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure”, 
p. 319 
10
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure”, 
p. 319 
11
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure”, 
p. 313 
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(no matter if measured in perquisites or in other benefits he can obtain by using the 
payments received by investors) will outweigh the incurred (agency) cost. Moreover, in this 
model, agency cost can be seen as a measure of deviation of interest between principal and 
agent. As a result, a lower fraction α can be interpreted as a lower likelihood that the 
manager will act in shareholder’s best interest. Following this model, the obvious conclusion 
that could be drawn is, that the higher a manager's ownership in a firm, the more likely he 
will act in shareholders' best interest12. Some empirical studies, however, do not support this 
notion without reproach13 which is why other theories about management ownership have 
been developed (e.g. entrenchment theory14 - see further down). 
2.2 Mechanisms to reduce agency cost 
Obviously, as far as I presented it, the model by Jensen and Meckling would not be 
applicable to reality. If owner-managers sell equity only as long as their incremental increase 
in personal wealth outweighs the agency cost they incur, we would not see multi-million 
dollar corporations, traded publicly, with management holding only a tiny fraction of the 
shares. To ensure that shareholders' invested capital is not exposed to the free disposition of 
the management, control instruments have been implemented. 
Literature suggests a wide variety of instruments designed to minimize agency cost and 
boost performance. Although those instruments are heavily interrelated, they can roughly 
be divided in two categories, financial and non-financial alignment mechanisms. I will start 
by reviewing the latter one. 
2.2.1 Non-financial alignment mechanisms 
Non-financial mechanisms to reduce agency cost are designed to decrease the divergence of 
interests without actively tying a manager's pecuniary wealth to shareholders' wealth. In this 
paper, I want to focus on the most prominent of those measures, monitoring / bonding and 
the threat of dismissal, the first of which Jensen and Meckling explicitly analyzed in their 
paper. 
                                                      
12
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “CEO incentives – It’s not how much you pay, but how” 
13
 cf. e.g. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and Market Valuation”; Janakirman, 
Radhakrishnan, Tsang, 2010, “Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership, and Executive Compensation” 
14
 cf. e.g. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and Market Valuation”; Janakirman, 
Radhakrishnan, Tsang, 2010, “Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership, and Executive Compensation” 
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2.2.1.1 Monitoring / Bonding 
If a manager wants to raise funds but has no desire to increase his consumption of non-
pecuniary wealth to corresponding levels, he could issue “guarantees” not to consume such 
high levels in order to encourage investors to pay a higher amount for their share. This 
activity is called “bonding”. If the principal is interested in curbing the manager’s perquisites 
consumption he will engage in “monitoring”. In doing so, the principal will closely observe 
the agent's actions, and threaten him with certain consequences if he is seriously departing 
from the behavior the principal is hoping for. 
No matter which of those two mechanisms is prevalent (a mixture would also be possible), 
the costs, as well as the benefits, of aligning interests will be incurred by the former owner-
manager15. As a value maximizing individual, a manager will sign such a contract only as long 
as the benefits outweigh the costs. Using the model presented above, this relationship can 
be depicted as follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
15
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure”, 
p. 324, 325 
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Other than in section 2.1.2 above, monitoring is possible now. Let us assume that investors, 
through anticipating his behavior, forced a manager to point C, yielding a firm value equal to 
V' and a perquisite consumption level of F'. Assume furthermore, that monitoring does 
reduce perquisite consumption F, and that the monitoring costs (M) are increasing with the 
magnitude of the desired reduction. 
If it would be possible to force the manager to a certain level of F at zero cost, investors 
would force him towards point A (the ideal solution where the agency cost is equal to zero). 
A level of perquisite consumption lower than F* however, would not be possible since the 
Figure 3 “The optimal solution with monitoring / bonding” 
From Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency cost and ownership 
structure”, p.324 
V … firm value 
F … value of non-pecuniary wealth the agent will extract 
U … indifference curves 
α ... the fractional ownership the agent retains after resorting to outside funds 
A … the “ideal” solution 
C … the “optimal” solution if investors anticipate the agent’s change in behavior 
E … optimal solution to the agent 
G … optimal solution to the principal (not feasible since agent is worse off) 
M … monitoring cost = D-E 
D … equilibrium of firm value and perquisite consumption F’’ if monitoring costs are equal to zero 
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manager would not sign such a contract (his personal welfare would decrease if he moves up 
the line beyond point A). 
In fact, monitoring is seldom available at zero cost, and therefore if monitoring forces the 
manager to extract a lower level of non-pecuniary wealth, the value of the firm would not 
increase by the same magnitude as F decreases. Rather, the firm would move along the 
green expansion path shown in Figure 3. Since monitoring costs are increasing at higher 
levels, the expansion path is a concave function, reaching its maximum at point G. A rational 
manager however, striving to maximize his personal welfare, will not commit himself to a 
contract which does not give him the highest feasible utility. From the manager's 
perspective, the optimal solution is denoted by point E (the point where the expansion path 
is tangent to the highest indifference curve - in this case U4). At this point, firm value equals 
V'' and perquisite consumption is at F''. The monitoring cost at point E is given by M=D-E. It is 
important to realize that point D does not denote the ideal solution, but rather an optimal 
one. As mentioned above, if M=0 for all levels of F, the ideal solution would be at point A. 
The monitoring model presented in Figure 3 is also valid for bonding activities since "[...] it 
makes no difference who actually makes the monitoring expenditures - the owner bears the 
full amount of costs [...]"16 and gets all the benefits. Monitoring / bonding costs will be 
different for every company, depending on the individual value a manager assigns to the 
perquisites available, the composition of the board (cf. section 2.2.3.1), manager’s 
entrenchment (cf. section 2.2.2.1), how incentive contracts are shaped (cf. section 2.2.2.2), 
how observable manager’s actions are, etc.. Which form is dominant in a firm depends on 
who can limit the perquisite consumption at a lower cost. Is the manager able to issue a 
compelling contract to limit his extraction of F, bonding will be the prevalent activity. If the 
manager is not able to do so (or only at a higher cost), investors will engage in monitoring.  
Links to other sections 
In case investors want to engage in monitoring, they often delegate this task to the board of 
directors (at least investors with only a small stake oftentimes have to rely on the board, 
since they do not have the incentive and the means to conduct this task themselves). The 
                                                      
16
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure”, 
p.325 
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question at hand is how the board should be composed. How many directors should be on 
the board? How many outside directors should be included? Different implications of those 
questions are presented in section 2.2.3.1. A group that is considered highly capable of 
monitoring management are large (institutional) investors, presented in section 2.2.3.2 . 
Furthermore, monitoring is closely related to the next section. 
2.2.1.2 Threat of dismissal 
Although I have no intention to test for this instrument separately (for example by 
examining the relationship between management turnover and performance, or by running 
an event analysis), I want to present its implications (in short) for the sake of completeness. 
This instrument, which is also designed to mitigate the agency problem, is obviously 
extremely closely related to monitoring (if not a consequence of it). If the agent's actions are 
monitored with high scrutiny and he does not act in the principal's interest (i.e. deliver poor 
performance), he is threatened with dismissal. Since a large portion of a managers’ wealth is 
typically tied to the firm he works for, especially in terms of his invested human capital (i.e. 
training, prospects on the job market, etc.), the threat of dismissal should constrain 
manager's behavior, lessen agency cost and is supposed to boost performance in turn. 
Although this argumentation is consistent with previous studies17, there is a considerable 
controversy about its virtue. Part of the research confirms that "[...] poor stock return 
increases the probability of a CEO's losing his job"18 and that "[...] boards react relatively 
quickly to poor performance in their decisions to replace the CEO"19. Other empirical 
findings, however, suggest that “[…] dismissals are not an important source of managerial 
incentives since the increases in dismissal probability due to poor performance and the 
penalties associated with dismissal are both small"20. Researchers supporting that notion 
attribute the lack of empirical evidence to the fact that “[…] employment contracts, 
severance agreements, or golden parachute arrangements [...] further reduce or eliminate 
                                                      
17
 cf. e.g.  Weisbach, 1988, "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover"; Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate 
governance and firm performance"; Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board 
of directors” 
18
 cf. Weisbach, 1988, "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover", p.440 
19
 cf. Weisbach, 1988, "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover", p.443 
20
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”, p.227 
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the pecuniary punishment for failure […]”21. Furthermore, they suggest that the board does 
not always act in shareholders’ best interest either since its members are oftentimes 
reluctant to lay off managers after periods of poor performance due to psychological and 
social factors such as collegiality22. 
Links to other sections 
Usually researchers tested for the threat of dismissal using CEO or management turnover as 
a proxy. Since the studies that did find a significant relationship revealed that the turnover 
probability is especially sensitive to the size of the board23, the number of outside directors 
on the board24 (cf. section 2.2.3.1 further down), and the concentration of institutional 
shareholders25 (cf. section 2.2.3.2 further down), I expect those numbers to incorporate the 
threat of dismissal, which is why I will not test for this mechanism by using a separate 
variable. Furthermore, in case the manager is entrenched (cf. section 2.2.2.1 below), the 
threat of dismissal becomes even less powerful, due to the lower probability of a lay off26. 
2.2.2 Financial alignment mechanisms 
Financial alignment mechanisms are designed to mitigate the agency problem by actively 
connecting the agent's and the principal's wealth. Although these measures can be split in 
two major groups (managerial equity ownership and incentive compensation plans), I want 
to continue with the overall effect first, since an interesting study form 201027 examined the 
aggregated effect. Later on, I'm going to present the two groups separately. 
When agency theory came up in the 70s, the academic community was positive that they 
discovered a key driver to a further understanding of manager behavior. In these days, 
financial alignment seemed to be a powerful tool to reduce agency cost, forcing the manager 
                                                      
21
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”, p242 
22
 cf. Bebchuck, Fried, 2006, “Pay without Performance: An overview of the issues” 
23
 cf. Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
24
 cf. e.g.  Weisbach, 1988, "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover" 
25
 cf. Hartzell, Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation” 
26
 cf. Janakirman, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, 2010, “Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership, and Executive 
Compensation” 
27
 cf. e.g. Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, Carpenter, 2010, "Agency theory revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder 
interest alignment" 
  
14 
 
to act in shareholders' best interest. After years of empirical research however, "enthusiasm 
is clearly waning"28. 
Even early studies found that the change in manager's wealth (measured in absolute dollar 
value) that is associated with a change in shareholder wealth is almost negligible small29. But 
contrary to recent studies, the general conclusion in these early days was not that financial 
alignment mechanisms have been implemented ineffectively, but rather that management 
should receive even more stock and option grants in order to increase their share, which was 
supposed to align interests30. 
Recent researchers on the other hand, criticize that “[…] upon discovering practices that 
appear inconsistent with the cost-efficient provision of incentives, financial economists have 
often labored to come up with clever explanations for how such practices might be 
consistent with arm’s length contracting after all. Practices for which no explanation has 
been found have been considered ‘anomalies’ or ‘puzzles’ that will ultimately either be 
explained within the paradigm or disappear”31. 
Although the tenor of recent papers is that financial alignment instruments do not work well 
the way they have been implemented, Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart and Carpenter32 argued that 
it is too early to dismiss the effectiveness of financial alignment altogether. They argue that 
preceding studies failed to measure CEOs' wealth change appropriately and that CEOs, since 
they typically have a large portion of their personal wealth invested in the firm, should be 
considered as shareholders rather than employees. This is why they introduced CEO return 
(the percentage change of the CEO's wealth within one year - analogous to stock return) as a 
proxy of financial alignment. By using this variable they found "[...] a positive, statistically 
significant, and economically meaningful relationship between CEO return and shareholder 
return [which] stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom in the management 
                                                      
28
 cf. Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, Carpenter, 2010, "Agency theory revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder interest 
alignment", p.1029 
29
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives” found that CEO's wealth 
changes by roughly $3 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth 
30
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “CEO incentives – It’s not how much you pay, but how” 
31
 cf. Bebchuck, Fried, 2006, “Pay without Performance: An overview of the issues”, p. 8,9 
32
 cf. Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, Carpenter, 2010, "Agency theory revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder interest 
alignment" 
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literature that such financial alignment either does not exist or is so small in magnitude as to 
be irrelevant"33. 
Since the concept of CEO return involves his stake in the firm, one can expect the correlation 
to be higher in firms with high managerial (CEO) ownership (which happens in part 
mechanically through his ownership in the firm). Nevertheless it would be interesting to see 
if managerial ownership or the various components of incentive compensation have a larger 
impact when CEO return is used as compensation proxy. This is why I want to run two 
separate regressions. One in which managerial ownership is included in the computation of 
the CEO return, and one where managerial ownership is omitted altogether. This approach 
will illustrate the impact of ownership on the performance / CEO return relationship. 
Alternatively, I will capture the degree of financial alignment by using conventional 
measures too, which are presented in the following. 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis1A: CEO return is positively related to performance. 
Hypothesis1B: High (low) performance coincides with high (low) CEO return 
 
2.2.2.1 Managerial equity ownership 
With their model, Jensen and Meckling implicitly stated that the most profitable firms should 
be those with high managerial ownership (convergence-of-interest hypothesis34). 
Theoretically, their arguments would suggest that an owner-manager invests almost his 
whole wealth in his company before he resorts to outside funds35. Empirically, this “[…] is 
not consistent with what we generally observe”36. A major reason why owner-managers do 
not wait to search for outside financing until they are running out of (cost-efficient) wealth 
could be diversification. Since agents tend to be risk averse they could be reluctant to put all 
                                                      
33
 cf. Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, Carpenter, 2010, "Agency theory revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder interest 
alignment", p. 1041 
34
 cf. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation” 
35
 As previously explained he will resort to outside funding only to the extent that the preceeds from the 
purchase outweigh the incurred agency cost. 
36
 cf. Jensen, Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency costs and ownership structure”, 
p. 349 
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their eggs into one basket. As long as the additionally incurred agency cost (of accumulating 
more outside funding) is lower than the value of risk reduction, the agent will continue 
raising funds. 
On the other side, if a manager is willing to keep a high stake in the firm, although this will 
leave him poorly diversified, and thereby reduce agency cost, the effect on shareholders will 
not necessarily be a positive one. In such a situation, the manager may want to decrease his 
risk via investing in less risky projects (which probably would be less profitable). The 
shareholders, able to hedge their risk via diversification on the market, would be better off if 
the firm's resources would be invested in the riskier, more profitable project. So there 
should be considerable shareholder interest that the manager is well diversified, as long as 
the incurred agency cost (to be borne by the manager) is lower than the difference between 
the risky and the less risky project.  
That managerial ownership connects CEO’s wealth with shareholders' wealth and therefore 
in general provides incentives to act in shareholders' interest, is almost undoubted37. Some 
studies found that the incentive effect of managerial equity ownership is even higher than 
the effect of highly pay-for-performance sensitive compensation packages38, which are 
presented in the next section. 
Following the agency theory, it does not come as a surprise that the incentive effect of 
managerial ownership is supposed to be more prevalent in small firms, because (i) the 
manager in such companies is often the founder and (ii) if not, he is more likely to have 
enough wealth to acquire a significant share of the firm and still remain sufficiently 
diversified (which is difficult for managers of multimillion dollar corporations39). It is worth 
noting that, although managers of large companies typically have a smaller share, they 
usually “[…] tend to have a larger dollar investment in their firms’ shares”40. However, since 
the model builds on the manager's personal cost of consuming perquisites, the agent's 
                                                      
37
 From the reviewed literature concerning managerial ownership only the 2005 paper by Sundaramurthy, 
Rhoades, and Rechner, "A Meta-analysis of the effects of executive and institutional ownership on firm 
performance" did neither find a significant positive nor a significant negative relationship 
38
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”; Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, 
Carpenter, 2010, "Agency theory revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder interest alignment" 
39
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “CEO incentives – It’s not how much you pay, but how” 
40
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”, p.237 
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extraction of non-pecuniary wealth will be the lower, the higher his fractional ownership 
position in the firm (which is represented by the steeper slope of α).  
Although this argumentation is supported by part of the literature41, there is considerable 
empirical evidence that is not consistent with the proposition that managerial ownership is a 
good thing per se. 
Researchers rising demur against this view argue that, even given the case that the manager 
has enough wealth to finance his firm and still remain diversified, high managerial ownership 
cannot automatically be taken as an indicator of high performance. These authors42 are 
concerned that managers are likely to become “entrenched" with increasing ownership 
fraction. That is, if their stake is relatively high they could get powerful enough to exert 
considerable pressure on the board (cf. section 2.2.3.1), resist hostile takeovers43 (refers to 
the market of corporate control, which I do not intend to test for in my analysis), have a say 
on the shape of their own compensation plans (see section 2.2.2.2 further down), or 
seriously contradict instruments imposed by institutional shareholders (cf. section 2.2.3.2). 
In other words, "[...] large managerial ownership insulates from other forces that reduce 
agency costs [...]"44. Management's ability to exert pressure on the board or resist 
amendments desired by large shareholders could lead to poor performance, a low pay-for-
performance sensitivity and high compensation levels. 
One should recognize however, that the "negative" effect of managerial ownership on other 
control mechanisms could also be due to a lower demand for other instruments to align 
interests45. High stock ownership by the management could already reduce a large part of 
agency costs, making additional efforts obsolete. 
                                                      
41
 cf. e.g. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”; Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 
1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value; Damodaran, John, Liu, 2005, "What motivates 
managers? Evidence from organizational form changes" 
42
 cf. e.g. Stulz, 1988, "Managerial Control of voting rights"; Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management 
ownership and market valuation”; Janakiraman, Radhakrshnan, Tsang, 2010, “Institutional Investors, 
Managerial Ownership, and Executive Compensation” 
43
 cf. Stulz, 1988, "Managerial Control of voting rights" 
44
 cf. Hermalin, Weisbach, 1991, "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance" 
45
 cf. Hermalin, Weisbach, 1991, "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance" 
  
18 
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that entrenchment not only arises through high managerial 
ownership (and therefore voting power46), also a manager’s characteristics such as “[…] 
tenure with the firm, status as a founder, or even personality […]”47 can lead to such a 
situation. Moreover, if the CEO also serves as chairman of the board, he can easily get 
entrenched48. 
Concerning managerial ownership, the effects on performance predicted by the 
convergence-of-interest hypothesis and the entrenchment theory point in opposite 
directions. Under the convergence-of-interest hypothesis performance increases with 
manager’s stake and it decreases under entrenchment theory49. That is why some authors50 
proclaim a somewhat N-shaped relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
46
 Managers can increase their voting power not only through ownership in the firm. For a detailed overview of 
the ways managers could use to increase their voting power, see Stulz, 1988, "Managerial Control of voting 
rights". 
47
 cf. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation”, p. 294 
48
 cf. e.g. Chiang, Lin, 2011, "Examining Board Composition and Firm Performance"; Yermack, 1996, “Higher 
market valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
49
 At this point I want note that some authors use the term "managerial power theory" instead of 
"entrenchment theory". There is no difference between those terms as long as one is aware of the fact that 
entrenchment can also arise through factors other than ownership. 
50
 cf. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation”; Janakirman, 
Radhakrishnan, Tsang, 2010, “Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership, and Executive Compensation” 
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They argue that for increases at low levels of managerial ownership (from 0 to L1) the 
convergence-of-interest effect does boost performance and that the entrenchment at this 
level is negligible51. At a medium level (L1 to L2)
52 the manager's increased ownership 
position already leads to substantial entrenchment. Although the interests of the principals 
and the agent are still converging, a manager at this level already has significant influence on 
many instruments designed to discipline him. This influence, which is caused by his 
entrenchment, outweighs the positive effect of increased ownership, resulting in a decrease 
of interest alignment. At high levels (> L2) the convergence-of-interest effect dominates 
                                                      
51
 cf. Hermalin, Weisbach, 1991, "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance" 
52
 Although researchers did find similar N-shaped relationships, the values for L1 and L2 differ with respect to 
the managers in consideration: In their 1988 paper "Management ownership and market valuation", Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny considered the whole board of directors and fixed L1 at 5% and L2 at 25%. In contrast, 
considering only top-five executives in their 2010 paper " Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership, and 
Executive Compensation", Janakiraman, Radhakrshnan, and Tsang pinned the levels down at 1% and 5% 
respectively. 
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Figure 4 “The relationship between performance and managerial ownership” 
Derived from Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation”, p. 301  
Note: From 0 to L1 increasing ownership has a positive effect on performance. From L1 to L2, ownership 
probably still has a positive effect on performance due to convergence-of-interest effect. This effect however, 
is outweighed by the entrenchment effect of increased ownership. For ownership portions > L2 an agent’s 
influence due to entrenchment is not significantly higher than for levels just below L2. Therefore, the 
convergence-of-interest effect (which operates over the whole range of ownership) results in a positive 
relationship between ownership and performance again. 
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again, since “[…] managements with even more […] ownership might not be significantly 
more entrenched […]”53. 
Nowadays, many firms require their managers to hold a substantial share of the company. 
However, they oftentimes allow them to do so via holding options instead of shares54. Since 
options do not have the same risk distribution as a firm's stock (options don't have a 
downside risk) they do not induce the same alignment of interest. Hence, it is reasonable to 
use a managerial ownership variable that does not included unexercised options. 
Links to other sections 
The interrelation of this section with others can - for the most part - be attributed to the 
entrenchment effect. If a manager is entrenched he could potentially resist board decisions 
(cf. section 2.2.3.1 - especially with respect to the nomination of outside directors), or 
oppose corporate governance changes imposed by institutional shareholders (cf. section 
2.2.3.2). Moreover, “[…] increased shareholdings of the CEO reduce the probability that he 
resigns […]”55. In other words, high managerial ownership reduces the effectiveness of the 
threat of dismissal. 
With his influence on the board, an entrenched CEO could also have an impact on the 
implementation of new compensation plans, thereby potentially produce "[...] considerable 
distortions and costs to investors and the economy"56. 
Furthermore, one should be aware of the fact that managerial ownership is often a product 
of compensation schemes with a heavy reliance on options. If the manager is performing 
well he will exercise his options, resulting in holding a larger portion of the firm57. If this 
portion is sufficiently large, the agent could get powerful enough to influence his own 
compensation. 
 
 
                                                      
53
 cf. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation”, p. 302 
54
 cf. Lavelle, L., 2002, "How to halt the options express" 
55
 cf. Weisbach, 1988, “Outside directors and CEO Turnover”, p. 450 
56
 cf. Bebchuk, Fried, 2006, "Pay without Performance: An Overview of the issues", p. 5, 6 
57
 cf. Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance" 
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Hypothesis 
Hypothesis2A: At low and high (intermediate) levels, managerial ownership has a positive 
(negative) relationship to performance. 
Hypothesis2B: With increasing managerial ownership, the level of compensation will rise and 
the performance sensitivity will decline, either because there is a lower need or because the 
manager is powerful enough to resist an elaborate implementation. Concerning 
compensation there is no piecewise linear relationship but only a linear one. 
 
2.2.2.2 Incentive contracts 
Another way to constrain a manager’s behavior (i.e. limiting his extraction of non-pecuniary 
wealth) is the use of highly pay-for-performance sensitive compensation contracts. Those 
contracts are designed to provide an incentive for the manager to deliver the best possible 
performance, via connecting his compensation to firm performance. Figure 3 presented in 
section 2.2.1.1 is also applicable to incentive contracts (e.g. as part of a bonding contract). 
The higher the pay-for-performance sensitivity, the higher is the cost M (because if their 
income is conditional on performance, managers want to get compensated for the excessive 
risk they are exposed to). 
These contracts typically comprise of a mixture of base salary, bonus, option grants, stock 
grants, long term performance plans and additional perks, and are usually “[…] prepared by 
the remuneration committee in partnership with a human resource consulting firm”58. 
Moreover, deferred payments, pension plans, etc. play a role in providing incentives. 
Although the data I intend to analyze covers only firms traded on North American stock 
exchanges (such as the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE], the American Stock Exchange 
[ASE], the NASDAQ, etc.), it is noteworthy that the components of managerial pay are used 
differently in different cultures, economies etc.59, which is illustrated in the following. 
 
                                                      
58
 cf. Dossi, Patelli, Zoni, 2010, “The Missing Link between Corporate Performance Measurement Systems and 
Chief Executive Officer Incentive Plans”, p. 551 
59
 cf. Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value" 
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Although neither the table nor the figure explicitly includes stock options, stock grants and 
deferred compensation, it becomes evident that CEO compensation practices differ 
substantially with respect to the country. Despite the fact that they pay about the same 
average base salary, in terms of total direct compensation (TDC) continental Europe seems 
to pay less to their CEOs. As can be referred form the table, this difference can, for the most 
part, be attributed to a lower reliance on long term incentive plans. If the UK is also included 
in the European Segment, the difference becomes even more obvious. 
TABLE 1 
Regional differences in average CEO compensation 
France Germany United Kingdom United States 
Base Salary [€000s] 700 800 950 700 
Annual Bonus as % of 
Base Salary 
120% 160% 110% 140% 
Total cash 
compensation [€000s] 
1.540 2.080 1.995 1.680 
Long-Term Incentives 
as % of Base Salary 
115% 60% 130% 370% 
Total direct 
compensation [€000s] 
2.345 2.560 3.230 4.270 
Source: HayGroup in Dossi, Patelli, Zoni, 2010, “The Missing Link between Corporate Performance 
Measurement Systems and Chief Executive Officer Incentive Plans”, p. 539 
Note: The sample was composed of the largest US and European companies (€3-10 billion in total revenues) 
700
1.680
4.270
950
1.995
3.230
800
2.080
2.560
700
1.540
2.345
Base Salary [€000s]
Total cash 
compensation [€000s]
Total direct 
compensation [€000s]
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Figure 5 “Composition of the average CEO compensation in different countries” 
From HayGroup in Dossi, Patelli, Zoni, 2010, “The Missing Link between Corporate Performance 
Measurement Systems and Chief Executive Officer Incentive Plans”, p. 539 
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As mentioned above, this analysis does not explicitly display equity-based compensation, 
which is a crucial component of nowadays top management compensation, but as an 
illustration of the differences it serves its purpose. In the following, I want to present how 
equity-based compensation evolved over the last two decades.  
Due to financial economists’, and henceforth politics’ and societies’, enthusiasm in the 1990s 
over the effectiveness of highly performance sensitive compensation schemes to align 
interests, one would expect an increased usage of those contracts in the last decades, 
especially with corporations boasting themselves of using highly sensitive executive 
compensation. And in fact, a study in 2005 showed that the equity-based compensation 
substantially increased between 1993 and 2003, even after controlling for industry, size and 
performance effects60. This increase can mostly be attributed to the excessive use of option 
grants in the 1990s, where firms exploited the advantage that options did not have to be 
included in the income statement as long as they have not been exercised, which is good for 
cash poor start-ups but was also used by long-established, solvent companies61. 
Interestingly, executives’ cash compensation also increased according to this study, which 
shows that equity based compensation was not used as a substitute to cash. A potential 
                                                      
60
 cf. Bebchuk, Grinstein, 2005, “The Growth of Executive Pay” 
61
 cf. Lavelle, 2002, "How to halt the options express" 
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Figure 6 “Composition of the average CEO compensation in Europe and the U.S.” 
From HayGroup in Dossi, Patelli, Zoni, 2010, “The Missing Link between Corporate Performance Measurement 
Systems and Chief Executive Officer Incentive Plans”, p. 539 
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explanation for this instance is that managers want to get compensated for the additional 
amount of personal welfare they put at risk in accepting highly equity based compensation.  
Most studies addressing pay-for-performance sensitivity found that compensation in small 
firms tends to be far more sensitive to performance than in large firms62. Authors argue that 
pay-for-performance sensitivity tends to be lower in large firms due to the fact that they 
usually have a low volatility and small growth opportunities63. This suggests that in cases 
where management is easier to monitor, the need for expensive incentive contracts is 
lower64. Small, highly volatile firms with high growth opportunities on the other hand, tend 
to use more incentive generating compensation since it is difficult to monitor manager’s 
actions sufficiently65. 
Those highly performance sensitive CEO compensation plans  are more expensive, because 
"[...] these contracts typically incorporate risk premiums to compensate for [the] risk 
shifting"66. Part of this premium could for example be a higher base salary67. 
In recent years, after the various crises, media as well as the public and politics started to 
pay close attention to top management compensation. In many cases, contemporary 
compensation plans were perceived as unfair and not justifiable with respect to delivered 
performance. As a prominent example just remember when Stephen Hester, CEO of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), bowed to the political pressure in January 2012 and "[...] 
decided he would not accept the 3.6m shares that the bank's board had decided to award 
him [...]"68. Some protagonists in the recent public uproar claimed that flaw compensation 
schemes were limited to a few companies, or that they are outcomes of unintended 
mistakes made by the board, and henceforth should be corrected fast.  
                                                      
62
 cf. e.g Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”; Hartzell, Starks, 2003, 
“Institutional Investors and Executive Comepensation”; 
63
 cf. Hartzell, Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive Comepensation” 
64
 cf. Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation" 
65
 cf. Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value" 
66
 cf. Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, Carpenter, 2010, "Agency theory revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder interest 
alignment", p.1035 
67
 cf. Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation", p.84 
68
 http:\\www.guardian.co.uk\business\2012\jann\29\rbs-stephen-hester-waives-bonus (last access on Jan. 
31st, 2012) 
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Previews empirical evidence rather supports public perceptions than rejecting them, finding 
that "[...] 'bad apples' [...] have been widespread, persistent, and systematic [...]"69, and 
furthermore identifying "[...] structural defects in the underlying governance structures that 
enable executives to exert considerable influence over their boards"70. Those defects in turn 
enable managers to influence their compensation significantly. 
Some investors may feel that a firm’s direct expenditures in managements’ compensation 
are negligible small and economically not significant (left alone the costs incurred through 
providing flaw incentives). Empirical results, however, revealed that the aggregate 
compensation paid to top-five executives in the US economy between 1993 and 2003 was 
about $350 billion. Presented as a percentage of total earnings (net income) the economic 
relevance of executive compensation becomes even more evident. From 1993 to 2003, 
overall compensation of the top-five executives equaled roughly 7 percent of the aggregate 
earnings. Since the magnitude was smaller in the first years of this period (around 5% from 
1993 to 1997, and over 8% from 1999 till 2003), the findings suggest a “[…] growing 
economic significance of executive pay”71. 
Although executive compensation is apparently expensive, pay-for-performance sensitivity is 
pretty low according to some researchers. A study by Jensen and Murphy in 199072 analyzing 
the relationship between change in shareholder wealth and CEO wealth, revealed that CEO’s 
cash compensation changed only about 3 cents per $ 1000 change in shareholder wealth 
(including stock options CEO’s wealth change was equal to about 30 cents). According to 
them, this weak relationship is primary an outcome of compensation constraints imposed by 
politics and the public73. These constraints prevent firms from paying their managers a 
sufficient amount in order to reduce the agency problem. In a recent article Dillon74, 
confirming that view, argued that the increased public scrutiny of recent years potentially 
cause firms problems in finding new talent for vacant management jobs, which in turn would 
                                                      
69
 cf. Bebchuk, Fried, 2006, "Pay without Performance: An overview over the Issues", p.6 
70
 cf. Bebchuk, Fried, 2006, "Pay without Performance: An overview over the Issues", p.6 
71
 cf. Bebchuk, Grinstein, 2005, “The Growth of Executive Pay”,p.295; which is also consistent with the findings 
of Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation" 
72
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives” 
73
 In their 2008 paper, "Information asymmetry, contract design and process of negotionan: The stock options 
awarding case", Bruslerie and Deffains-Crapsky also argued in favor of this argumentation by defining a model 
in which any interference by politics or society in the option granting process will "[...] induce a social cost of 
mis-optimization [p.90]". 
74
 cf. Dillon, 2009, "The coming battle over executive pay" 
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have a negative impact on firm performance in the long run. In fact, she argues that firms 
feel that "[...] the challenge of setting executive pay sufficient to attract, motivate, and 
retain top talent just got harder [...]"75. Hence, it would be necessary to ensure that top 
managers earn at least the same as they would get anywhere else76. Such practices however, 
could lead to inefficient arrangements, because committees could seek to reward similar as 
peer groups rather than connecting the compensation sufficiently to performance. 
This is why others77 argue that the composition and implementation of management 
compensation is to blame for the apparently weak connection between performance and 
executive pay. They identify potential problems within the components, which are briefly 
discussed in the following: 
Base salary: Although the base salary could, theoretically, be awarded in a performance 
contingent way too (by cutting and raising it depending on performance), "empirical 
evidence suggests [...] that U.S. firms do not use salary mechanisms effectively"78. This is 
why the base salary is typically the fixed income a manager gets within one year, 
independent of his performance. Due to this independence, the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity will be lower in firms where base salary accounts for a high portion of total 
compensation. Most managers, however, will require a certain amount of base salary in 
order to compensate the risk they are taking in accepting a high portion of their annual pay 
to be conditional on performance. 
Due to the fact that base salary is decreasing sensitivity, it would be useful to run an 
additional regression without it, in order to test whether or not the other components of 
compensation are sufficiently connected to performance and how big the negative impact of 
base salary on performance sensitivity is.  
Bonus: This is the part of the compensation that should be directly conditional on 
performance. Part of it is usually dependent on stock market performance, part on 
accounting numbers and yet another part depends on subjective factors such as employee 
satisfaction. The problem is, that “although bonuses represent 50 percent of CEO salary, 
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such bonuses are awarded in ways that are not highly sensitive to performance as measured 
by changes in market value of equity, accounting earnings, or sales”79. Henceforth, those 
bonuses could either be conditional on unobservable, yet important, performance 
measures, or they are based on insufficient measures benefitting the manager rather than 
the shareholders. The oftentimes weak connection between desired behavior and reward 
system has already been addressed in the 70s80. If, for example, managers receive bonuses 
conditional on the value of M&As, they will engage in such activities no matter if they create 
economically meaningful (and therefore for shareholders beneficial) growth or not. The 
same applies for bonus systems which reward only short-term performance. Although the 
principals may hope for long-term profitability, these systems make it “[…] personally 
rational for officials to sacrifice long term growth […] (by selling off equipment and property, 
or by stifling research and development) […]”81. 
Another potential problem of bonuses is that they are often based on year-to-year 
performance and thereby "[...] do not seem to be designed to reward managers for their 
own performance"82. As long as managers' compensation is not based on relative 
performance measures, it is possible that they get rewarded for market or industry 
movements that were not caused by their personal performance. This is why I want to run 
my regressions using relative performance as well.  
Options: Firms regularly grant options to their executives which they can execute after their 
expiration. The use of options was particularly popular in young, fast growing firms in the 
1990s since, unlike bonus payments, they did not need to be expensed in the income 
statement before they had been exercised, which made them less of a burden to liquidity83. 
Although this changed in June 2005, when the FAS 123(R) of the US GAAP became effective 
and required firms to expense options at the intrinsic value or with a fair value approach, 
options are still a frequently used component of executive compensation. 
The problem is that, if a large portion of manager's wealth is based on options, he could 
have an incentive to engage in riskier projects than the shareholders would prefer, since the 
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 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”, p.262 
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manager would not have to bear any downside risk84. In the worst case, he will not execute 
the option, but in the best case an extremely risky project could provide the agent with a 
very valuable option. 
Another potential problem is, that conventional options can get "in the money" through 
market or industry movements, henceforth having nothing to do with the agent's 
performance. This will provide managers with an incentive to exercise during short-term 
spikes or to postpone earnings to a point in time where they can benefit the most. In the 
worst case, firms would unwillingly "[...] provide perverse incentives to manipulate 
earnings"85. One way to mitigate these potential problems would be the use of indexed 
options (which are tied to an underlying index to avoid rewarding market movements), or 
premium-priced options (options where the exercise price is higher than the stock price at 
the grant date)86. 
Stock grants: Stock grants have similar potential problems as options. They too, permit gains 
from market or industry movements, but unlike options they expose managers to the 
downside risk as well. On the other hand, increased ownership could provide incentives to 
act in shareholders’ best interest (as presented above). 
Pension plans: These are the payments managers receive during their retirement. Since they 
are oftentimes not reported as salient as other compensation components, they usually 
receive less attention. In most cases they are not even appropriately included in common 
research databases. Since these payments are usually not conditional on performance, 
studies which do not capture this component usually observe a higher pay-for-performance 
sensitivity than actually present. 
Deferred compensation: Firms sometimes choose to postpone compensation payments to a 
later point in time, in order to gain tax advantages for the mangers or the company. The 
incentive effect of those payments is almost unknown, since "[...] information provided 
about deferred compensation arrangements does not allow the most diligent outsider to 
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estimate with any precision the value conferred on executives through these 
arrangements"87 
Severance agreements, golden parachutes etc.: As mentioned in section 2.2.1.2 those 
arrangements potentially weaken the threat of dismissal as an instrument to limit managers 
behavior. Additionally, those payments could have a negative effect on the incentive effect 
of performance sensitive compensation plans. In other words, "while firms spend large 
amounts on producing a payoff gap between performing well and performing poorly, the 
money spent on soft-landing arrangements works in the opposite direction, narrowing the 
payoff gap between good and poor performance"88. 
Summed up, criticism is not about the functionality of performance sensitive pay, but rather 
focuses on its implementation. To test the implications of the various components of 
executive pay, I want to run separate regressions in which I will omit certain components in 
order to observe how correlation coefficients are changing. 
Links to other sections 
This section is strongly related to the sections 2.2.3.1 (presented next) and 2.2.3.2 since the 
board of directors and institutional investors are usually the stakeholders capable of pushing 
through highly performance sensitive compensation schemes. 
As mentioned above, the capability (and the willingness) of directors and institutional 
investors to impose highly performance sensitive plans on the management is probably 
decreasing with managerial ownership (entrenchment). For this reason, and because 
managers often build up stakes through receiving stock grants and executing options, 
incentive compensation is also heavily interrelated with managerial ownership (presented in 
section 2.2.2.1). 
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Hypothesis 
Hypothesis3A: Independent of its measurement, managerial compensation is positively 
related to performance. 
Hypothesis3B: High (low) performance will lead to a high (low) level of compensation 
 
2.2.3 Influential players  
But who is better equipped to monitor a manager or to introduce a sophisticated 
compensation plan? An inside director or an outside director? How about an institutional 
investor? There is extensive literature available addressing this issue. In the following, this 
section will provide the reader with an overview of the different theories. 
2.2.3.1 Board of directors 
To have a board of directors in place is mandatory for every publicly traded corporation. The 
purpose of the board is, among other things, to monitor the management (section 2.2.1.1), 
to approve major decisions, to decide about management compensation plans (section 
2.2.2.2), or even to force a manager's resignation (section 2.2.1.2). In essence, it serves to 
reduce agency cost. Without it, shareholders' wealth would be far more exposed to 
management's free disposal. The question is how the board should look like, especially with 
respect to the number of seats and the number of outside directors in place. 
The argument behind a large board is, that there are more specialists in the board, which, in 
the aggregate, are more likely to act in shareholders' best interest. Following this argument, 
a high number of board members should have a positive effect on firm performance and a 
negative one on the level of compensation89. On the opposite, the coordination efforts 
within a large board will certainly be higher than in a board with a low number of directors. 
The cost of this coordination may even offset the benefits of a large board. Additionally, 
directors do not serve on the board for free, which makes a large board even more 
expensive. These costs are the reasons why some researchers90 argue that the higher 
effectiveness of a small board could serve as an indicator of high firm performance. They 
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argue that "[...] even if boards’ capacities for monitoring increase with board size, the 
benefits are outweighed by such costs as slower decision-making, less-candid discussions of 
managerial performance, and biases against risk-taking"91. Concerning compensation, their 
findings suggest that pay-for-performance sensitivity is lower92 and "[...] CEO compensation 
is higher when the board is large […]"93, even after controlling for size, industry and 
performance effects. 
Concerning the origin of directors, one could argue that internal directors are more 
beneficial to a firm, since they can better evaluate the decision making quality of the CEO 
and his performance (which in turn should have effects on the structure of compensation 
plans). Even if an insider could have more insight on how well a CEO performs, he is probably 
also more prone to benefit a colleague (i.e. the CEO or another member of the top 
management team), rather than the owners of the corporation. Even if they do not 
intentionally benefit the management team, there is an increased likelihood that they get 
manipulated by it. In the end, since the management is oftentimes involved in electing 
prospective directors, they may feel obliged to dance with the one that brought them. A 
particularly critical task of the board of directors is setting up a compensation committee 
that decides about the firm's compensation schemes. Since inside directors benefit from 
these arrangements themselves, their decisions about compensation may seriously depart 
from stockholders' best interest94.  
For these reasons, some authors95, along with large and influential entities such as the SEC 
or institutional shareholders like the California Public Employee's Retirement System 
(CalPERS)96, believe that a firm is better off with a high portion of outside directors on the 
board. This should have a positive effect on performance (either through stringent 
monitoring or the implementation of more sensitive compensation contracts). The prevailing 
belief that an independent board is beneficial to shareholders and society, is also reflected in 
                                                      
91
 cf. Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors”, p.186 
92
 cf. Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
93
 cf. Bebchuk, Fried, 2006, "Pay without Performance: An overview over the Issues", p.13 
94
 cf. Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value" 
95
 cf. e.g. Chiang, Lin, 2011, "Examining Board Composition and Firm Performance"; Weisbach, 1988, "Outside 
directors and CEO Turnover"; Bebchuck, Fried, 2006, “Pay without Performance: An overview of the issues”, 
Gupta, Fields, 2009, "Board independence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Director Resignations" 
96
 cf. Gupta, Fields, 2009, "Board independence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Director 
Resignations" 
  
32 
 
the listing requirements of the NYSE and the NASDAQ which place high emphasize on a 
substantial number of outside directors. 
The positive effect of an independent board is however not uniformly approved. In an 
empirical study in 2008 Bhagat and Bolten97, although examining a positive correlation 
between board independence and CEO turnover, did not find a significant positive 
relationship between a high number of outside directors and firm performance. In 1996 
Yermack98 did not find such a relationship either. 
Even if there is a positive relationship between outside directors and performance it would 
be premature to draw the conclusion, that a board comprising only of outsiders would be 
the best solution. Such a board will lack essential knowledge about the firm, which could 
provide managers with a better opportunity to sneak out wealth, with the board not even 
recognizing it. Moreover, in the case of a resignation (no matter if forced or not) the board 
of directors has to decide about a successor. In these situations insiders may be better 
equipped than outsiders to evaluate candidates99, due to their superior knowledge of the 
firm and its needs. 
In essence, there is probably an optimal mix of insiders and outsiders, depending on the 
firm. Firm characteristics, such as size, ownership structure, industry, etc. may determine the 
optimal composition of the board.  
As mentioned above, the effectiveness of the board of directors is not uniformly approved, 
since the directors are "[...] themselves agents, whose interests are not necessarily aligned 
with the shareholders'"100. Those who do not agree with the effectiveness of the board to 
safeguard shareholders' interests101 argue that the board does not interact with 
management at “arm’s length”102. Even concerning outside directors, researchers do not 
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unambiguously agree about their positive effect on firm performance103. Two factors that 
could nonetheless force outside members of the board towards acting in shareholders’ best 
interest are104 
1. their personal liability - especially outside directors have to meet certain obligations 
2. reputation - during the election process, shareholders will not vote for directors with 
a reputation of acting more in the managements interest. "On the other hand, [since 
they get nominated by the management] directors could seek to establish a 
reputation of not rocking-the-boat, which might make them more attractive to other 
firms [...]"105. 
This argumentation sounds all but convincing, and unfortunately so does part of the 
empirical evidence. The researchers106 that did not find a significant correlation between the 
composition of the board and performance, attribute the lack of evidence to "[...] top 
management's control of the board-selection process"107. 
According to part of the literature108 the influence (and especially the independence – 
measured by the number of outside directors) of the board is declining with managerial 
ownership (section 2.2.2.1). Concerning the inclusion of outside directors this observation 
could be due to the agent’s entrenchment, since he will probably not nominate directors 
that potentially cause him problems109. Another explanation could be that, if managers hold 
a substantial share in the firm their interests get aligned with shareholders’ through 
managerial ownership, making the hiring of a high number outside directors unnecessary. 
This relationship between managerial ownership and the independence of the board is 
important to recognize, since, if one examines a positive relationship between outside 
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directors and performance without controlling for managerial ownership, the observed 
correlation could be spurious due to the hypothesized effect of managerial ownership on 
outside directors (high  managerial ownership substitutes for an independent board). 
Therefore, it would be useful to examine the relationship for different levels of managerial 
ownership. 
It is worth noting that the situation described above can also arise from factors other than 
high managerial ownership. "Social and psychological factors - collegiality, team spirit, a 
natural desire to avoid conflict within the board, friendship and loyalty, and cognitive 
dissonance110 - exert additional pressure [...]"111 on directors, possibly pushing them towards 
benefitting management rather than shareholders. Moreover, CEOs still have considerable 
influence on directors' welfare (either pecuniary or in the form of granted perquisites). 
Board members' natural interest in their own welfare, may in turn lead to situations in which 
inefficient investments or compensation arrangements are approved that are not optimal to 
the shareholders is actually beneficial to directors. 
Another reason why directors possibly do not always act in shareholders' best interest, 
which was briefly mentioned above, is that they want to get reelected. To get on the list of 
candidates often requires intervention of the incumbent management. Having a reputation 
of being a petty-minded pedant who frequently resists inefficient compensation 
arrangements could substantially decrease the likelihood of getting nominated for the board 
of another company. 
This is why, although I do expect to find a significant positive correlation between the board 
variables and the performance / compensation variables, I do not expect the coefficient to 
be high. 
Furthermore, the relationship should have changed after 2005 since, “after the wave of 
accounting frauds and corporate governance scandals that occurred in several countries 
between 2000 and 2005 (e.g., Enron in the United States, Parmalat in Italy, and Royal Ahold 
in the Netherlands), legislators placed great emphasis on the need for independence within 
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boards of directors and, especially, within the remuneration committees”112. Along with 
some authors, arguing that “recent reforms, […] may weaken some of these factors [reasons 
why the boards’ interest could deviate from shareholders’ interest] but will not eliminate 
them”113, I would expect to find substantial differences in the correlation coefficients before 
and after 2005. 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis4A: The number of directors on the board is negatively correlated with 
performance. 
Hypothesis4B: Board size is negatively related to the level of compensation 
Hypothesis5A: The number of outside directors is positively related to performance. 
Hypothesis5B: Board independence has a negative impact on the level of compensation. 
 
2.2.3.2 Institutional investors 
The presence of large (institutional) shareholders could also be efficient in reducing the 
agency problem, due to their power in shareholder meetings. Since these firms invest huge 
sums in the firm, it is in their best interest to ensure that management is working towards 
improving stock returns, and unlike the average small investor, they have the means and the 
incentive to voice their concerns and apply pressure on management in a more direct and 
effective manner. This thought is especially consistent with early research114, stating that 
“one of the groups who seem to play large role in these activities [monitoring] is composed 
of the security analysts employed by institutional investors, brokers and investment advisory 
services […]”115. 
Basically, institutional investors (similarly to the board of directors) can basically use three 
different instruments to reduce agency cost. They can (i) monitor the agent's behavior with 
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high scrutiny and thereby expose him to a certain (ii) threat of dismissal (cf. sections 2.2.1.1 
and 2.2.1.2), or they use their voting power to establish (iii) highly performance sensitive 
compensation plans.  
In case they engage in issuing contracts designed to provide managers with incentives to act 
in the shareholders’ best interest, pay-for-performance sensitivity is supposed to be higher 
and the level of compensation should be lower, which is empirically supported by part of the 
literature116. This effect, however, seems to be stronger in companies with low managerial 
ownership117, henceforth supporting the entrenchment theory (presented previously). In 
firms with high managerial ownership (i.e. substantial entrenchment of management), 
executives could use their voting power to resist attempts to establish compensation 
schemes that put a higher fraction of their wealth at risk. 
Although there is a little controversy about the question whether or not institutional 
ownership (and especially the concentration of this ownership) has a positive effect on 
performance118, the primary discussion is about which channels they use to achieve this 
enhancement. The question is whether they improve performance implicitly (clientele effect 
- described next) or explicitly (e.g. by enforcing new compensation plans). 
Some argue that institutional investors actively choose firms with low agency cost. Under 
this clientele effect, institutional investors would not actually cause agency cost to decrease, 
but rather just favorably invest in firms with sophisticated measures in place to retain a low 
level of interest divergence (meaning instruments such as monitoring, highly performance 
sensitive compensation plans for top executives, etc.). Concerning compensation 
arrangements, the proponents of this view found that institutional investors, although 
favoring companies with high pay-for-performance sensitivity, are quite indifferent to the 
level of top management compensation119. 
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Others argue that institutional investors are outstandingly well equipped to monitor 
management or to establish incentive compensation plans. Researchers following that 
argumentation, think that “[…] institutional investor monitoring, on average, tends to be 
used in concert with incentive compensation in mitigating the agency problems between 
shareholders and managers”120. 
Although there are some indications that institutional investors actively choose companies 
that provide the desired instruments to reduce agency cost (including appropriate 
compensation plans121), others did not observe this behavior. Rather they argue that theory 
about the clientele effect suggests that institutional ownership will increase with higher 
levels of managerial ownership (section 2.2.2.1), because the agency cost will be lower in 
such firms. Their empirical results however, revealing that institutional shareholdings are 
declining with managerial ownership122, contradict this notion. 
In testing the implications of institutional ownership on firm performance, researchers are 
well advised to focus not only on the presence of institutional shareholders but on 
concentration as well. 
Consider a firm with 40% institutional ownership. At the first glance, one could argue that 
the management of this firm is most likely monitored intensively or that it probably 
established highly performance sensitive compensation plans. However, if no single 
institutional shareholder holds a substantial stake in the firm, they will not engage as fiercely 
in actions to limit manager's non-value maximizing behavior. This argumentation is 
supported by a major paper of Shleifer and Vishny, as their "[...] analysis indicates  that large 
[institutional] shareholders raise expected profits and the more so the greater their 
percentage of ownership”123. They argue that, since he would have to share the benefits of 
disciplining the management with the remaining shareholders, an investor will only engage 
in doing so, if and only if the benefits accumulated in his own shares will outweigh the costs 
of disciplining the agents. Hence, the large shareholder's incentive to discipline the agents 
increases with his stake, because with his ownership position the fraction of the benefits 
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attributable to him will increase too. Therefore, it is crucial to focus on the concentration of 
institutional shareholders too, rather than just on the overall stake they own. 
Basically, literature suggests three different variables to measure the effects of institutional 
ownership: 
1. the proportion of total shares that is held by institutional shareholders124 - to capture 
the effects of the presence of institutional investors 
2. top-five institutional shareholders as a percentage of total institutional 
shareholdings125 - to capture the concentration of institutional investors 
3. the proportion of total shares that is held by top-five institutional shareholdings126 - 
to capture the concentration of institutional investors 
Yet another concern is about how institutional shareholders have an impact on performance 
(e.g. on stock return). Some argue that their efforts are “…reflected in the higher capitalized 
value of the ownership claims to corporations and not in the period to period portfolio 
returns”127. If this is the case there should be no significant relationship between 
institutional ownership and stock return. If performance is measured with Tobin's q, 
however, there should be an observable relationship, since q increases with the market 
value of the firm. 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis6A: High concentration of institutional shareholders is positively related to 
performance. The presence is also positively related, but less in magnitude. 
Hypothesis6B: Presence, and even more so concentration, of institutional investors has a 
negative relationship to  the level of compensation. 
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3 Methodology 
  
This section starts by explaining why I chose to analyze the performance / compensation 
relationship for the CEO only. Afterwards it provides a summary of the used variables, 
followed by the regression equations and a summary of the expected correlation 
coefficients. Details about the used data will be presented in the next section. 
3.1 Why to focus solely on the CEO 
 In search of solutions to the problems stemming from the separation of ownership and 
control, researchers oftentimes examined the relationship between top management 
compensation and various performance indicators, while controlling for numerous other 
variables. I am especially interested in the relationship between the chief executive officer 
and the shareholders of a firm, which is why the variables used in the analysis will only 
capture compensation and ownership data from the CEO. Nevertheless, the results should 
provide a sufficient indication for the rest of the top management team too, since a 
preceding study found that "[...] managerial ownership of the top-five executives increases 
monotonically with CEO ownership, suggesting that CEO ownership also can be a proxy for 
managerial ownership"128. 
Due to the previous observation that “[…] pay-for-performance sensitivity is stronger for the 
CEO than for the other top managers of the firm”129 and the "[...] fact that the CEO in a firm 
usually receives the largest compensation incentives among the top executives"130, I hope to 
get more meaningful results by focusing solely on the chief executive officer. 
I identified the CEO of a company with a binomial variable provided by ExecuComp. For 
those firms for which this variable was not provided I assumed the CEO to be the highest 
ranked executive in terms of base salary and bonus. Years in which the CEO changed have 
been excluded from the sample to avoid bias. 
                                                      
128
 cf. Janakiraman, Radhakrshnan, Tsang, 2010, “Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership, and Executive 
Compensation”, p.680 
129
 cf. Hartzell, Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive Comepensation”, p.2365 
130
 cf. Zheng, 2010, "Heterogenous institutional investors and CEO compensation" 
  
40 
 
3.2 Performance measures 
Previous researchers employed a hardly manageable variety of measures to capture firm 
performance. They did so, because the various variables come with certain advantages and 
disadvantages. In the following, this paper describes the performance indicators I decided to 
employ in order to balance the advantages and disadvantages. 
3.2.1 Stock return 
The first performance indicator that typically comes into one's mind is the stock return. In 
fact, some authors131 used it in their analysis, revealing that "the contemporaneous stock 
return has a significant impact on executive compensation"132. The major advantage of the 
stock return is that "[...] it is the fundamental scorecard for CEOs of public companies. And 
it's the same scorecard for everyone"133. Moreover, especially young firms with low cash 
reserves oftentimes implement market-based compensation schemes in order to avoid 
liquidity problems134. 
Although stock return is the measure investors are usually most concerned about, which 
would make it the logical choice in selecting a performance measure, it has the major 
drawback that it is “[…] susceptible to investor anticipation. If investors anticipate the 
corporate governance effect on performance, […] stock returns will not be significantly 
correlated with governance even if a significant correlation between performance and 
governance indeed exists”135. Since accounting measures do not share this disadvantage, 
they are also frequently used to describe the performance / compensation relationship. 
3.2.2 ROA 
One of the accounting measures that is typically used in corporate governance related 
research is the Return on Assets (ROA)136. In analyzing the relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance it seems reasonable to employ an accounting measure 
as well, since previous studies found “[…] support for the view that boards of directors look 
                                                      
131
 cf. e.g. Balsam, Fernando, Tripathy, 2011, "The impact of firm strategy on performance measures used in 
executive compensation"; Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation" 
132
 cf. Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation", p.106 
133
 cf. Hansen, Ibarra, Peyer, 2010, "The Best-Performing CEOs in the World", p.107 
134
 cf. Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value" 
135
 cf. Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance", p.264 
136
 cf. e.g. Balsam, Fernando, Tripathy, 2011, "The impact of firm strategy on performance measures used in 
executive compensation"; Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance", Gupta, Fields, 
2009, "Board independence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Director Resignations" 
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at accounting numbers when evaluating a CEO’s performance, possibly even more than at 
stock returns”137. Moreover it seems that "high accounting returns lead companies to 
emphasize accounting performance [...], and downplay market returns."138. Another 
explanation for the emphasis of accounting performance could be that market-based 
indicators are too noisy139. 
To use solely accounting numbers could also be insufficient due to two major disadvantages. 
First, the performance evaluation is only possible ex-post since they do not reflect effects of 
future cash flows (whereas e.g. stock return reflects future pay offs of recent investments 
too), and, second, they can get manipulated easier than market-based performance 
measures140. For these reasons, I will run separate regressions using either stock market or 
accounting performance. 
3.2.3 Tobin’s q 
Tobin’s Q represents a mixture of accounting and stock market measures and has been 
frequently used by numerous researchers to proxy for corporate performance141. One of its 
major advantages is that, unlike stock returns, it reflects capitalized effects as well. If, for 
example, market participants anticipate the positive effect of, let's say, an independent 
board, stock return would not yield a significant relationship. Tobin's q, however, uses 
market and book values in concert, making it possible to capture these capitalized effects. 
Formally it is the ratio of the market value of a firm divided by its replacement or 
reproduction cost.  
 =
	
			ℎ		
		
 
Nevertheless researchers defined the exact inputs differently, especially with respect to the 
value of debt (as part of the market value) and the replacement cost of the firm. Since the 
                                                      
137
 cf. Weisbach, 1988, "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover", p. 447,448 
138
 cf. Wade, Porac, Pollock, 1997, "Worth, words, and the justification of executive pay", p. 641 
139
 cf. Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value" 
140
 cf. Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value" 
141
 cf. Hartzell, Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive Comepensation”; Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, 
"Corporate governance and firm performance"; cf. Hermalin, Weisbach, 1991, "The Effects of Board 
Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance"; Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of 
companies with a small board of directors”; Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and 
market valuation” 
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different definitions are closely related142, I decided to stick with the uncomplicated 
definition of Hartzell and Starks in 2003143:  
 =
	
			 + 
			

				
 
Where the book value of debt is defined as the difference between the book value of total 
assets and the book value of equity. Applying this definition on the formula presented above 
results in the following equation: 
 =
		 + 			 − 		
			
 
 
3.2.4 Timing 
Since part of a manager’s compensation is supposed to be dependent on his long term 
performance, it would be useful to include the performance measure of the preceding year 
in the regression equation, too144. 
3.2.5 Relative performance 
As criticized in section 2.2.2.2 (incentive compensation), firms may base CEO compensation 
on absolute measures, such as stock return, instead of using relative performance measures 
to evaluate a CEO’s personal performance. In doing so, they would reward performance that 
the CEO did not actually cause. To answer the question if CEO compensation is sufficiently 
connected to performance, and therefore socially more acceptable, it seems appropriate to 
test for relative performance as well. 
Moreover, using relative performance should be a sufficient approach to avoid data bias due 
to periods of overvaluation as have happened in the late 1990s or the early 2000s145. 
                                                      
142
 cf. Chung, Pruitt, 1994, “A simple approximation of Tobin’s q” 
143
 cf. Hartzell, Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive Comepensation”, p. 2357 (footnote no. 8); 
Bhagat and Bolton used a similar definition in their 2008 paper "Corporate governance and firm performance". 
The only difference is that they additionally subtracted deferred taxes in the numerator. Since this position is 
typically quite small, I got similar values for q when I calculated it for the period they used. 
144
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives” 
145
 cf. Dossi, Patelli, Zoni, 2010, “The Missing Link between Corporate Performance Measurement Systems and 
Chief Executive Officer Incentive Plans” 
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In case of the stock return I am going to capture relative performance via calculating the 
industry return and subtracting it from the individual firm’s stock return. For the ROA and 
Tobin’s q I subtracted the mean of the industry (using the 2 digit SIC code) in order to 
construct a relative performance measure146. 
3.3 Compensation variables 
In management compensation related research, the variable that is frequently used to 
measure management compensation is called total direct compensation (TDC). Although 
ExecuComp offers total direct compensation as a ready-to-use variable, I decided to 
calculate TDC separately. I did so because this approach enables me to analyze the impact of 
different components of TDC separately. It would be interesting to see, for example, how the 
correlation coefficient of CEO compensation changes if the probably non-performance 
related base salary is omitted in the calculation of TDC. 
In this work, as well as in the ExecuComp database, TDC is defined as the sum of base salary, 
bonus, stock grants, option grants147, long term incentive payments, other compensation-
like value received by the CEO (severance payments, debt forgiveness, etc.), and additional 
perks. However, during the years of the sample (1993-2009) the requirements concerning 
compensation-related information in the proxy statement changed, and with it, the 
calculation of TDC. In particular, when US GAAP’s FAS 123(R) became effective in June 2005, 
firms were required to expense the value of granted compensation-like options using the 
intrinsic value or a fair value approach. For this reason it seemed necessary to analyze the 
data in two subsets, prior and after 2005. 
Although the concept of CEO return seemed a rewarding alternative strategy when I 
reviewed the literature, it turned out as impossible to be employed in my analysis. To 
construct this measure sufficiently, one needs data on insider trading, which was not 
included in the databases I had access to. For this reason, I have to leave the empirical 
testing to further research. 
                                                      
146
 Analogous to Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance”; Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 
2003, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices”; Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009, “What matters in corporate 
governance?” 
147
 Following the majority of the reviewed literature, I used the aggregated Black-Scholes value of all options 
granted in the given fiscal year, which is provided by the ExecuComp database. In fact, not a single paper used 
a different method for time prior to 2005. 
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3.4 Control variables 
As already explained in the literature review there is a wide variety of additional factors that 
could have an impact on the performance / compensation relationship. This work considers 
a selective set of the control variables that have been suggested by previous research, which 
are briefly summarized in the following. Control variables that have been suggested by the 
literature but have not been considered in this work, mostly because they were not available 
in the datasets I had access to, are outlined in section 7 (Limitations and Extensions). 
3.4.1 Managerial ownership 
One part of the literature suggests that the divergence of interests will be the lower, the 
higher the managerial ownership is, thereby proclaiming a linear positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and performance (convergence-of-interest hypothesis)148.  
Another part on the opposite, suggests that although the interests should converge with 
increasing ownership, a manager's power also rises with his stake149. The more powerful a 
manager gets, the higher the possibility that he substantially departs from value-maximizing 
behavior or that he influences corporate governance in a self-serving way. This 
"entrenchment" effect will then superimpose the convergence-of-interest effect, resulting in 
a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and performance. Managerial 
power can arise from different sources (status as a founder, personality, etc.), the most 
direct way, however, is to increase the voting rights under manager's control. Although this 
increase can be achieved via different ways150, it is complicated to create sufficient variables, 
other than managerial ownership, to be employed in a regression analysis. 
For this reason, and because it is the way that is best quantifiable, I decided to proxy for 
managerial power (and interest alignment) by employing a variable that computes a 
manager’s ownership position as the percentage of total outstanding shares. This seems 
                                                      
148
 cf. e.g. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”; Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 
1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value; Damodaran, John, Liu, 2005, "What motivates 
managers? Evidence from organizational form changes" 
149
 cf. e.g. Stulz, 1988, "Managerial Control of voting rights"; Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management 
ownership and market valuation”; Janakiraman, Radhakrshnan, Tsang, 2010, “Institutional Investors, 
Managerial Ownership, and Executive Compensation” 
150
 cf. Stulz, 1988, "Managerial Control of voting rights" 
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especially appropriate since, according to Jensen and Murphy in 1990, it is the only 
computation that “really matters”151 in estimating the impact of CEO’s ownership. 
Concerning the measurement of the different levels of managerial ownership I decided to 
stick with the method first introduced by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny152, which computes the 
magnitude of managerial ownership as follows153: 
Managerial ownership (0% - L1) = ownership
154 … if ownership <L1 
 = L1 … if ownership ≥ L1 
Managerial ownership (L1 - L2)  = 0  … if ownership < L1 
 = ownership - L1 … if L1≤ ownership <L2 
 = L2 … if ownership ≥ L2 
Managerial ownership (L2 - 100%)  = 0  … if ownership < L2 
 = ownership - L2 … if ownership > L2 
L1 and L2 will be fixed at levels where the explanatory power of the model (as measured with 
R²) is the highest. 
In the performance perspective I expect to find the N-shaped relationship proposed, among 
others, by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny in 1988155. Concerning compensation, however, I 
expect to observe a linear relationship with CEO ownership, because there is no reason to 
believe that a CEO will decrease his compensation for any level of ownership. 
3.4.2 Number of directors in the board 
To test whether a large board with its highly specialized members can restrict managers’ 
actions in a more performance-effective manner, or a small and efficient one that does not 
spend many resources on forming an opposition, the number of directors was included in 
the regression function. 
                                                      
151
 cf. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “CEO incentives – It’s not how much you pay, but how”, p.7 
152
cf. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation” 
153
Janakiraman, Radhakrshnan, Tsang in their 2010 paper, “Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership, and 
Executive Compensation”, in contrast, used a binary variable for every interval (small, medium, and high 
managerial ownership), which was equal to one if the aggregated ownership of the top-five executives was 
between certain limits and zero otherwise. 
154
Again as percentage of total outstanding shares. 
155
 cf. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation” 
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Unfortunately it is hard for European students to obtain first-hand data about the board of 
U.S. corporations156, since, unlike many universities in the U.S., our libraries do not receive 
CD-ROMs of Compact Disclosure. Since I was not able to obtain access to an alternative 
source either (e.g. Corporate Library), I derived as much information as possible from the 
information given in the ExecuComp database. 
Concerning board size I did so through counting the board members that received meeting 
fees for a given company in a given year. Unfortunately, ExcuComp provides this data only 
starting from 2006, which is why I was not able to analyze the impact of board size in the 
preceding years. 
3.4.3 Board independence 
In order to test its impact on performance and compensation, previous research157 took the 
portion of outside directors on the board as a proxy for board independence. As with the 
other board-related data, I was not able to obtain the data from a primary source, but had to 
construct it. In case of board independence, I subtracted the number of managers that were 
identified as serving on the board in the ExcuComp database, from the total number of 
board members (identified as described above). Due to the fact that the number of outside 
directors henceforth depends on the total size of the board, it also covers only the years 
between 2006 and 2009. 
3.4.4 Concentration of institutional shareholdings 
As mentioned in section 2.2.3.2 of the literature review, there are three variables used to 
describe institutional ownership: 
1. the proportion of total shares that is held by institutional shareholders158 to capture 
the effects of their presence 
 
	 =
			ℎ		ℎ				
	 	ℎ	
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 At least not in a sufficient size; there is still to possibility to collect the data by hand from the proxy 
statements 
157
 cf. Chiang, Lin, 2011, "Examining Board Composition and Firm Performance"; Gupta, Fields, 2009, "Board 
independence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Director Resignations"; Yermack, 1996, “Higher 
market valuation of companies with a small board of directors”; 
158
 cf. Hartzell, Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation”; Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 
2003, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices” 
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2. top-five institutional shareholders as a percentage of total institutional 
shareholdings159 to capture the effects of their concentration 
 
5	 =
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			ℎ	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3. the proportion of total shares that is held by top-five institutional shareholdings160, as 
an alternative measure to proxy for their concentration 
 
5	 =
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The analysis of this paper will use the first one to proxy for the impact of the presence of 
institutional investors, together with either the second or the third measure to capture the 
effects of concentrated holdings. This approach should increase the power of the findings.  
3.4.5 Size 
It seems reasonable to control for firm size due to two reasons:  
1. CEOs of large firms get paid more161, meaning that compensation could also be a 
function of size 
2. it is possible that it is it easier to generate high returns if one starts from a low 
base162 
Researchers did typically control for size effects by using either sales163, assets164 or market 
capitalization165. Since this data is oftentimes skewed they frequently used a logarithmic 
function, which is why I chose to include log(assets) in my analysis. 
                                                      
159
 cf. Hartzell, Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation” 
160
 cf. Zheng, 2010, "Heterogenous institutional investors and CEO compensation" 
161
 cf. Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation" 
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 cf. Hansen, Ibarra, Peyer, 2010, "The Best-Performing CEOs in the World" 
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 cf. Bebchuk, Grinstein, 2005, “The Growth of Executive Pay” 
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 cf. Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009, “What matters in corporate governance?”; Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, 
"Corporate governance and firm performance”; Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 2003, “Corporate Governance and 
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3.4.6 Industry 
Due to the fact that compensation levels can not only be expected to increase with firm size, 
but also to vary across industries166, it is necessary to include an industry variable in the 
regression function too. Along with the majority of the reviewed literature, I used the 2-
digit167 Standard Industry Classification (SIC)-Code to control for the possibility that 
performance and compensation schemes vary substantially with respect to industry. Firms in 
low-growth industries for instance, will have a lower need for expensive performance-
contingent compensation schemes because, compared to executives in high-growth 
industries, their CEOs typically choose among a smaller and easier assessable set of finance 
opportunities and are therefore easier to monitor. 
In addition, controlling for the industry avoids bias due to different industry-specific 
performance levels. If performance is measured using Tobin’s Q for example, firms in the IT-
related industry typically have a high q due to their heavy reliance on intangible assets, 
whereas firms in the retail industry will have a lower value. 
Along with Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, and Carpenter in 2010168, I used STATA's "areg" 
function to control for industry effects. In an alternative specification, which I did not report 
in this work, I ran part of the regressions with the "xi" function as well, and got identical 
results concerning the point estimates of the employed variables169. The only term that was 
different from the "areg" results was the intercept. Since I was only interested in the point 
estimates of the employed corporate governance variables, I did not show the constant 
terms in my results. 
3.4.7 E-Index 
In their corporate charters and bylaws, firms can include provisions that limit shareholders’ 
power or decrease the takeover probability. Both types theoretically increase agency cost 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Equity Prices”; Gupta, Fields, 2009, "Board independence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Director 
Resignations"Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009, “What matters in corporate governance?” 
165
 cf. Zheng, 2010, "Heterogenous institutional investors and CEO compensation" 
166
 cf. Bebchuk, Grinstein, 2005, “The Growth of Executive Pay” 
167
 cf. e.g.  Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrel, 2009, “What matters in corporate governance?”; Wade, Porac, Pollock, 
1997, "Worth, words, and the justification of executive pay"; Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of 
companies with a small board of directors”; Zheng, 2010, "Heterogenous institutional investors and CEO 
compensation" 
168
 cf. Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, Carpenter, 2010, "Agency theory revisited: CEO Return and Shareholder 
interest alignment" 
169
 With exemption of the point estimates of the different 2-digit SIC codes, which I never intended to report. 
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and thereby decrease firm value. In a widely recognized paper in 2003, Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick170 created an index that equally weighted 24 provisions suggested by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which is a major consultant for institutional investors. 
They assigned a score to each firm in their sample, depending on the number of provisions in 
place. With these scores, they created a “democracy” and a “dictatorship” portfolio 
(democracy scored low, and dictatorship high respectively). The strategy of going long the 
democracy portfolio and shorting the dictatorship portfolio created significantly positive 
abnormal returns of more than 8% p.a., indicating that “[…] the long-run benefits of 
eliminating multiple provisions would be enormous”171. Moreover, firms with low scores had 
a higher firm value (as measured with Tobin’s q). 
However, in a paper published in 2009 by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell172 argued that from 
the 24 provisions suggested by the IRRC, only 6 are actually significantly negatively related to 
performance, and that the remaining 18 provisions are more or less noise. The six provisions 
they employed are (i) staggered boards, (ii) supermajorities to change corporate bylaws, (iii) 
supermajorities to change the corporate charter, (iv) supermajorities to approve mergers, (v) 
golden parachutes, and (vi) the adoption of poison pills. They found not only that high scores 
in the index are negatively related to firm value, but that they are monotonically negatively 
related.  
Thus, it can be expected that the index is negatively related to performance in this study too. 
Moreover, I would expect compensation levels to be higher in firms in which managers are 
better insulated from disciplining forces. Since U.S. firms’ scores between 1990 and 2006 can 
be downloaded from Prof. Bebchuk’s homepage173, I included this data as a control variable 
in part of the regressions. 
3.4.8 CEO age 
Previous research174 showed that principal agent conflicts aggravate if the agent approaches 
the age of retirement (i.e. the agency cost rises). Those managers have an incentive to 
sacrifice profitable long-term projects for the sake of short-term gains, because they will not 
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 cf. Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 2003, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices” 
171
 cf. Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 2003, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices”, p.145 
172
 cf. Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009, “What matters in corporate governance?” 
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 http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml (last access on July 2
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, 2012) 
174
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be able to receive the full benefits of a project that pays off after their retirement. 
Moreover, they do not need to be concerned about finding a new job later on and are 
therefore immune against the disciplining effect of job market reputation. 
So, in order to capture the potential negative effect of near-retirement-age on performance, 
I will include a dummy variable in the regression that is equal to one if the CEO is older than 
63175. 
Furthermore it is worth noting that these problems should be especially observable in the 
regressions using market-based performance measures, since accounting proxies are 
oriented backwards and henceforth will not reflect any inefficiencies in the future. 
3.4.9 Interlock 
Interlock is a binary variable concerning compensation, which is offered by the ExecuComp 
database. It indicates whether or not an officer is able to influence his own compensation. 
In particular, “ ’TRUE’ indicates that the named officer is involved in a relationship requiring 
disclosure in the ‘Compensation Committee Interlocks and Insider Participation’ section of 
the proxy. This generally involves one of the following situations: 
1. The officer serves on the board committee that makes his compensation decisions 
2. The officer serves on the board (and possibly compensation committee) of another 
company that has an executive officer serving on the compensation committee of the 
indicated officer's company 
3. The officer serves on the compensation committee of another company that has an 
executive officer serving on the board (and possibly compensation committee) of the 
indicated officer's company”176 
This disclosure requirement is yet another indication of the great importance the SEC assigns 
to the independence of the board. Due to the obvious connection to compensation, I 
included interlock in the regression equation. 
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 cf. Weisbach, 1988, "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover" 
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3.5 Regression Functions and Expected Correlations 
In the following the regression functions are presented. There are two versions to be 
employed in the analysis, one in that performance is the dependent variable, and one where 
the level of compensation is the dependent variable. Afterwards tables 2 and 3 summarize 
the expected relationships for the performance and the compensation perspective 
respectively.  
3.5.1 Performance perspective 
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3.5.2 Compensation perspective 
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3.5.3 Expected Correlations 
TABLE 2 & 3 
Expected empirical relationships 
 
Performance perspective  Compensation perspective 
     
 Performance 
measure 
  Level of 
compensationt 
Compensationt +  (rel.) stock returnt + 
Managerial ownership 
(0%-L1)t 
+  (rel.) stock returnt-1 + 
Managerial ownership 
(L1-L2)t 
-  (rel.) ROAt + 
Managerial ownership 
(L2- 100%)t 
+  (rel.) ROAt-1 + 
Board sizet -  (rel.) Tobin’s qt + 
Board independencet +  (rel.) Tobin’s qt-1 + 
Presence of inst. 
investorst 
+  Managerial ownershipt + 
Concentration of inst. 
holdingst 
+  Board sizet + 
CEO near retirementt -  Board independencet - 
E-indext -  Presence of inst. investorst - 
 
 
 Concentration of inst. 
holdingst 
- 
 E-indext + 
 Firm sizet + 
 Interlockt (TRUE) + 
Note: These tables show the expected prefix of the relationships between the dependent variable 
(performance, level of compensation) and the explaining measures. Concerning the performance perspective, 
the relationship will be tested for one year stock return, ROA, and Tobin's q, both with absolute and in relative 
computations.   
4 Data 
 
This section starts with explaining where the data was obtained from and which years are 
covered by the analysis. Afterwards, it provides the reader with some descriptive statistics, 
followed by the correlations between the employed variables. 
4.1 Sample description 
The data on performance and compensation was obtained from the ExecuComp database 
within Standard & Poors Compustat. Data concerning institutional shareholdings has been 
downloaded from the corresponding section within the Thomson Financial database 
(formerly CDA Spectrum). The combination of these sets yields a sample of 3,080 unique 
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firms traded on North American Stock Exchanges (NYSE, ASE, NASDAQ, etc.) between 1992 
and 2009. After deleting years in which the CEO changed177, observations that were lacking 
necessary data, and all data from 1992 (due to the low number of observations), the sample 
consisted of 23,167 firm year observations, with 3010 unique firms (as identified by the 
ticker symbol). Table 4 shows the number of observations per year. As it illustrates, the 
number of observations ranges from 976 in 2008 to 1624 in 1999.  This high number of 
observations should provide the analysis with sufficient explanatory power. 
TABLE 4 
Number of observations per year 
 
Fiscal Year Number of observations Percent Cum. 
1993 1,107 4.78 4.78 
1994 1,454 6.28 11.05 
1995 1,492 6.44 17.49 
1996 1,515 6.54 24.03 
1997 1,524 6.58 30.61 
1998 1,589 6.86 37.47 
1999 1,624 7.01 44.48 
2000 1,600 6.91 51.39 
2001 1,460 6.30 57.69 
2002 1,409 6.08 63.77 
2003 1,423 6.14 69.91 
2004 1,358 5.86 75.78 
2005 1,263 5.45 81.23 
2006 1,064 4.59 85.82 
2007 1,095 4.73 90.55 
2008 976 4.21 94.76 
2009 1,214 5.24 100.00 
Total 23,167 100.00  
Note: This table depicts the number of firm year observations per year between 1993 and 2009. Observations 
where the CEO changed, that were lacking necessary data and all observations of 1992 (due to the low number 
of observations) were deleted.   
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
As mentioned above, the SEC changed the requirements concerning the disclosure of 
compensation data in 2005, making the data less comparable over the whole range of years, 
which is why the data has been analyzed in two subsamples (1993 – 2005 and 2006 – 2009). 
On top of that, the financial crisis that started in 2007 potentially caused considerable 
distortions in the data, making a separate analysis of the two subsamples even worthier. 
                                                      
177
 cf. Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation” 
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Still, it seems rewarding to have look on the overall data first. To make the items that are 
denoted in $ comparable over the years, I included inflation adjusted178 positions too. 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics, 1993-2009 
 
TABLE 5 
Descriptive statistics of the whole sample 
 
 mean median min max Standard 
Deviation 
N 
Total direct compensation 
[in $1,000] 
4,647.28 2,151.80 0 655,448 10,674.38 23,167 
Total direct compensation 
(inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
5,390.18 2,577.49 0 830,815.4 12,736.11 23,167 
Salary [in $1,000] 650.65 593.96 0 8,100 373.29 23,167 
Salary (inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
763.16 700.65 0 8,100 418.96 23,167 
Bonus [in $1,000] 652.19 256.82 0 102,015.2 1,742.56 23,167 
Bonus (inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
774.26 319.21 0 134,400.3 2,032.15 23,167 
ROA 
[in %] 
4.27 4.01 -29.95 61.32 7.54 23,167 
1 year stock return 
(dividends reinvested) 
[in %] 
18.73 10.56 -99.13 997.56 63.64 23,167 
Tobin's q 1.93 1.44 .37 78.56 1.72 23,150 
Percentage of total shares held 
by the CEO 
2.71 .31 0 76.11 6.66 23,162 
Number of directors 8.99 9 1 32 2.98 4,253 
Number of outside directors 7.42 7 0 30 3.11 4,253 
Percentage of total outstanding 
shares held by institutions 
66.74 70.14 0 100 22.39 16,853 
Book value of assets 
[in $m] 
14,181.41 1,733.42 6.859 2,223,299 73,352.17 23,167 
Book value of assets(inflation 
adjusted) 
[in $m] 
16,046.24 2,057.98 7.16 2,223,299 77,973.14 23,167 
E-index 2.48 3 0 6 1.31 5,048 
CEO age 55.79 56 29 93 7.58 22,149 
 
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics of a selective set of variables to be employed in the regression 
analysis. The inflation adjusted values are denoted in 2009 constant $. Inflation values have been downloaded 
from http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/ (last access on July 13th, 2012).   
                                                      
178
 the inflation values were obtained from http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-
rates/ (last access on July 13
th
, 2012) 
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Between 1993 and 2009 the average CEO earned about $ 5.4 million in total direct 
compensation (2009 constant $). The data on TDC seems to be skewed however, since the 
median CEO earned only $ 2.6 million. Unlike base salary, where the mean and the median 
are both near $ 0.7 million, the bonus is skewed too, with the mean (median) CEO earning $ 
0.8 (0.32) million. Although they apparently account for a large portion of total 
compensation (salary plus bonus adds up to just about 25% of average TDC), components 
other than base salary and bonus are not included in this table since their computation 
substantially changed in 2005, which makes descriptive statistics of the concerned 
components over the whole range of years less valuable. Instead, they are reported in tables 
6 and 7. The mean ROA from 1993-2009 was 4.3% and the mean one year stock return with 
reinvested dividends was about 18.7%. The average (median) Tobin's q was equal to 1.9 
(1.4). 
In line with previous research179, the average CEO holds about 2.7% of the firms outstanding 
equity, whereas the median CEO holds only 0.3%. Since data on the board was only available 
from 2006 to 2009, the corresponding descriptive statistics are summarized further down. 
Notably, more than half of the average and median firm's equity is in the hand of 
institutional investors (66,7% / 70,1%).  
It is not surprising that the mean and the median book value of assets are substantially 
different from each other. In order to sufficiently capture firm size in the regression analysis, 
I used a logarithmic function of the book value of total assets. The average and median 
scores of the E-Index are close to the ones reported by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell180, i.e. 
the average and median firm has about three provisions in place that decrease shareholder 
rights and takeover probability. 
The values concerning CEOs' age are similar to the ones reported by Bhagat and Bolton181, 
reaching its minimum at 29 (e.g. Michael S. Dell of Dell Inc. in 1993), and its maximum at  93 
(Walter J. Zable of Cubic Corp. in 2009).  
Next, table 6 describes the data from 1993 till 2005.  
                                                      
179
 cf. Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance”; Jensen, Murphy, 1990, 
“Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives" 
180
 cf. Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009, “What matters in corporate governance?” 
181
 cf. Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance” 
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4.2.2 Descriptive statistics, 1993-2005 
 
TABLE 6 
Descriptive statistics of the 1993 - 2005 subsample 
 
 mean median min max Standard 
Deviation 
N 
Total direct compensation 
[in $1,000] 
4,439.15 2,002.96 0 655,448 11,276.86 18,818 
Total direct compensation 
(inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
5,357.90 2,470.95 0 830,815.4 13,669.71 18,818 
Salary [in $1,000] 618.79 560 0 5,806.65 346.21 18,818 
Salary (inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
758.06 692.03 0 6,138.57 412.44 18,818 
Bonus [in $1,000] 730.99 350 0 102,015.2 1,670.76 18,818 
Bonus (inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
881.52 437.55 0 134,400.3 2,033.10 18,818 
Restricted stock grants 
[in $1,000] 
468.73 0 -4.53 650,812.1 5,144.37 18,818 
Restricted stock grants 
(inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
552.43 0 -5.62 824,939.1 6,436.2 18,818 
Option Awards (BLK value) 
[in $1,000] 
2,204.58 504.17 0 600,347.3 8,941.80 18,818 
Option Awards (BLK value) 
(inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
2,664.45 625.21 0 720,107.7 10,776.75 18,818 
ROA [in %] 4.37 4.07 -29.95 61.324 7.38 18,818 
1 year stock return 
(dividend reinvested) [in %] 
20.15 11.76 -99.13 997.56 63.09 18,818 
Tobin's q 1.98 1.46 .40 78.56 1.83 18,804 
Percentage of total shares 
held by the CEO 
2.77 .31 0 76.11 6.63 18,813 
Percentage of total 
outstanding shares held by 
institutions 
63.76 66.53 0 100 22.53 12,876 
Book value of assets [in $m] 11,647.49 1,509.21 6.86 1,494,037 53,730.05 18,818 
Book value of assets 
(inflation adjusted) 
[in $m] 
13,973.51 1,855.51 8.23 1,622,278 61,738.01 18,818 
E-index 2.46 3 0 6 1.31 4,358 
CEO age 55.84 56 29 91 7.61 17,889 
 
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics of a selective set of variables to be employed in the regression 
analysis. The inflation adjusted values are denoted in 2009 constant $. Inflation values have been downloaded 
from http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/ (last access on July 13th, 2012).   
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The numbers on total direct compensation and base salary remain more or less unchanged, 
but the level of the bonus payments is slightly higher. Most important to realize however, is 
the great reliance on option awards during this sample period. With a mean of $ 2.7 million 
(denoted in 2009 constant dollar) it accounts for half of the average CEO compensation (for 
the median CEO, options account for about 25% of total direct compensation). That the 
mean and the median deviate so much from each other can, for the most part, be attributed 
to some enormous stock grants, such as the controversial option grant Steve Jobs received in 
2000, which was worth more than half a billion U.S. dollar. 
Restricted stock grants on the other hand, are only of subordinate importance. Similar to the 
previously presented table, the average (median) CEO holds about 2.7% (0.3%) of the total 
outstanding shares. Concerning institutional ownership, the values for 1993-2005 are a little 
bit lower, but still well above 50%. The performance variables,  the E-index, and the CEO age 
remain roughly the same. The book value of assets is slightly below the one presented 
before, and skewed too. 
Table 7 below shows descriptive statistics for the years 2006-2009. 
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4.2.3 Descriptive statistics, 2006-2009 
 
TABLE 7 
Descriptive statistics of the 2006 - 2009 subsample 
 
 mean median min max Standard 
Deviation 
N 
Total direct compensation 
[in $1,000] 
5,547.88 3,241.55 0 134,457.9 7,465.59 4,349 
Total direct compensation 
(inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
5,529.84 3,233.52 0 137,736.2 7,451.96 4,349 
Salary [in $1,000] 788.5 750 0 8,100 447.57 4,349 
Salary (inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
785.26 747.36 0 8,100 445.33 4,349 
Bonus [in $1,000] 311.24 0 0 76,951 1,988.66 4,349 
Bonus (inflation adjusted) 
[in $1,000] 
310.16 0 0 73,872.96 1,961.79 4,349 
Stock grants (fair value) 
[in $1,000] 
1,729.71 370.32 0 70,505.57 3,505.13 4,349 
Option Awards (fair value) 
[in $1,000] 
1,367.82 164.64 0 78,421 3,433.36 4,349 
Non-Equity Compensation 
[in $1,000] 
1,062.09 430 -299.624 20,461.47 1,855.24 4,349 
Percentage of total shares 
held by the CEO 
2.47 .29 0 65.2 6.77 4,349 
ROA [in %] 3.83 3.73 -29.92 50.34 8.17 4,349 
1 year stock return 
(dividend reinvested) 
 [in %] 
12.59 5.85 -98.99 840 65.63 4,349 
Tobin's q 1.73 1.36 .37 15.51 1.11 4,346 
Number of directors 8.99 9 1 32 2.98 4,252 
Number of outside 
directors 
7.42 7 0 30 3.11 4,252 
Percentage of total 
outstanding shares held by 
institutions 
76.39 80.67 0 100 18.92 3,977 
Book value of assets 
[in $m] 
25,145.61 3,320.81 7.156 2,223,299 127 4,349 
Book value of assets 
(inflation adjusted) 
[in $m] 
25,014.91 3,304.44 7.156 2,223,299 125,691.9 4,349 
E-index 2.61 3 0 6 1.29 690 
CEO age 55.58 55 29 93 7.43 4,260 
 
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics of a selective set of variables to be employed in the regression 
analysis. The inflation adjusted values are denoted in 2009 constant $. Inflation values have been downloaded 
from http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/ (last access on July 13th, 2012).   
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As with the 1993-2005 subsample, this subsample, too, presents similar numbers concerning 
total direct compensation and base salary. Interestingly, bonus payments seem to be less 
important between 2006 and 2009, with the mean being less than half of the one observed 
in the previous table. That the median is equal to zero is caused by the remarkable 
circumstance, that only about 20% of all firm year observations in this subsample reported 
bonus payments greater than zero. This seems to be consistent with the findings by Wade, 
Porac, and Pollock in 1997182, who argued that not rewarding a bonus is a powerful signal to 
the market that the board is independent. 
As in the previous subsample, compensation relies heavily on components other than salary 
and bonus. In this subsample equity based compensation (i.e. stock and option grants) 
accounts for about 55% of the average total compensation. Notable, option awards seem to 
be of lower importance during this period. Furthermore, about one fifth of the average TDC 
falls under non-equity compensation, a position not reported prior to 2005183. The mean and 
median performance variables are considerably lower than between 1993 and 2005, which 
is probably caused by the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 (the values are considerably lower 
during this two years than in the two years preceding them). 
As previously mentioned I had no access to primary resources concerning the board of 
directors, which is why these numbers are only included in the 2006-2009 subsample. 
Descriptive statistics on board size and the number of outside directors indicate a high 
emphasis on the independence of the board, with the average and mean board having only 
about two inside directors. Concerning institutional ownership, the data indicates an 
increase over the years, reaching a mean (median) of 76% (81%) of total outstanding equity. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the value of total assets substantially increased over time, 
even after controlling for inflation. The average and median CEO age, as well as the E-index, 
remain about the same (the E-index was only available for 2006, which is why it has only 690 
observations). 
                                                      
182
 cf. Wade, Porac, Pollock, 1997, "Worth, words, and the justification of executive pay" 
183
 These numbers are not separately reported in an inflation adjusted form, because they are fairly close to the 
unadjusted ones. 
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4.3 Correlation coefficients 
Table 8 provides the reader with the pairwise correlations between a selective set of 
variables. In particular, it shows the correlations between three compensation variables, all 
employed performance variables (though not the lagged terms) and all included control 
variables, though not in every specification. 
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TABLE 8 
Pairwise correlations 
 
 TDC salary bonus rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q ceo_own bsize boardind instprc top5inst top5tot Size eindex interlock 
salary 0.30*** 1.00                  
bonus 0.35*** 0.27*** 1.00                 
rE 0.06*** -0.06*** 0.04*** 1.00                
rel. rE 0.05*** -0.04*** 0.01** 0.96*** 1.00               
ROA 0.04*** 0.01** 0.03*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 1.00              
rel. ROA 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.93*** 1.00             
q 0.15*** -0.09*** -0.02*** 0.38*** 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.29*** 1.00            
rel. q 0.13*** -0.05*** -0.01 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.91*** 1.00           
ceo_own -0.06*** -0.13*** -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 1.00          
bsize 0.27*** 0.35*** 0.02 -0.06*** -0.03** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.19*** -0.09*** -0.26*** 1.00         
boardind 0.11*** 0.17*** -0.05*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.32*** 0.55***  1.00       
instprc 0.03*** 0.13*** -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.08*** 0.07*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.15*** -0.09*** 0.05*** 1.00       
top5inst -0.11*** -0.21*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.11*** -0.10*** 0.10*** -0.15*** -0.05*** -0.41*** 1.00      
top5tot -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.17***  0.01 0.66*** 0.28*** 1.00    
size 0.31*** 0.59*** 0.29*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** 0.01 -0.17*** -0.05*** -0.20*** 0.61***  0.28*** 0.04*** -0.28*** -0.16*** 1.00   
eindex -0.06*** 0.00 -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.02 -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.17*** 0.11***  0.15*** 0.07*** -0.05*** -0.00 -0.01 1.00  
interlock -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.14*** - - -0.12*** 0.03*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.04*** 1.00 
agedummy -0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.15*** -0.10*** -0.17*** -0.05*** 0.04*** -0,01* -0-03*** -0.05*** 0.05*** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Note: TDC ... total direct compensation; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - 
mean industry performance measure); CEO_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size; boardind ... board independence; instprc ... percentage of total shares held by 
institutions; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by institutions; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional 
shareholders as a percentage of total outstanding shares; size ... log of total assets; eindex ... E-index; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63 
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Apparently almost all variables are correlated with each other, most of them even on the 
0.01 significance level. This is a major reason why none of these indicators can be seen as 
conclusive, since they do not take into account any other variables than the two concerned. 
If, for example, size is positively correlated with TDC and board size, and board size positively 
with TDC, it is easily possible that size jointly increases TDC as well as the size of the board, 
making  the relationship between board size and TDC spurious. Nevertheless the correlation 
coefficients can be taken as first indicators of the relationships between the variables. 
TDC is significantly positively correlated with all employed performance measures, most 
notably with Tobin's q. This relationship does not seem to be caused by salary, since this 
component is negatively correlated with stock return and q, and only moderately positively 
with operating performance. Concerning stock return and ROA, bonus payments seem to 
contribute to the positive relationship with TDC. 
Strikingly, stock ownership by the CEO is negatively correlated to total direct compensation 
as well as to salary, and positively correlated to all performance proxies. Concerning the 
compensation, the correlation coefficients have a prefix opposite to that expected. A 
possible explanation could be that high-ownership CEOs' wealth primary increases through 
stock ownership, making high compensation levels obsolete. The positive relationship with 
performance on the other hand, is supported by part of the literature184. As mentioned 
above it is important to realize, however, that these results are not conclusive yet, since they 
neither account for additional control variables nor for alternative specifications (i.e. 
different levels of ownership). 
The relationship between CEO ownership and (i) the firm size, (ii) the E-Index, and (iii) his 
age is not surprising, because (i) it is difficult for managers of big firms to acquire a 
substantial fraction of the firm, (ii) if the CEO holds a sufficient share to insulate himself from 
external regulation, the need for additional amendments should be lower, and (iii) a 
manger's wealth probably rises with his age, which makes it easier to acquire a meaningful 
stake. 
                                                      
184
 cf. e.g. Jensen, Murphy, 1990, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”; Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 
1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value"; Damodaran, John, Liu, 2005, "What motivates 
managers? Evidence from organizational form changes" 
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Under the hypothesis that influential CEOs favor insider dominated boards, the negative 
correlation with the number of outside directors was expected. The negative correlations 
with the number of board members and the presence of institutional shareholders is 
surprising, though. Since previous findings suggest that a board is getting less effective with 
increasing size185, one would expect the correlation coefficient between CEO ownership and 
board size to be positive. Additionally, if CEO ownership has a positive effect on performance 
(as suggested by the correlations), the expected consequence would be that more 
institutional investors acquire shares, due to the potentially lower agency cost. Concerning 
the concentration this is one of the few points where the correlation coefficients of the two 
specifications point in opposite directions. 
Consistent with previous research186, the pairwise correlations suggest that compensation 
tends to be higher in firms with a large board. Surprisingly, a high portion of outside 
directors seems to facilitate high levels of TDC and salary too. Concerning the relationship 
between firm performance and board size the correlation coefficients again support earlier 
empirical findings. The negative relationship between performance proxies and the board 
independence was unexpected though. 
According to table 8 the concentration of institutional shareholders is mildly negatively 
correlated with all employed performance variables, no matter how concentration is 
measured. This would suggest that, contrary to the expectations, concentrated holdings by 
institutions do not enhance performance but have a moderately negative effect on it. The 
negative correlation with TDC and salary is in line with the expectations on the other hand. 
Interestingly the mere presence of institutional shareholders is lacking a significant 
relationship to stock return and q, though it seems to have a positive effect on accounting 
performance. Their negative relationship with board size and the positive one with board 
independence would be supportive to the notion that institutional investors favorably invest 
in firms with elaborate corporate governance.  This would also be consistent with what 
                                                      
185
 cf. Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
186
 cf. Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
  
64 
 
others observed, since Gupta and Fields in 2009187 found that institutional investors, such as 
CalPERS, recently place high emphasis on board independence. 
Along with the expectations, size is highly positive correlated with compensation and also 
with board size and independence. Concerning the compensation, this correlation is 
consistent with preceding literature, which claimed that CEOs of large companies get paid 
more188. The large size and complexity possibly makes it necessary to employ a high number 
of directors in order to ensure sufficient monitoring. Due to authorities' emphasis on board 
independence, large firms may hire a high number of outside directors.  
Consistent with the proclamations by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell in 2006189, the E-index is 
negatively related to performance. The negative correlation with compensation, that seems 
to be caused by bonus payments, comes as a surprise though. A CEO near retirement, 
although insignificant correlated with TDC, is highly positive correlated with salary. 
Moreover, its  negative correlation with rE and q, could be interpreted as an indication that 
the principal-agent problem indeed aggravates if the agent is near retirement. 
5 Regression results 
 
In a first approach I ran a multivariate regression analysis over the whole sample years and 
included all variables that were available over the whole range. In other words, I excluded 
board size, board independence, and the E-Index due to a lack of availability. Also, I did not 
account for different levels of CEO ownership, because in regressions not presented in this 
work, I did not find any significant "N-shaped" relationship between the performance 
variables and various levels of equity ownership by the CEO190. Table 9 shows the results of 
the performance perspective of this first estimation. For the sake of brevity, and because 
they yield similar results, I will only show the most representative tables in this section. 
Tables including other specifications, especially ones with an alternate variable measuring 
the concentration of institutional holdings, can be found in the appendix. 
                                                      
187
 cf. Gupta, Fields, 2009, "Board independence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Director 
Resignations" 
188
 cf. Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation" 
189
 cf. Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009, “What matters in corporate governance?” 
190
 Additionally, I tested for quadratic and logarithmic relationships, but did not observe a significant 
relationship either. 
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5.1 1993 - 2009 
5.1.1 Performance perspective 
 
TABLE 9 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2009 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
TDC 0.508*** 0.402*** 0.0360*** 0.0287*** 0.0324*** 0.0280** 
 (4.16) (3.80) (4.98) (5.01) (2.78) (2.48) 
       
ceo_own 0.239** 0.253** 0.109*** 0.104*** 0.0122*** 0.0128*** 
 (2.14) (2.45) (10.51) (10.43) (4.32) (4.75) 
       
instprc -0.196*** -0.0870*** -0.0122*** -0.00250 -0.0100*** -0.00740*** 
 (-6.43) (-3.07) (-3.87) (-0.82) (-8.54) (-6.54) 
       
Top5inst -0.669*** -0.529*** -0.141*** -0.124*** -0.0284*** -0.0250*** 
 (-11.57) (-10.02) (-26.02) (-24.11) (-20.20) (-18.41) 
       
agedummy -4.771*** -5.062*** 0.0500 0.0924 -0.171*** -0.170*** 
 (-3.40) (-3.81) (0.34) (0.65) (-5.33) (-5.47) 
       
size -5.789*** -5.095*** -0.321*** -0.273*** -0.210*** -0.188*** 
 (-11.52) (-11.01) (-6.61) (-5.89) (-7.11) (-6.57) 
N 16853 16853 16853 16853 16853 16853 
R
2 0.044 0.022 0.128 0.066 0.176 0.062 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure 
(individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); TDC ... total direct compensation 
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by 
institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
As can be referred from this table, it seems that CEO total direct compensation is 
significantly positively related to every performance variable employed, no matter if 
computed absolutely or relatively (though the relation is smaller in magnitude for relative 
performance proxies). It should be noted though, that the point estimations in the 
performance perspective concerning TDC are multiplied by 1.000 for the sake of a better 
readability. That means that the point estimate of e.g. CEO TDC and one year stock return in 
Panel A is actually only about 0.000,5. A possible interpretation of this result is that an 
increase  CEO's TDC by $1.000 is accompanied by an increase of about 0.000,5 percentage 
points in stock return. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that increases in CEO ownership are accompanied by an 
increase in performance, henceforth supporting the convergence-of-interest theory. As 
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mentioned earlier, I did not find any other than a linear relationship between performance 
and CEO  ownership, although I tested for various levels as well as for a logarithmic and 
quadratic relationship. 
Interestingly, the point estimates concerning the presence and the concentration of 
institutional ownership suggest that its relationship to performance is negative, which 
contradicts the majority of the reviewed literature. This negative relationship is weaker for 
relative performance measures. However, in a specification shown in table 29 of the 
appendix (in which concentration was measured as the percentage of total outstanding 
shares held by institutions), it seems that at least the presence (not the concentration) of 
institutional shareholders is accompanied by high absolute and relative performance. 
Henceforth, the results concerning institutional ownership should be treated with caution. 
A CEO near the age of retirement and firm size are both negatively related to performance in 
the majority of specifications. The only exemption are the estimates concerning the ROA and 
the near-retirement-dummy variable. Those two coefficients are positive, but statistically 
not significant. The negative relationship to stock return and q can be seen as an indication 
that a CEO near retirement is indeed prone to invest in short-time projects only since he 
would not be able to receive all benefits from a long-term project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
67 
 
5.1.2 Compensation perspective 
 
TABLE 10 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2009 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC 
rE 15.69
***      
 (4.41)      
       
rE, t-1 9.245
***      
 (3.00)      
       
rel. rE  15.95
***     
  (3.97)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  7.883
**     
  (2.41)     
       
ROA   111.8***    
   (3.66)    
       
ROAt-1   -14.31    
   (-0.59)    
       
rel. ROA    82.32***   
    (2.92)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    10.84   
    (0.50)   
       
q     786.0*  
     (1.93)  
       
qt-1     658.6
*  
     (1.84)  
       
rel. q      529.4 
      (1.43) 
       
rel. qt-1      867.8
*** 
      (2.92) 
       
ceo_own -6.682 -7.472 -11.09 -10.55 -20.68 -21.33 
 (-0.50) (-0.56) (-0.84) (-0.80) (-1.40) (-1.44) 
       
instprc -20.24*** -22.18*** -23.02*** -23.80*** -10.57 -12.40* 
 (-3.73) (-4.01) (-4.09) (-4.16) (-1.58) (-1.88) 
       
Top5inst 5.591 2.596 3.957 1.602 27.35** 23.94* 
 (0.71) (0.33) (0.50) (0.20) (2.13) (1.89) 
       
agedummy 307.8 314.0 203.2 197.2 383.0 379.2 
 (1.31) (1.33) (0.85) (0.83) (1.61) (1.58) 
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Table 10 continued 
 
     
size 2616.0*** 2608.5*** 2555.8*** 2553.3*** 2657.7*** 2647.4*** 
 (26.91) (27.02) (27.07) (27.10) (27.04) (27.42) 
       
interlock 258.2 293.5 178.7 198.2 158.1 194.0 
 (0.32) (0.36) (0.22) (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) 
       
N 13802 13802 13802 13802 13802 13802 
R
2 0.142 0.140 0.135 0.135 0.171 0.168 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: TDC ... total direct compensation; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... 
relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 
institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets; 
 
In looking on the performance / compensation relationship presented in this table, it 
becomes evident that there is a significant positive relationship between a firm's 
contemporaneous performance and CEO's total direct compensation. The high coefficients 
of model 3 and 4 suggest that firms are especially concerned about the operating 
performance in setting a CEO's pay191. Firm value, as measured with Tobin's q, apparently 
also plays a important role in the compensation / performance relationship. The remarkably 
high level of this measure is most likely a result from the small magnitude of q192. If, for 
example, a firm has a q of one (i.e. its market value is equal to its replacement cost) an 
increase by one means an enormous change in firm value that is bound to be accompanied 
by an outstanding increase in CEO compensation. Thus, even incremental changes in q 
would lead to a considerable reaction in the level of compensation, which in turn results in a 
very high point estimate. Concerning relative performance measures it seems that they are 
of equivalent importance as the absolute proxies. Moreover, it seems that the preceding 
year's stock return and q also play a role in the relationship. 
Contrary to empirical results by other researches193, the presence of institutional 
shareholders is significantly negatively related to the level of compensation, but the 
concentration seems to be positively related to it. The point estimates of concentration in 
the models 1 to 4 are not statistically significant, though, making a concrete statement 
                                                      
191
 It should be noted that it makes no sense to compare the point estimates of stock return and ROA with 
Tobin's q as well, since q is denoted as a portion rather than in percent . 
192
 Since the correlation between q and its lagged term is around 0.7 and significant at the 0.01 level, I did not 
include an interaction term in the regression function. 
193
 cf. Janakiraman, Radhakrshnan, Tsang, 2010, “Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership, and Executive 
Compensation” 
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impossible. In addition, models 3 and 4 of the alternative specification shown in table 30 of 
the appendix, find a significant negative relationship between concentration of institutional 
shareholders and the level of compensation. Henceforth, the findings concerning the 
concentration of institutional ownership are far from conclusive yet. 
The findings presented in the table are supportive to the view that CEOs of large firms earn 
more, which is consistent with previous findings194. That a CEO near retirement earns 
significantly more than other CEOs cannot be confirmed by the findings, although the point 
estimates are all positive. Strikingly, CEO ownership seems to have a negative impact on the 
level of compensation, but since the coefficients are not significant that relationship is not 
conclusive. 
Obviously, the results presented so far call for a finer grain in order to yield more meaningful 
statements about the interrelation of CEO compensation, performance and corporate 
governance. Especially because I did not yet sufficiently consider the different components 
of TDC prior and after 2005. To account for the deviating disclosure requirements and 
computations of those two sub-periods, I ran separate regressions.  
5.2 1993-2005 
The E-index is available for the years 1990 - 2006, which is why I included it in the regression 
function of this section. However, since the E-index dataset is considerably smaller than the 
one available from ExecuComp I ran two separate regressions, which are reported in the 
panels of table 11. I did only do so for the performance perspective, since Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Ferrell195 proposed that it mainly affects performance.  In an alternative specification, 
which is not shown in here, I included the index in the compensation perspective too, but it 
substantially decreased the explanatory power of the model. 
5.2.1 Performance perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
194
 cf. Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation" 
195
 cf. Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009, “What matters in corporate governance?” 
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TABLE 11 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2005 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
TDC 0.483*** 0.394*** 0.0324*** 0.0273*** 0.0333*** 0.0292** 
 (3.84) (3.55) (4.96) (4.91) (2.60) (2.36) 
       
ceo_own 0.379*** 0.345*** 0.0921*** 0.0915*** 0.0130*** 0.0125*** 
 (2.74) (2.67) (8.18) (8.47) (3.81) (3.81) 
       
instprc -0.114*** -0.109*** -0.0125*** -0.00237 -0.0103*** -0.00874*** 
 (-3.24) (-3.31) (-3.57) (-0.70) (-7.20) (-6.30) 
       
Top5inst -0.634*** -0.560*** -0.127*** -0.111*** -0.0277*** -0.0257*** 
 (-10.23) (-9.82) (-22.00) (-20.30) (-17.09) (-16.22) 
       
agedummy -6.589*** -6.391*** 0.0319 0.112 -0.191*** -0.180*** 
 (-4.19) (-4.29) (0.20) (0.73) (-5.07) (-4.87) 
       
size -5.904*** -5.705*** -0.441*** -0.365*** -0.215*** -0.200*** 
 (-10.36) (-10.69) (-8.07) (-6.90) (-6.70) (-6.42) 
N 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 
R
2 0.048 0.026 0.124 0.062 0.177 0.063 
Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
TDC 0.257*** 0.173*** 0.0241*** 0.0222*** 0.0111** 0.00791 
 (2.87) (2.68) (3.88) (3.59) (1.98) (1.60) 
       
ceo_own 0.503* 0.409 0.0922*** 0.0987*** 0.0144* 0.0148** 
 (1.87) (1.64) (4.37) (4.85) (1.86) (2.00) 
       
instprc 0.0793 -0.0383 -0.0124* 0.000121 -0.00819*** -0.00708*** 
 (1.48) (-0.76) (-1.87) (0.02) (-3.29) (-2.91) 
       
Top5inst -0.555*** -0.500*** -0.160*** -0.143*** -0.0276*** -0.0259*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.29) (-14.37) (-13.57) (-10.43) (-9.99) 
       
agedummy -6.947*** -6.390*** 0.0233 0.0165 -0.235*** -0.232*** 
 (-3.16) (-3.06) (0.09) (0.07) (-3.87) (-3.82) 
       
eindex -1.272* -1.720*** -0.335*** -0.249*** -0.184*** -0.178*** 
 (-1.95) (-2.86) (-4.05) (-3.13) (-7.31) (-7.28) 
       
size -2.340*** -2.734*** -0.402*** -0.345*** -0.0951*** -0.0879*** 
 (-3.22) (-4.06) (-4.11) (-3.61) (-4.08) (-4.00) 
N 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 
R
2 0.061 0.026 0.143 0.089 0.169 0.054 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Panel A shows the results of a regression without E-index, because including the index substantially 
decreases sample size (from 12,876 to 4,347). Panel B reports the estimates if it is included. It is worth noting 
that the coefficient of determination increased in this specification.  
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); TDC ... total direct compensation (multiplied by 
1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; 
top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by institutions; 
agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; eindex ... E-index; size ... log of total assets 
  
71 
 
Both panels indicate that CEO compensation is positively related to the employed 
performance variables, though the point estimates are lower for the relative performance 
proxies. This could be due to a tendency of firms to evaluate the performance of their CEOs 
by using absolute measures rather than relative ones. Additionally, they both support the 
notion of a positive relationship between CEO ownership and performance. 
Concerning the relationship between institutional ownership and performance, the picture 
changed slightly in some specifications. Although presence and concentration remain 
negatively related to performance in the specification without E-index, in the one including it 
the statistical significance is waning. In addition, in the two specifications shown in the 
appendix (both with a different variables capturing institutional investor concentration), the 
presence is positively related to performance. The point estimates of concentration on the 
opposite, remain negative in every specification, indicating that concentrated institutional 
ownership coincides with low performance. Moreover, both tables show that a CEO near 
retirement and firm size are negatively correlated with performance. 
The coefficients of the E-index support the findings by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell196, in that 
all estimates have a negative prefix and are statistically meaningful. These findings however, 
do not necessarily indicate that the performance decreases the more provisions are in place. 
It is also possible that low performing firms establish more provisions, in order to secure 
their jobs. As pointed out by other researchers as well197, tracking causality is oftentimes a 
tricky task.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                      
196
 cf. Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009, “What matters in corporate governance?” 
197
 cf. Gompers, Ishii, Metrick, 2003, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices” 
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5.2.2 Compensation perspective 
 
TABLE 12 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2005 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC 
rE 16.33
***      
 (4.08)      
       
rE, t-1 9.552
***      
 (2.83)      
       
rel. rE  16.55
***     
  (3.65)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  8.512
**     
  (2.37)     
       
ROA   117.1***    
   (3.02)    
       
ROAt-1   -5.215    
   (-0.18)    
       
rel. ROA    96.03***   
    (2.71)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    13.67   
    (0.53)   
       
q     788.3*  
     (1.85)  
       
qt-1     747.3
**  
     (2.03)  
       
rel. q      563.5 
      (1.43) 
       
rel. qt-1      930.3
*** 
      (2.97) 
       
ceo_own -3.642 -3.071 -5.066 -5.093 -16.54 -16.30 
 (-0.22) (-0.19) (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.92) (-0.91) 
       
instprc -27.07*** -27.21*** -27.25*** -28.32*** -13.33* -14.85* 
 (-4.30) (-4.31) (-4.28) (-4.34) (-1.69) (-1.89) 
       
Top5inst 1.644 -0.0883 1.882 -0.205 26.32* 23.47* 
 (0.19) (-0.01) (0.21) (-0.02) (1.86) (1.66) 
       
agedummy 104.5 103.0 -38.95 -47.80 171.3 160.5 
 (0.40) (0.39) (-0.15) (-0.18) (0.64) (0.60) 
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Table 12 continued 
 
     
size 2611.1*** 2610.7*** 2557.0*** 2551.6*** 2649.8*** 2643.6*** 
 (20.66) (20.68) (20.61) (20.74) (21.03) (21.17) 
       
interlock 335.0 294.3 145.2 162.4 168.5 176.9 
 (0.40) (0.35) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
R
2 0.123 0.121 0.115 0.115 0.156 0.153 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: TDC ... total direct compensation; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... 
relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 
institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
Similar to the findings presented earlier, it seems that firms reward their CEOs primary on 
the basis of contemporaneous performance indicators. Nevertheless they seem to consider 
lagged stock return and q too. Moreover, in line with the findings presented in section 5.1, 
relative performance seems to play an equivalent role to absolute measures. Last year's 
Tobin's q is also highly positively related to compensation. The findings concerning CEO 
ownership remain more or less unchanged, still indicating an insignificant negative 
relationship to performance. 
In line with the findings in the 1993 - 2009 sample, the presence of institutional investors is 
negatively related to compensation. Concentrated institutional shareholdings on the 
opposite seem to be positively related to the level of compensation, though this relationship 
is only mildly significant in the specification that uses Tobin's q as performance indicator. 
Again, the alternative specification presented in table 32 of the appendix contradicts this 
impression, with the majority of its concentration point estimates being negatively related to 
compensation, although not all of them significantly. Thus, it is still not possible to draw any 
clear conclusions addressing concentrated institutional ownership. Still consistent with 
previous empirical evidence, compensation is heavily related to firm size. Although the point 
estimates concerning interlock and near-retirement age indicate a positive relationship they 
are not conclusive.  
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5.3 2006-2009  
5.3.1 Performance perspective 
TABLE 13 
Regression results: Performance perspective 2006 - 2009 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
TDC 0.665*** 0.476*** 0.0645*** 0.0465*** 0.0146*** 0.0117*** 
 (3.96) (3.03) (3.42) (2.60) (4.16) (3.45) 
       
ceo_own -0.0817 -0.113 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.0115** 0.0111** 
 (-0.61) (-0.86) (4.95) (4.96) (2.57) (2.56) 
       
bsize -0.773* -0.766* -0.163*** -0.180*** -0.0320*** -0.0335*** 
 (-1.68) (-1.82) (-2.87) (-3.27) (-3.41) (-3.77) 
       
bind 0.0262 0.0447 -0.0154 -0.00864 -0.000119 0.000575 
 (0.32) (0.57) (-1.37) (-0.78) (-0.06) (0.32) 
       
instprc -0.107 -0.0616 0.000225 0.000939 -0.00365*** -0.00314** 
 (-1.29) (-0.78) (0.02) (0.11) (-2.63) (-2.31) 
       
Top5inst -0.479*** -0.437*** -0.190*** -0.180*** -0.0247*** -0.0232*** 
 (-3.05) (-3.00) (-12.55) (-12.60) (-10.86) (-10.60) 
       
agedummy 2.881 2.050 0.130 0.0679 -0.0991* -0.104** 
 (0.90) (0.66) (0.35) (0.19) (-1.96) (-2.13) 
       
size -3.254*** -2.871*** 0.0429 0.0800 -0.108*** -0.0991*** 
 (-2.93) (-2.78) (0.35) (0.66) (-5.16) (-4.89) 
N 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 
R
2 0.040 0.014 0.197 0.107 0.217 0.072 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure 
(individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); TDC ... total direct compensation 
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board 
independence; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional 
shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
Apparently it makes not much of a difference if one analyses the relationship between CEO 
compensation and performance from 1993 to 2005, or from 2006 till 2009, the point 
estimates remain comparable, even though the disclosure requirements and the 
computation changed. Despite the fact that the magnitude is slightly higher than in the 
previous period, it still seems that CEO compensation is higher related to absolute than to 
relative performance measures. This is again an indication that firms tend to reward their 
CEOs with a higher emphasis on absolute than on firm-specific performance. Although two 
of them have a negative prefix, the significant point estimates concerning stock ownership 
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by the CEO also indicate a positive relationship with performance, which could be caused by 
the better alignment of interests and less inefficient spending.  
In line with findings by Yermack in 1996198, a high number of board members is negatively 
related to performance, possibly indicating that the higher coordination effort indeed offsets 
the benefits of a more specialized board. Concerning the independence of the board the 
regression results do not allow any conclusions, which is also consistent with part of the 
literature199. 
The findings about the presence of institutional shareholders remain mixed in this sub-
sample too, again yielding statistically significant negative relationships when used in a 
specification where concentration is measured with the variable Top5inst, and statistically 
positive relationships when employed in a regression that uses Top5tot. The prefix of the 
concentration of institutional ownership remains the same, indicating that concentrated 
holdings by institutions coincide with poor performance. 
Somehow contrary to the results presented above CEOs near retirement are not as much 
negatively related to performance anymore. Although the previous specifications indicated 
an insignificant positive relationship to operating performance as well, in the 2006-2009 
sample the point estimates to stock performance are not negative anymore, but 
(insignificantly) positive. Despite the fact that these results cannot be taken as conclusive, it 
is still worth mentioning the change in the prefixes. Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
negative relationship between size and ROA ceased to exist too. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
198
 cf. Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
199
 cf. Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance"; Yermack, 1996, “Higher market 
valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
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5.3.2 Compensation perspective 
TABLE 14 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 2006 - 2009 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC 
rE 12.21
***      
 (2.82)      
       
rE, t-1 0.348      
 (0.11)      
       
rel. rE  11.83
***     
  (2.97)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  -1.348     
  (-0.49)     
       
ROA   76.22**    
   (2.37)    
       
ROAt-1   -48.45    
   (-1.31)    
       
rel. ROA    47.99   
    (1.45)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -26.64   
    (-0.73)   
       
q     978.9***  
     (4.10)  
       
qt-1     -582.7
***  
     (-2.94)  
       
rel. q      710.5*** 
      (3.03) 
       
rel. qt-1      -372.3
* 
      (-1.95) 
       
ceo_own -27.43 -26.87 -29.78 -29.05 -30.80 -30.04 
 (-1.17) (-1.15) (-1.28) (-1.25) (-1.32) (-1.29) 
       
bsize -49.33 -50.37 -53.49 -51.82 -50.46 -47.17 
 (-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.77) (-0.72) 
       
bind -13.85 -14.69 -15.02 -15.66 -14.59 -15.47 
 (-0.94) (-1.00) (-1.02) (-1.06) (-0.99) (-1.05) 
       
instprc 10.12 10.10 8.157 8.770 9.517 10.12 
 (1.16) (1.16) (0.97) (1.03) (1.09) (1.17) 
       
Top5inst 36.08** 34.92** 34.21** 32.80** 36.73** 35.56** 
 (2.31) (2.23) (2.31) (2.20) (2.39) (2.33) 
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Table 14 continued 
 
     
agedummy 1074.1** 1077.5** 1097.0** 1090.3** 1089.8** 1091.9** 
 (2.09) (2.09) (2.13) (2.11) (2.12) (2.12) 
       
size 2463.0*** 2467.3*** 2459.9*** 2456.0*** 2479.3*** 2473.5*** 
 (14.55) (14.55) (14.64) (14.63) (14.59) (14.59) 
N 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
R
2 0.420 0.418 0.416 0.415 0.420 0.417 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: TDC ... total direct compensation; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... 
relative relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance 
measure); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; instprc ... presence of 
institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total 
shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of 
total assets 
 
The point estimates of the one year stock return, both in absolute and in relative terms, and 
the absolute ROA, are comparable to the estimates in section 0. The coefficients of the 
relative ROA and both specifications of q changed however. Other than in the findings 
above, the relative ROA is not significantly related to CEO compensation anymore, which 
could serve as an indicator that in recent years firms departed from evaluating the CEO's 
personal performance, but rather reward him on an absolute basis. If this is the case, it is 
possibly an outcome of the financial crisis in which compensation committees may were 
reluctant to punish their CEO for poor operating performance during times of an economic 
downturn. As mentioned previously, the high estimates addressing contemporaneous 
Tobin's q are most likely a result from the small magnitude of q. Although the negative prefix 
of both lagged terms of q stands in sharp contrast to the estimates observed above, it is 
somehow consistent with what we observe in looking on the other lagged performance 
measures. As already pointed out in section 4.2, this could be an outcome of the potentially 
distorting effect of the recent financial crisis that seriously affected the market value in the 
calculation of q. 
In line with the previous evidence, CEO ownership seems to be negatively related to the 
level of compensation, but its coefficients remain insignificant. The results addressing board 
size and independence are both not significant. They can merely serve as weak indications 
that the compensation level tends to be lower the higher the portion of outsiders on the 
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board (which is consistent with part of the literature200), and also with increasing board size 
(which is inconsistent with the findings of others201). 
Contrary to the findings in the 1993-2005 specification, the presence of institutional 
investors is not negatively related to the level of TDC anymore (neither is it in the alternative 
specification in the appendix). Concentration of intuitional ownership on the other hand, is 
now significantly positively related to the level of compensation, which is in opposition to 
earlier evidence202. 
In line with the indications of the preceding tables, though now significant, a CEO near the 
age of retirement seem to get paid more than his younger colleagues. The coefficients of 
firm size stay literally the same. Interlock is not included in the 2006 - 2009 subsample, since 
not a single firm indicated that possible conflict of interest. 
5.4 Analyzing the components of compensation 
In order to estimate the impact of the various components of executive compensation on 
performance this section computes the level of compensation by using different 
specifications. In particular, it will analyze the relationship under specifications that exclude 
either salary, bonus, or option grants. The changes in point estimates, compared to the ones 
reported above, will serve as indications of the effectiveness of the remaining components 
as well as of  the omitted component. 
5.4.1 Exclude salary from TDC 
The first component to be omitted in the calculation of the level of CEO compensation is the 
base salary. This procedure enables me to evaluate if salary contributes to the positive 
relationship between performance and compensation or not. If the point estimates stay 
roughly the same, this can be taken as an indicator that salary is indeed independent of 
performance. 
 
                                                      
200
 Bebchuck, Fried, 2006, “Pay without Performance: An overview of the issues”, Gupta, Fields, 2009, "Board 
independence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Director Resignations" 
201
 cf. Chiang, Lin, 2011, "Examining Board Composition and Firm Performance", Yermack, 1996, “Higher market 
valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
202
 cf. Hartzell, Starks, 2003, “Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation”; Janakiraman, Radhakrshnan, 
Tsang, 2010, “Institutional Investors, Managerial Ownership, and Executive Compensation” 
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5.4.1.1 1993-2005 
Performance perspective 
TABLE 15 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2005, salary excluded 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_os 0.487*** 0.398*** 0.0322*** 0.0270*** 0.0336*** 0.0294** 
 (3.82) (3.54) (4.95) (4.90) (2.60) (2.37) 
       
ceo_own 0.379*** 0.344*** 0.0921*** 0.0915*** 0.0129*** 0.0125*** 
 (2.74) (2.67) (8.18) (8.47) (3.80) (3.80) 
       
instprc -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.0125*** -0.00236 -0.0103*** -0.00872*** 
 (-3.23) (-3.30) (-3.57) (-0.70) (-7.17) (-6.28) 
       
Top5inst -0.634*** -0.561*** -0.127*** -0.111*** -0.0277*** -0.0257*** 
 (-10.24) (-9.83) (-22.00) (-20.30) (-17.11) (-16.24) 
       
agedummy -6.566*** -6.372*** 0.0334 0.113 -0.189*** -0.178*** 
 (-4.18) (-4.28) (0.21) (0.73) (-5.03) (-4.83) 
       
size -5.843*** -5.656*** -0.435*** -0.360*** -0.211*** -0.197*** 
 (-10.39) (-10.73) (-8.02) (-6.85) (-6.90) (-6.62) 
N 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 
R
2 0.048 0.026 0.124 0.062 0.177 0.064 
Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_os 0.258*** 0.175*** 0.0240*** 0.0220*** 0.0112** 0.00802 
 (2.86) (2.67) (3.88) (3.59) (1.97) (1.60) 
       
ceo_own 0.503* 0.409 0.0922*** 0.0987*** 0.0144* 0.0148** 
 (1.87) (1.64) (4.37) (4.85) (1.86) (2.00) 
       
instprc 0.0795 -0.0381 -0.0123* 0.000131 -0.00818*** -0.00707*** 
 (1.48) (-0.76) (-1.87) (0.02) (-3.29) (-2.91) 
       
Top5inst -0.554*** -0.500*** -0.160*** -0.143*** -0.0276*** -0.0259*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.29) (-14.37) (-13.58) (-10.44) (-9.99) 
       
agedummy -6.934*** -6.381*** 0.0246 0.0177 -0.235*** -0.231*** 
 (-3.16) (-3.05) (0.10) (0.07) (-3.87) (-3.82) 
       
eindex -1.270* -1.717*** -0.334*** -0.249*** -0.184*** -0.177*** 
 (-1.95) (-2.85) (-4.05) (-3.13) (-7.31) (-7.27) 
       
size -2.303*** -2.712*** -0.398*** -0.341*** -0.0937*** -0.0869*** 
 (-3.19) (-4.04) (-4.09) (-3.58) (-4.08) (-4.01) 
N 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 
R
2 0.061 0.026 0.143 0.089 0.169 0.054 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Panel A shows the results of a regression without E-index, because including the index substantially 
decreases sample size (from 12,876 to 4,347). Panel B reports the estimates if it is included. It is worth noting 
that the coefficient of determination increased in this specification.  
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Note of table 15 continued 
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_os ... CEO compensation without salary  
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by 
institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; eindex ... E-index; size ... log 
of total assets 
 
The coefficients concerning CEO compensation are almost exactly the same as reported in 
table 11, where salary was still included in the computation of TDC. Moreover, the R2 also 
remained about the same. Thus, it seems that salary does not contribute to the relationship 
between performance and compensation at all, which is consistent with the common 
believe that base salary is not rewarded in a performance sensitive way. 
The point estimates addressing stock ownership by the CEO remain literally the same as in 
the original results. The same applies for the values of the performance / E-Index 
relationship. The point estimates concerning size and the dummy variable capturing near-
retirement-age are comparable to the original estimates too, though they are sometimes 
moderately higher in magnitude. 
Not surprisingly, the significant coefficients concerning the presence of institutional 
ownership in the E-index including specification remained about the same, still indicating 
that the presence coincides with low performance. However, in a regression with an 
alternative measure for concentration of institutional ownership (see table 35 of the 
appendix), the presence is again positively associated with all performance variables. The 
prefix of the concentration did not change in a single specification, still indicating a negative 
relationship. 
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Compensation perspective 
TABLE 16 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2005, salary excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os 
rE 16.35
***      
 (4.09)      
       
rE, t-1 9.636
***      
 (2.85)      
       
rel. rE  16.59
***     
  (3.66)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  8.605
**     
  (2.39)     
       
ROA   115.9***    
   (2.99)    
       
ROAt-1   -4.868    
   (-0.17)    
       
rel. ROA    94.37***   
    (2.67)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    14.31   
    (0.56)   
       
q     788.7*  
     (1.85)  
       
qt-1     754.0
**  
     (2.05)  
       
rel. q      562.3 
      (1.43) 
       
rel. qt-1      938.1
*** 
      (3.00) 
       
ceo_own -3.271 -2.710 -4.595 -4.595 -16.24 -15.99 
 (-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.91) (-0.89) 
       
instprc -27.58*** -27.72*** -27.78*** -28.85*** -13.78* -15.30* 
 (-4.39) (-4.40) (-4.37) (-4.44) (-1.75) (-1.95) 
       
Top5inst 1.991 0.273 2.069 -0.0270 26.78* 23.93* 
 (0.23) (0.03) (0.23) (-0.00) (1.89) (1.70) 
       
agedummy 53.33 52.13 -90.48 -99.22 120.6 109.7 
 (0.20) (0.20) (-0.34) (-0.37) (0.45) (0.41) 
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Table 16 continued 
 
     
size 2463.2*** 2462.9*** 2408.6*** 2403.2*** 2502.2*** 2496.0*** 
 (19.51) (19.52) (19.43) (19.55) (19.88) (20.01) 
       
interlock 366.8 326.0 177.6 194.8 199.8 208.3 
 (0.44) (0.39) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.25) 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
R
2 0.115 0.113 0.107 0.106 0.149 0.146 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: ceo_c_os ... CEO compensation without salary; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... 
Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance 
measure); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by 
top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
Interestingly, each point estimate addressing the compensation / performance relationship, 
stayed roughly the same compared to the ones presented above. Also, the equivalence of 
relative performance measures remained more or less unchanged. This gives additional 
support to the previously indicated missing link between salary and performance. Moreover, 
it is worth noting that, with exemption of Tobin's q,  the remaining components are not 
related to lagged operating performance measures either. The coefficients of CEO ownership 
are also comparable to previously presented results. 
The significant coefficients of institutional ownership remain more or less the same, further 
indicating a negative relationship between the presence and compensation. In reverse, this 
can serve as an indication that institutional investors are quite indifferent to level of base 
salary. The point estimates of ownership concentration still do not allow any meaningful 
conclusions, since they remain positive in the models 5 and 6, negative in the models 3 and 4 
(see table 36 in the appendix), and insignificant in the models 1 and 2. 
There is still no significant relationship between the retirement dummy variable and 
interlock on one side, and the level of compensation on the other. The interrelation of firm 
size and the level of compensation stays positive on the 0.01 significance level. R2 did not 
change substantially, with an negligible decrease of only about 0.007.  
To see whether or not the new rules effective under US GAAP FAS 123(R) also changed the 
role of base salary, the next section shows the results of the years 2006 to 2009. 
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5.4.1.2 2006 - 2009 
Performance perspective 
TABLE 17 
Regression results: Performance perspective 2006 - 2009, salary excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_os 0.680*** 0.483*** 0.0645*** 0.0457** 0.0152*** 0.0121*** 
 (3.95) (3.01) (3.39) (2.54) (4.26) (3.54) 
       
ceo_own -0.0831 -0.114 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.0115** 0.0110** 
 (-0.62) (-0.87) (4.95) (4.95) (2.57) (2.56) 
       
bsize -0.767* -0.761* -0.162*** -0.180*** -0.0319*** -0.0333*** 
 (-1.67) (-1.80) (-2.86) (-3.26) (-3.40) (-3.76) 
       
bind 0.0261 0.0445 -0.0154 -0.00868 -0.000118 0.000575 
 (0.32) (0.56) (-1.37) (-0.79) (-0.06) (0.32) 
       
instprc -0.107 -0.0613 0.000254 0.000956 -0.00364*** -0.00313** 
 (-1.29) (-0.78) (0.03) (0.11) (-2.62) (-2.31) 
       
Top5inst -0.479*** -0.437*** -0.190*** -0.180*** -0.0247*** -0.0232*** 
 (-3.05) (-3.00) (-12.55) (-12.60) (-10.87) (-10.60) 
       
agedummy 2.925 2.085 0.135 0.0731 -0.0984* -0.103** 
 (0.91) (0.67) (0.37) (0.20) (-1.95) (-2.12) 
       
size -3.191*** -2.817*** 0.0523 0.0887 -0.107*** -0.0984*** 
 (-2.89) (-2.75) (0.43) (0.74) (-5.22) (-4.95) 
N 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 
R
2 0.040 0.014 0.197 0.107 0.217 0.073 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure 
(individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_os ... CEO compensation 
without salary (multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence 
of institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total 
shares held by institutions; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; agedummy ... dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
As in the 1993 - 2005 subsample the estimates concerning the relationship between 
performance and compensation remain almost unchanged and highly significant. Some point 
estimates even increased slightly. Consistent with the results of the earlier years, this 
outcome too, implies that salary is not connected to performance in an observable way. The 
coefficients of CEO ownership and the number of board members stay at the same 
magnitude as well, indicating a positive (negative) relationship between ownership (board 
size) and performance. The estimates concerning board independence remain insignificant. 
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Concerning institutional ownership the picture is similar to the one presented earlier. 
Although the prevalent specification indicates that the presence and the concentration of 
institutional shareholders is negatively related to performance, the alternative specification 
shown in table 37 of the appendix indicates that at least the presence is positively related to 
performance, which again makes a powerful conclusion about this relationship impossible. 
Concentration, however, has a negative prefix in the alternative specification as well. 
The point estimates of size and CEO retirement dummy, as well as the R2, stay fairly close at 
their original values. 
Compensation perspective 
TABLE 18 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 2006 - 2009, salary excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os 
rE 12.20
***      
 (2.85)      
       
rE, t-1 0.450      
 (0.14)      
       
rel. rE  11.75
***     
  (3.00)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  -1.283     
  (-0.47)     
       
ROA   71.30**    
   (2.31)    
       
ROAt-1   -45.03    
   (-1.28)    
       
rel. ROA    42.43   
    (1.33)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -22.81   
    (-0.65)   
       
q     963.3***  
     (4.15)  
       
qt-1     -558.8
***  
     (-2.92)  
       
rel. q      688.8*** 
      (3.04) 
       
rel. qt-1      -344.3
* 
      (-1.88) 
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Table 18 continued 
 
     
ceo_own -23.13 -22.56 -25.33 -24.59 -26.64 -25.88 
 (-1.00) (-0.98) (-1.10) (-1.07) (-1.16) (-1.13) 
       
bsize -59.06 -60.13 -63.31 -61.82 -59.96 -56.78 
 (-0.92) (-0.94) (-0.98) (-0.96) (-0.94) (-0.89) 
       
bind -12.56 -13.41 -13.77 -14.37 -13.28 -14.15 
 (-0.87) (-0.93) (-0.95) (-0.99) (-0.92) (-0.97) 
       
instprc 9.480 9.453 7.575 8.165 8.910 9.498 
 (1.12) (1.12) (0.92) (0.98) (1.05) (1.12) 
       
Top5inst 35.42** 34.20** 33.22** 31.78** 36.24** 35.03** 
 (2.30) (2.22) (2.28) (2.17) (2.41) (2.34) 
       
agedummy 964.7* 968.2* 986.5* 979.7* 982.7* 984.9* 
 (1.89) (1.90) (1.93) (1.91) (1.93) (1.92) 
       
size 2314.6*** 2318.8*** 2311.0*** 2307.1*** 2331.1*** 2325.3*** 
 (13.74) (13.74) (13.82) (13.81) (13.80) (13.79) 
N 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
R
2 0.397 0.395 0.393 0.391 0.397 0.394 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: ceo_c_os ... CEO compensation without salary; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... 
Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance 
measure); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; instprc ... presence of 
institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total 
shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of 
total assets 
 
Despite the fact that the β-values of the performance indicators changed a little bit, they are 
still highly comparable to the ones reported in section 5.3.2. Interestingly, some of the 
estimates even increased, not only indicating that salary is not related to performance, but 
that it potentially weakens the relationship between compensation and performance. It 
should be noted, though, that the explanatory power of this regression slightly decreased. 
As the results in table 14, the coefficients in this table can also be interpreted as an 
indication that firms seem to jointly use absolute and relative stock market proxies to 
evaluate and reward their CEO's performance. Moreover, consistent with what we generally 
observed so far, the ROA is higher related to compensation than stock return, in this case 
indicating that the components other than salary are more sensitive to accounting 
performance.  
As in the performance perspective, the values concerning CEO ownership, board size and 
independence, and size preserve the same prefix and significance levels in a specification 
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that omits base salary. The β-values of the retirement dummy variable increased in 
magnitude as well as in significance. 
Concerning institutional holdings we observe a similar situation as in section 5.3.2. Contrary 
to the findings of the years 1993 - 2005 the presence is not significantly negatively related to 
compensation (not even in the alternative specification). As in the original results the point 
estimates of concentration are still positive and significant though, indicating that firms with 
highly concentrated institutional holdings pay their CEOs more of the components other 
than salary. In reverse, this implies that institutional investors do not care too much about 
base salary. 
5.4.2 Excluding bonus from TDC 
In this section the results of the specifications that omitted bonus payments in the 
calculation of compensation are presented. Omitting the bonus should help to further 
understand the role of bonus payments as a compensation component. Again, the 
relationship is tested in two subsamples covering the years 1993 to 2005 and 2006 to 2009 
respectively. 
5.4.2.1 1993 - 2005 
Performance perspective 
TABLE 19 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2005, bonus excluded 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_ob 0.465*** 0.387*** 0.0299*** 0.0259*** 0.0342** 0.0301** 
 (3.71) (3.42) (4.92) (4.82) (2.55) (2.32) 
       
ceo_own 0.379*** 0.345*** 0.0921*** 0.0915*** 0.0130*** 0.0125*** 
 (2.74) (2.67) (8.18) (8.46) (3.81) (3.81) 
       
instprc -0.114*** -0.109*** -0.0126*** -0.00243 -0.0103*** -0.00875*** 
 (-3.26) (-3.33) (-3.60) (-0.72) (-7.22) (-6.32) 
       
Top5inst -0.635*** -0.561*** -0.127*** -0.111*** -0.0277*** -0.0257*** 
 (-10.24) (-9.83) (-22.01) (-20.31) (-17.14) (-16.26) 
       
agedummy -6.563*** -6.368*** 0.0335 0.113 -0.189*** -0.178*** 
 (-4.17) (-4.27) (0.21) (0.74) (-5.02) (-4.82) 
       
size -5.687*** -5.544*** -0.424*** -0.352*** -0.205*** -0.191*** 
 (-10.40) (-10.75) (-7.90) (-6.75) (-7.10) (-6.83) 
N 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 
R
2 0.047 0.025 0.124 0.062 0.177 0.064 
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Panel B (of table 19) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_ob 0.241*** 0.170*** 0.0230*** 0.0215*** 0.0112* 0.00800 
 (2.86) (2.62) (3.92) (3.60) (1.93) (1.56) 
       
ceo_own 0.504* 0.409 0.0923*** 0.0988*** 0.0145* 0.0148** 
 (1.87) (1.64) (4.37) (4.86) (1.87) (2.00) 
       
instprc 0.0790 -0.0382 -0.0124* 0.000115 -0.00818*** -0.00707*** 
 (1.47) (-0.76) (-1.88) (0.02) (-3.29) (-2.91) 
       
Top5inst -0.556*** -0.500*** -0.160*** -0.144*** -0.0277*** -0.0260*** 
 (-6.61) (-6.30) (-14.39) (-13.59) (-10.45) (-10.00) 
       
agedummy -6.929*** -6.378*** 0.0250 0.0181 -0.234*** -0.231*** 
 (-3.15) (-3.05) (0.10) (0.07) (-3.86) (-3.82) 
       
eindex -1.283** -1.724*** -0.336*** -0.250*** -0.185*** -0.178*** 
 (-1.97) (-2.87) (-4.06) (-3.14) (-7.32) (-7.28) 
       
size -2.211*** -2.665*** -0.391*** -0.335*** -0.0913*** -0.0852*** 
 (-3.09) (-3.99) (-4.03) (-3.53) (-4.06) (-4.00) 
N 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 
R
2 0.060 0.026 0.142 0.089 0.169 0.054 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Panel A shows the results of a regression without E-index, because including the index substantially 
decreases sample size (from 12,876 to 4,347). Panel B reports the estimates if it is included. It is worth noting 
that the coefficient of determination increased in this specification.  
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_ob ... CEO compensation without bonus  
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by 
institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; eindex ... E-index; size ... log 
of total assets 
 
If bonus payments are not added to the total direct compensation in the sample period from 
1993 to 2005, the coefficients of the compensation / performance relationship change only 
moderately. For model 1 to 4 they slightly decline, and for the models using Tobin's q as 
performance measure 3 out of 4 point estimates slightly increase. Since the magnitude of 
the change is very small and the R2 stays almost exactly the same, these findings support the 
interpretation that bonuses apparently do not account for the previously observed positive 
relationship between TDC and performance. This apparently weak impact is at least partly 
caused by the fact that from the 12,876 (4,347) firm year observations in this subsample, 
3,625 (738) reported bonus payments equal to zero. According to Wade, Porac, and 
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Pollock203 not paying a bonus is a powerful signal to the market that the board, and 
especially the compensation committee, acts independently from the CEO. 
Concerning the various control variables, not a single one changed substantially compared to 
the estimates shown in table 11. The coefficients of CEO ownership are almost identical to 
those presented earlier. The significant point estimates of a CEO near retirement, size and E-
index remain comparable to the original values, all indicating that they coincide with low 
performance. The only exemption is the relationship between a CEO near retirement and 
operating performance, which is positive but not significant. 
The estimates of the employed institutional variables are almost identical to those reported 
in the original table, i.e. that no clear statements about the relationship between presence 
of institutional investors can be made, since the coefficients change with the alternative 
specifications. The β-values of ownership concentration are also unchanged, i.e. negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
203
 cf. Wade, Porac, Pollock, 1997, "Worth, words, and the justification of executive pay" 
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Compensation perspective 
TABLE 20 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2005, bonus excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob 
rE 15.20
***      
 (3.83)      
       
rE, t-1 9.423
***      
 (2.81)      
       
rel. rE  15.77
***     
  (3.50)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  8.485
**     
  (2.38)     
       
ROA   105.3***    
   (2.73)    
       
ROAt-1   -1.718    
   (-0.06)    
       
rel. ROA    90.94***   
    (2.59)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    12.29   
    (0.48)   
       
q     762.9*  
     (1.80)  
       
qt-1     773.0
**  
     (2.12)  
       
rel. q      546.6 
      (1.40) 
       
rel. qt-1      949.2
*** 
      (3.04) 
       
ceo_own -3.535 -3.120 -4.632 -4.822 -16.86 -16.63 
 (-0.22) (-0.19) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.95) (-0.94) 
       
instprc -25.61*** -25.72*** -25.85*** -26.84*** -11.78 -13.25* 
 (-4.15) (-4.16) (-4.14) (-4.20) (-1.51) (-1.71) 
       
Top5inst 1.792 0.370 1.623 -0.0697 27.12* 24.38* 
 (0.21) (0.04) (0.19) (-0.01) (1.95) (1.76) 
       
agedummy 11.59 12.73 -124.4 -132.5 85.26 74.80 
 (0.05) (0.05) (-0.48) (-0.51) (0.33) (0.29) 
       
  
90 
 
Table 20 continued 
 
     
size 2207.8*** 2208.8*** 2155.6*** 2150.8*** 2250.5*** 2244.5*** 
 (17.81) (17.83) (17.72) (17.84) (18.22) (18.34) 
       
interlock 399.2 361.1 222.0 237.2 237.4 245.5 
 (0.48) (0.43) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
R
2 0.098 0.096 0.091 0.090 0.135 0.132 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: ceo_c_ob ... CEO compensation without options; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... 
Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance 
measure); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by 
top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
Overall, the decrease in the coefficient of determination (unadjusted R²) by roughly 20% 
indicates that bonus in fact plays a considerable role in the relationship between 
compensation on one hand, and performance and control variables on the other204. This 
impact, however, cannot be observed in the β-values of the performance variables, since the 
magnitude of the decrease in the coefficients seems too small to be of any relevance. In 
particular, it is surprising that the point estimates of the ROA versions did not change 
substantially, since one would expect that bonus payments are typically based on accounting 
performance205. This expected but not observed decline, however, is probably at least partly 
caused by the previously mentioned observations in which a bonus of zero was reported. 
The results on CEO ownership and interlock are comparable to the original terms, and also 
still not significant. The prefix of the variable addressing  presence of institutional ownership 
stays the same and is significant in 11 of 12 combinations (including the alternative 
specification in the appendix), indicating that institutional investors were indifferent to 
bonus payments as well (during the examined period of time).  Consistent with every other 
regression result there is no conclusive relationship between concentrated institutional 
holdings and CEO compensation level during the sample period. Moreover it is worth noting 
that the coefficients of size slightly increased and stayed significantly positive related to all 
performance variables, no matter if measured relatively or absolutely. The point estimates 
of the retirement dummy dropped by about 80. 
                                                      
204
It should be noted that the decrease in R² is not caused by a lower number of employed variables - they 
remain exactly the same. The only difference is that, except for observations where no bonus was paid in the 
first place, TDC has a lower value. 
205
 cf. Wade, Porac, Pollock, 1997, "Worth, words, and the justification of executive pay" 
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5.4.2.2 2006 - 2009 
Performance perspective 
TABLE 21 
Regression results: Performance perspective 2006 - 2009, bonus excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_ob 0.711*** 0.507*** 0.0901*** 0.0717*** 0.0193*** 0.0159*** 
 (3.73) (2.82) (4.02) (3.45) (4.49) (3.83) 
       
ceo_own -0.0867 -0.117 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.0115** 0.0111** 
 (-0.64) (-0.89) (4.96) (4.97) (2.57) (2.57) 
       
bsize -0.788* -0.776* -0.165*** -0.182*** -0.0325*** -0.0339*** 
 (-1.72) (-1.84) (-2.91) (-3.31) (-3.46) (-3.82) 
       
bind 0.0185 0.0391 -0.0161 -0.00909 -0.000273 0.000455 
 (0.23) (0.50) (-1.43) (-0.83) (-0.15) (0.26) 
       
instprc -0.108 -0.0624 0.000178 0.000928 -0.00367*** -0.00315** 
 (-1.31) (-0.79) (0.02) (0.10) (-2.64) (-2.32) 
       
Top5inst -0.477*** -0.436*** -0.190*** -0.180*** -0.0247*** -0.0232*** 
 (-3.04) (-2.99) (-12.56) (-12.61) (-10.85) (-10.59) 
       
agedummy 3.018 2.150 0.122 0.0559 -0.0997** -0.105** 
 (0.94) (0.69) (0.33) (0.16) (-1.98) (-2.15) 
       
size -3.225*** -2.846*** -0.00235 0.0321 -0.116*** -0.106*** 
 (-2.84) (-2.70) (-0.02) (0.26) (-5.41) (-5.13) 
N 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 
R
2 0.040 0.014 0.198 0.109 0.219 0.074 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure 
(individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_ob ... CEO compensation 
without bonus (multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence 
of institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total 
shares held by institutions; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; agedummy ... dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
Strikingly, the β-values concerning the performance / compensation relationship increased 
considerably when the bonus is not considered, while the coefficient of determination stays 
unchanged. This increase seems attributable to the very low number of firms that reported 
bonus payments other than zero. Out of 3,899 firm year observations in this subsample only 
628 reported a bonus greater than zero.  As mentioned earlier, not paying a bonus to the 
CEO can serve as a signal to the market that the compensation committee is not influenced 
by the CEO. However, to validate this statement, an event study would be required, which is 
not aim of this work. Obviously, due to the low number of non-zero bonus values in the 
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original sample, the analysis of its impact becomes less meaningful. Nevertheless, I reported 
the findings in short for the sake of completeness.   
The coefficients of all other variables are comparable to those presented in the original set. 
CEO ownership still coincides with high operating performance and a high firm value (as 
measured with Tobin's q), while being insignificantly related to stock performance. Still 
consistent with Yermack's findings206, the size of the board is considerably negatively related 
to performance. The coefficients of board independence did not change either, remaining 
insignificant as in all other results. Moreover, the picture concerning institutional ownership 
is the same as in the preceding specifications. A clear statement about the effect of its 
presence is impossible, and its concentration is negatively related to every performance 
variable employed. The point estimates of (i) agedummy and (ii) size that are significant are 
also fairly close to the original terms, all indicating a negative relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
206
 cf. Yermack, 1996, “Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
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Compensation perspective 
TABLE 22 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 2006 - 2009, bonus excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob 
rE 10.53
***      
 (2.83)      
       
rE, t-1 1.173      
 (0.43)      
       
rel. rE  10.68
***     
  (2.98)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  -0.677     
  (-0.27)     
       
ROA   68.51**    
   (2.56)    
       
ROAt-1   -32.28    
   (-1.12)    
       
rel. ROA    51.71*   
    (1.90)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -18.99   
    (-0.66)   
       
q     954.4***  
     (4.28)  
       
qt-1     -530.6
***  
     (-2.93)  
       
rel. q      731.2*** 
      (3.34) 
       
rel. qt-1      -353.3
** 
      (-2.02) 
       
ceo_own -16.74 -16.23 -19.97 -19.50 -20.57 -19.87 
 (-0.75) (-0.73) (-0.90) (-0.88) (-0.93) (-0.90) 
       
bsize -26.69 -27.44 -28.70 -26.93 -26.73 -23.28 
 (-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.48) (-0.48) (-0.42) 
       
bind 0.432 -0.323 -0.535 -1.135 -0.0818 -0.959 
 (0.05) (-0.04) (-0.06) (-0.13) (-0.01) (-0.11) 
       
instprc 11.82 11.85 10.07 10.56 11.41 12.04 
 (1.47) (1.47) (1.28) (1.33) (1.41) (1.49) 
       
Top5inst 32.68** 31.68** 32.62** 31.77** 34.39** 33.43** 
 (2.18) (2.11) (2.27) (2.20) (2.32) (2.26) 
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Table 22 continued 
 
     
agedummy 873.0* 876.5* 893.7* 889.9* 894.6* 896.1* 
 (1.91) (1.91) (1.95) (1.94) (1.96) (1.95) 
       
size 2271.1*** 2275.5*** 2268.0*** 2265.3*** 2290.5*** 2285.7*** 
 (14.65) (14.64) (14.69) (14.67) (14.65) (14.64) 
N 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
R
2 0.457 0.456 0.454 0.453 0.459 0.456 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: ceo_c_ob ... CEO compensation without bonus; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... 
Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance 
measure); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; instprc ... presence of 
institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total 
shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of 
total assets 
 
The R² of all models rose considerable compared to the original set (table 14), which shows 
that the scarcely made bonus payments were not only apparently insufficiently connected to 
performance, but that they even made the connection between TDC and performance 
weaker. This is probably also the reason why there is a significant relationship between 
relative ROA and compensation now. Moreover, even the puzzling negative point estimates 
of lagged q got less severe. The other coefficients are all similar to the ones reported in table 
14.  
The point estimates of the rows concerning CEO ownership, board size, and board 
independence all have the same prefix as in the original table and remain insignificant. The 
relationship between institutional ownership and compensation did not change either, 
which is not surprising since it is hardly imaginable that institutional investors in the 
aggregate care about seldom paid bonuses. Interestingly, the findings show a lower 
significance and magnitude concerning a situation in which the CEO is near retirement, in 
the reverse indicating that CEOs near retirement are more likely to receive bonus payments. 
Firm size is still highly significantly related to the level of pay. 
5.4.3 Excluding options from TDC 
Options are a frequently and extensively used component of executive pay, as the 
descriptive statistics in section 4.2 already indicated. Due to this popularity, and because 
they are oftentimes praised as to align interests, it seems rewarding to examine the change 
in the models if options are excluded in the calculation of CEO compensation. In addition, 
such an analysis will show whether the other components are rewarded in a performance-
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contingent way or if options are the only component that connects shareholders' wealth 
with managers'. As in the previous analysis, this section will also start with the 1993-2005 
period. 
5.4.3.1 1993 - 2005 
Performance perspective 
TABLE 23 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2005, options excluded 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_oo 0.268** 0.182*** 0.0369** 0.0313*** 0.00341** 0.00267* 
 (2.48) (2.70) (2.54) (2.74) (2.46) (1.78) 
       
ceo_own 0.379*** 0.345*** 0.0922*** 0.0916*** 0.0129*** 0.0125*** 
 (2.73) (2.67) (8.17) (8.46) (3.77) (3.78) 
       
instprc -0.124*** -0.117*** -0.0132*** -0.00297 -0.0110*** -0.00941*** 
 (-3.53) (-3.57) (-3.78) (-0.88) (-7.80) (-6.87) 
       
Top5inst -0.642*** -0.567*** -0.127*** -0.112*** -0.0282*** -0.0261*** 
 (-10.32) (-9.90) (-22.07) (-20.37) (-17.39) (-16.53) 
       
agedummy -6.708*** -6.479*** 0.0195 0.101 -0.195*** -0.184*** 
 (-4.25) (-4.34) (0.12) (0.66) (-5.15) (-4.94) 
       
size -5.071*** -4.982*** -0.407*** -0.336*** -0.140*** -0.134*** 
 (-9.60) (-10.08) (-7.37) (-6.35) (-10.40) (-10.31) 
N 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 
R
2 0.042 0.021 0.123 0.060 0.146 0.035 
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Panel B (of table 23) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_oo 0.202*** 0.127*** 0.0262*** 0.0237*** 0.00273** 0.00162 
 (2.99) (5.60) (3.50) (3.07) (2.30) (1.39) 
       
ceo_own 0.500* 0.406 0.0919*** 0.0984*** 0.0143* 0.0147** 
 (1.86) (1.63) (4.34) (4.83) (1.84) (1.98) 
       
instprc 0.0714 -0.0436 -0.0131** -0.000540 -0.00856*** -0.00734*** 
 (1.33) (-0.86) (-1.98) (-0.09) (-3.39) (-2.98) 
       
Top5inst -0.558*** -0.502*** -0.160*** -0.144*** -0.0278*** -0.0261*** 
 (-6.64) (-6.32) (-14.41) (-13.61) (-10.43) (-9.98) 
       
agedummy -6.963*** -6.399*** 0.0207 0.0142 -0.235*** -0.232*** 
 (-3.16) (-3.05) (0.08) (0.06) (-3.85) (-3.82) 
       
eindex -1.349** -1.772*** -0.341*** -0.255*** -0.188*** -0.180*** 
 (-2.07) (-2.94) (-4.13) (-3.21) (-7.37) (-7.30) 
       
size -1.918*** -2.439*** -0.371*** -0.316*** -0.0693*** -0.0691*** 
 (-2.70) (-3.67) (-3.85) (-3.35) (-3.40) (-3.52) 
N 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 
R
2 0.057 0.024 0.141 0.088 0.163 0.050 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: Panel A shows the results of a regression without E-index, because including the index substantially 
decreases sample size (from 12,876 to 4,347). Panel B reports the estimates if it is included. It is worth noting 
that the coefficient of determination increased in this specification.  
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_oo ... CEO compensation without options 
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by 
institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; eindex ... E-index; size ... log 
of total assets 
 
In looking on the panels A and B from table 23 it becomes evident that options apparently 
contribute substantially to the link between compensation and performance as measured 
with rE and Tobin's q. In both specifications, the point estimates concerning those proxies 
dropped dramatically compared to the original estimates, indicating that options account for 
a large part of the previously observed positive relationship. Although this is not surprising, 
due to the fact that options become more valuable (and henceforth raise the level of 
compensation) the more they are "in the money" (i.e. the higher the value of the stock of 
the firm), the results still serve as an illustration of the magnitude and importance of options 
as a tool to align the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders. All other 
relationships, including the puzzling results concerning the presence of institutional holdings, 
remain more or less unchanged. 
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Compensation perspective 
TABLE 24 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2005, options excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo 
rE 3.420
*      
 (1.81)      
       
rE, t-1 -0.953      
 (-0.64)      
       
rel. rE  2.967     
  (1.56)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  -1.141     
  (-0.72)     
       
ROA   54.15*    
   (1.67)    
       
ROAt-1   -28.68    
   (-1.24)    
       
rel. ROA    45.44   
    (1.51)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -20.62   
    (-1.02)   
       
q     119.4  
     (1.32)  
       
qt-1     -115.5  
     (-1.49)  
       
rel. q      97.71 
      (1.50) 
       
rel. qt-1      -96.30
* 
      (-1.70) 
       
ceo_own -3.350 -3.086 -4.891 -4.941 -2.471 -2.475 
 (-0.60) (-0.55) (-0.97) (-1.00) (-0.43) (-0.43) 
       
instprc -2.325 -2.345 -2.000 -2.502 -2.388 -2.596 
 (-0.87) (-0.88) (-0.78) (-0.90) (-0.93) (-0.96) 
       
Top5inst 8.695* 8.170* 10.95** 10.03** 7.653* 7.332 
 (1.90) (1.78) (2.40) (2.24) (1.70) (1.62) 
       
agedummy 327.9*** 323.6** 312.5** 308.4** 314.1** 313.1** 
 (2.59) (2.55) (2.44) (2.38) (2.46) (2.44) 
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Table 24 continued 
 
     
size 1258.9*** 1256.7*** 1257.2*** 1254.7*** 1251.8*** 1251.1*** 
 (15.49) (15.53) (15.42) (15.62) (15.53) (15.64) 
       
interlock -47.80 -52.20 -81.89 -73.97 -61.94 -61.07 
 (-0.31) (-0.33) (-0.51) (-0.47) (-0.39) (-0.38) 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
R
2 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.080 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: ceo_c_oo ... CEO compensation without options; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... 
Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance 
measure); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by 
top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
If options grants are excluded in the calculation of compensation the model gets 
considerably weaker, i.e. the coefficient of determination drops by at least 30%. Thus, it 
seems that options play a considerable role in the relationship between compensation and 
performance. As mentioned above, this is not surprising however, since the value of the 
grants rises if the value of the underlying (i.e. the firm) rises. However, this specifications 
allows to draw conclusions how well the other components of executive pay are connected 
to various performance measures. Moreover, the argumentum e contrario gives an 
indication of the great extent to which options are the cause of the previously observed 
connection between shareholders’ and the CEO’s wealth.  
In the 1993-2005 subsample, all point estimates of absolute performance drop dramatically 
and loose statistical power. If performance is measured using Tobin's q as in model 5, the β-
value cease to be significant all together. Moreover, with exemption of q, the remaining 
components do not seem to be related to relative performance anymore, indicating that 
these components did not reward the CEOs for the firm specific performance. These findings 
imply that options have been the crucial component between 1993 and 2005 that connected 
compensation and performance. This interpretation is confirmed by table 48 in the 
appendix, which shows the results of an regression that used options only. 
The β-values of CEO compensation are still comparable to the original estimates. The ones 
concerning the presence of institutional shareholders however, changed substantially. 
Previously they always indicated that the presence is negatively related to the level of 
compensation. If options are omitted however, this relationship is not significant anymore. 
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This can be seen as an indication that institutional shareholders particularly influence the 
compensation-like option grants207, possibly because they dislike the diluting effect of option 
grants. Under this impression, the apparently positive relationship of the concentration in 
this specification is puzzling. This result should not be taken as conclusive, though, since in 
the alternative specification shown in the appendix, the point estimates of concentration are 
negative, though not significant. 
What is really interesting is that the coefficients of the retirement dummy variable increased 
remarkably and are significant above the 0.05% level now. This indicates that CEOs near 
retirement tend to get more of the remaining components than their younger colleagues. 
This is also somehow confirmed by the findings reported in table 48 in the appendix, which 
reports negative, though insignificant, point estimates concerning the near-retirement 
dummy. These results are especially interesting since the remaining components are 
apparently weaker connected to performance, which would support the previously indicated 
concern that the agency problem aggravates if the CEO is near retirement. The relationship 
between firm size and compensation remains highly significant, though lower in magnitude. 
This decline could be due to a tendency of large firms to grant relatively more options. 
Interlock is still insignificant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
207
 This interpretation is again supported by the findings of table 48 in the appendix, which presents point 
estimates tat are comparable to those reported in the original table. This indicates that institutional investors 
were particularly concerned about option grants in these years. 
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5.4.3.2 2006 - 2009 
Performance perspective 
TABLE 25 
Regression results: Performance perspective 2006 - 2009, options excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_oo 0.527*** 0.331** 0.0533** 0.0342 0.00455 0.00229 
 (3.09) (2.14) (2.35) (1.61) (1.45) (0.75) 
       
ceo_own -0.0848 -0.117 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.0112** 0.0107** 
 (-0.63) (-0.89) (4.93) (4.94) (2.49) (2.48) 
       
bsize -0.790* -0.775* -0.165*** -0.181*** -0.0319*** -0.0333*** 
 (-1.72) (-1.84) (-2.90) (-3.29) (-3.42) (-3.78) 
       
bind 0.0242 0.0425 -0.0156 -0.00883 -0.000280 0.000424 
 (0.29) (0.54) (-1.38) (-0.80) (-0.15) (0.24) 
       
instprc -0.107 -0.0615 0.000296 0.000958 -0.00369*** -0.00319** 
 (-1.28) (-0.78) (0.03) (0.11) (-2.66) (-2.35) 
       
Top5inst -0.480*** -0.437*** -0.190*** -0.180*** -0.0247*** -0.0231*** 
 (-3.06) (-3.00) (-12.56) (-12.61) (-10.86) (-10.60) 
       
agedummy 3.121 2.274 0.150 0.0877 -0.0859* -0.0919* 
 (0.97) (0.73) (0.41) (0.25) (-1.70) (-1.88) 
       
size -2.525** -2.269** 0.110 0.136 -0.0797*** -0.0743*** 
 (-2.44) (-2.37) (0.93) (1.17) (-4.06) (-3.90) 
N 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 
R
2 0.037 0.012 0.195 0.107 0.212 0.068 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure 
(individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_oo ... CEO compensation 
without options (multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... 
presence of institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage 
of total shares held by institutions; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; agedummy ... dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
As can be referred from table 25 excluding options substantially weakened the relationship 
between compensation and performance from 2006 to 2009. Other than in the estimates 
presented in the earlier subsample, an increase in compensation is now also associated with 
a lower increase in operating performance, when we compare the results to the original 
table. This finding however, is only statistically meaningful for the absolute measure of ROA, 
since the relative one, together with both versions of q, ceased to be significant. 
Nevertheless it is consistent with table 49 of the appendix, which shows that, in a regression 
that uses only options as compensation variable, the point estimates are higher than in the 
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regression that employed all components. Together, these findings suggest that options, 
although less extensively used, also play an important role during the year 2006 - 2009. 
The estimates addressing managerial ownership and board size are unchanged, still 
indicating a negative relationship between the number of directors on the board, and a 
positive between ownership and operating performance and firm value. Consistent with 
other researchers208, I did not observe a significant relationship between board 
independence and performance in this specification either. The interrelations of the 
presence of institutional ownership show a familiar situation. Although negatively related 
with performance in the models 5 and 6 of this specification, the alternative specification 
depicts a positive and significant relationship. Concentration is negatively related as usual. 
As the near-retirement dummy, the firm size measures, too, yield results fairly close to the 
original. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
208
 cf. Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance"; Yermack, 1996, “Higher market 
valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
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Compensation perspective 
TABLE 26 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 2006 - 2009, options excluded 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo 
rE 8.384
**      
 (2.57)      
       
rE, t-1 0.916      
 (0.36)      
       
rel. rE  7.890
***     
  (2.70)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  0.552     
  (0.26)     
       
ROA   51.75**    
   (1.98)    
       
ROAt-1   -33.39    
   (-1.24)    
       
rel. ROA    27.13   
    (0.99)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -14.57   
    (-0.55)   
       
q     535.7***  
     (3.07)  
       
qt-1     -455.4
***  
     (-3.04)  
       
rel. q      350.7** 
      (2.09) 
       
rel. qt-1      -312.7
** 
      (-2.23) 
       
ceo_own -38.52*** -38.16*** -40.03*** -39.41*** -38.30*** -37.83*** 
 (-2.71) (-2.69) (-2.81) (-2.77) (-2.69) (-2.66) 
       
bsize 2.780 2.754 -0.531 0.432 -2.256 -0.683 
 (0.05) (0.05) (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.04) (-0.01) 
       
bind -14.34 -14.91 -15.24 -15.67 -15.50 -15.97 
 (-1.12) (-1.16) (-1.19) (-1.22) (-1.21) (-1.25) 
       
instprc -0.246 -0.176 -1.623 -1.170 -1.149 -0.851 
 (-0.03) (-0.02) (-0.22) (-0.16) (-0.15) (-0.11) 
       
Top5inst 24.23* 23.81* 22.37 21.15 19.99 19.17 
 (1.70) (1.66) (1.63) (1.53) (1.43) (1.37) 
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Table 26 continued 
 
     
agedummy 666.6* 669.0* 682.8* 677.0* 654.7* 656.4* 
 (1.85) (1.85) (1.89) (1.87) (1.81) (1.81) 
       
size 1686.1*** 1688.2*** 1684.3*** 1681.1*** 1687.1*** 1683.2*** 
 (15.14) (15.16) (15.30) (15.32) (15.29) (15.32) 
N 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
R
2 0.368 0.367 0.365 0.364 0.367 0.365 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: ceo_c_oo ... CEO compensation without options; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... 
Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance 
measure); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; instprc ... presence of 
institutional investors; top5inst ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total 
shares held by institutions; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of 
total assets 
 
Omitting option grants from the calculation of CEO compensation results in a substantial 
decrease of R², indicating that options are indeed an important component in the 
compensation / performance relationship. This impression is supported by the changes of 
the point estimates concerning performance, which dropped substantially too. Although 
they did not decrease as dramatically as the estimates presented in the 1993-2005 
subsample, the decline in magnitude and statistical power is still remarkable. That the 
decrease did not turn out  as severe as above, is probably attributable to the lower reliance 
on compensation-like options during the year 2006 - 2009, as already indicated in the 
descriptive statistics. Since compensation in this period seems to be better balanced, 
dilution should be less of an issue. This could also explain why the presence of institutional 
shareholders did not have a significant negative relationship to the level of compensation in 
any specification during this period of time. If institutional investors are concerned about 
dilution, and henceforth influence compensation, better balanced compensation schemes 
could make such an effort obsolete. This argumentation is also supported by table 50 in the 
appendix, which reports considerably lower point estimates than the corresponding table in 
the 1993 - 2005 subsample. 
The most surprising result is without a doubt the significant negative relationship between 
CEO ownership and performance. Though this was indicated by the results of all other 
regressions too, it was never significant. The negative sign of the estimates gives support to 
the view that CEOs with high ownership portions receive considerably less compensation 
  
104 
 
from components other than options. In reverse, this could imply that high-ownership CEOs 
get more option grants than those with a lower stake209. 
The variables addressing board characteristics still have a negative sign, yet they are not 
significant. The situation of the variables describing institutional ownership is unaffected by 
the exclusion of option grants. Concentration remains positively connected to compensation 
and the presence estimates are insignificant and point in different directions.  
Interestingly, the previously highly significant retirement dummy variable is now lower in 
magnitude and less powerful. This is somehow contrary to the findings in the earlier 
subsample, since in this the dummy variable never yielded significant estimates until options 
were excluded from compensation. In the prevailing subsample the opposite is the case. If 
options are excluded the near retirement dummy becomes less significant and lower in 
magnitude, indicating that a CEO near retirement receives more option grants than his 
younger colleagues. 
Although the magnitude of the point estimates addressing firm size is considerably lower, 
they are of high statistical power. Nevertheless, the decline in magnitude can be seen as an 
indicator that large companies grant relatively more options, which is consistent with the 
argumentation in the 1993-2005 subsample and the evidence in table 50 of the appendix. 
6 Conclusion 
 
In recent months and years the compensation arrangements of top managers have been 
extensively discussed in public, the media and in politics. This increased concern is probably 
attributable to the fact that "executive compensation is at the center of a complex mix of 
societal problems, most notably the increasing gap between rich and poor and the economic 
crisis"210. Especially in times when the economy is on the verge of recession and future 
prospects getting worse and worse, publics’ and politics’ concern about corporate top 
management compensation plans increase considerably. During such periods shareholders, 
although almost indifferent to compensation levels during booms211, start to question 
                                                      
209
 Again, this is supported by the table in the appendix. 
210
 Dillon, 2009, "The coming battle over executive pay", p.97 
211
 cf. Bebchuk, Grinstein, 2005, “The Growth of Executive Pay” 
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prevailing compensation arrangements. That their "say on pay" increases can easily be 
illustrated by a recent incident at Citigroup Inc., where, for only the second time in the 
history of corporate America, a large U.S. bank’s compensation plan was rejected by its 
shareholders. Although Citigroup Inc. announced that the proposed compensation plan “[…] 
will attract and retain top talent […]”212, shareholders’ did not agree with awarding the CEO 
a compensation package worth about $55 million for a year in which the share price 
dropped about 44 percent. As Mike Mayo, and analysts at CLSA in New York declares: “Are 
you going to give the manager of the New York Yankees an incentive bonus if he wins one-
third of his games?”213. Due to this increased concern it seemed rewarding to take a closer 
look at the relationship between performance and compensation. Tables 27 and 28 
summarize the results of my analysis in comparison to the expected values. 
  
                                                      
212
 cf. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-17/citigroup-shareholders-reject-management-s-
compensation-plan-1.html (last access on June 8
th
, 2012) 
213
 cf. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-17/citigroup-shareholders-reject-management-s-
compensation-plan-1.html (last access on June 8
th
, 2012) 
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TABLE 27 & 28 
Comparison of expected and actually observed empirical relationships 
 
Performance perspective  Compensation perspective 
     
 Performance 
measure 
  Level of 
compensationt 
 
exp. 
1993 
- 
2005 
2006 
- 
2009 
  
exp. 
1993 
- 
2005 
2006 
- 
2009 
Compensationt + + +  (rel.) stock returnt + + + 
Managerial ownership 
(0%-L1)t 
+ 
+ + 
 
(rel.) stock returnt-1 + + ~ 
Managerial ownership 
(L1-L2)t 
- 
 
(rel.) ROAt + + + 
Managerial ownership 
(L2- 100%)t 
+ 
 
(rel.) ROAt-1 + ~ ~ 
Board sizet - n.a. -  (rel.) Tobin’s qt + + + 
Board independencet + n.a. ~  (rel.) Tobin’s qt-1 + + - 
Presence of inst. 
investorst 
+ ~ ~ 
 
Managerial ownershipt + ~ ~ 
Concentration of inst. 
holdingst 
+ - - 
 
Board sizet + n.a. ~ 
CEO near retirementt - - -  Board independencet - n.a. ~ 
E-indext - - n.a.  Presence of inst. investorst - - ~ 
Firm sizet 
 - - 
 Concentration of inst. 
holdingst 
- ~ + 
     CEO near retirement  ~ + 
     E-indext + / / 
     Firm sizet + + + 
     Interlockt (TRUE) + ~ n.a. 
Note: These tables compare the expected relationships with the ones actually observed, both for the 
performance and the compensation perspective.  The first column presents the expected (exp.)prefix of the 
point estimates. The second and third column summarize the actually observed relationships for the 
subsamples from 1993 - 2005 and 2006 - 2009 respectively. If there is no sign in the "expected" cell, this 
indicates that I had no expectations concerning this relationship. The signs in the remaining cells are defined as 
follows:  + ... positive relationship, - ... negative relationship, ~ ... insignificant, / ... not tested due to a 
substantial decrease in the explanatory power of the model, n.a. ... the data was not available for the 
considered subsample 
 
The most important result of the analysis is that there is a statistically meaningful, positive 
relationship between compensation and performance for both subsamples, no matter if 
performance is measured in absolute or relative terms214. This indicates that, in the 
aggregate, high (low) performance coincides with high (low) compensation. Overall, it seems 
that the preceding year's performance is of subordinate importance in this relationship. 
                                                      
214
With exemption of the lagged Tobin’s q in the 2006 - 2009 subsample. 
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Concerning managerial ownership my results are supportive to the convergence-of-interest 
hypothesis, since I did not find any indication that high or intermediate levels of ownership 
are negatively related to performance. Rather, my findings suggest that increases in 
ownership are accompanied by increases in performance. 
As can be referred from the tables 27 and 28, my findings do not support the notion that 
higher board independence (measured as the fraction of outside directors on it) is 
associated with higher performance. This is consistent with the insignificant results of 
previous research215. The board size on the opposite is negatively related to performance, 
which is consistent with earlier evidence.  Neither board characteristic is significantly related 
to the level of compensation. 
Contrary to my expectations the results do not support a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and performance. Although the insignificance of the presence is 
consistent with the findings of a reviewed paper216, the negative relationship between the 
concentration of institutional holdings and performance is surprising.  In the compensation 
perspective, the results in the 1993 - 2005 subsample show support to the expectations in 
that the presence of institutional shareholders is negatively related to the level of 
compensation. The findings addressing the concentration of the holdings during the years 
2006-2009 are not supportive though. 
Since the firms with CEOs near retirement yield a lower performance (as measured with 
Tobin's q and stock return), the findings are consistent with the notion that the principal 
agent conflict aggravates in such situations. Due to the possibility that these CEOs forego 
profitable long-term projects because of their shorter personal time horizon, the 
insignificant relationship with the specification using ROA also supports the interpretation 
since this accounting measure does not reflect possibly foregone investments. In the 
compensation perspective this dummy variable was only included as a control variable 
without any expectations. Seemingly, CEOs near retirement earned significantly more than 
their younger colleagues from 2006 to 2009. 
                                                      
215
 cf. Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance"; Yermack, 1996, “Higher market 
valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
216
 cf. Sundaramurthy, Rhoades, Rechner, 2005, "A Meta-analysis of the effects of executive and institutional 
ownership on firm performance" 
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Concerning provisions that limit shareholder power and the threat of a takeover, my findings 
are consistent with the ones of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell in 2009217, in that the E-index is 
significantly negatively related to performance. Although not expected, firm size was 
negatively related to performance in both subsamples (with exemption of the operating 
performance from 2006-2009). In the compensation perspective the coefficients concerning 
firm size confirm the common perception that CEOs of large firms earn more. 
In addition to the findings indicated in the tables 27 and 28, the results of this work indicated 
that, in the aggregate,  base salary is indeed not rewarded in  a performance-contingent 
way, and that institutional investors are indifferent to the level of compensation. Moreover, 
the use of bonus payments substantially decreased over time, possibly because not paying a 
bonus signals an independent compensation committee218. As a result bonus payments 
contributed to the positive relationship between performance and compensation in the 
earlier subsample, but not in the later one. In fact, it seems that the rare bonus payments 
between 2006 and 2009 were not connected to any of the used performance variables, 
henceforth weakening the link between TDC and performance. 
No matter which subsample is considered, options have been a widely used component in 
executive pay. The results of the regressions imply that options were the crucial component 
in connecting shareholders' wealth with CEO's wealth. This connection was stronger from 
1993 to 2005, probably due to their popularity in the 1990219 and because the SEC changed 
the reporting requirements in 2005. Moreover the results show that during the years 1993 - 
2005, where option grants have been used the most, the presence of institutional investors 
was negatively related to option grants, possibly because they dislike the diluting effect of 
excessive option grants. In addition, it is worth noting that large firms grant more options to 
their CEOs. 
It should be noted, though, that the findings of this work do not allow any references about 
causality. The results do not allow to draw any conclusions if the positive relationship 
between performance and compensation is caused by the fact that a higher compensation 
leads to higher performance or that higher performance results in higher compensation. 
                                                      
217
 cf. Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009, “What matters in corporate governance?” 
218
 cf. Wade, Porac, Pollock, 1997, "Worth, words, and the justification of executive pay" 
219
 cf. Lavelle, 2002, "How to halt the options express" 
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Pinning down causality, and evaluating if the link between performance and compensation is 
sufficient in magnitude and socially acceptable, is left to future research. Additionally, the 
results of the 2006 - 2009 subsample, which are at least partly biased due to distorting effect 
of the financial crisis, indicate that extending this subsample, in order to facilitate more 
meaningful statements about the performance / compensation relationship during this 
period, would be rewarding. In the following, section 7 gives some more suggestions for 
additional research. 
7 Limitations & Extensions 
 
In the beginning, this work was intended as an attempt to capture the relationship between 
performance and CEO compensation as thoroughly as possible, while controlling for a 
selective set of corporate governance variables. Unfortunately conducting this task in 
sufficient detail turned out to be way beyond the scope of a master-thesis, which is why this 
work ended up in merely describing the relationships between the variables without raising 
any claims concerning causality. Nevertheless, the findings are useful indicators for future 
research. In order to give some suggestions for potential future research this section briefly 
summarizes a couple of points that would reward closer attention. 
7.1 Board characteristics 
As suggested by previous research220, board members’ willingness to monitor with high 
scrutiny and establish effective compensation plans probably increases with the stake they 
are holding in the firm. The problem is that directors typically hold only a small fraction of 
the firm, which makes their personal cost of benefitting the CEO rather than the 
shareholders too low to offset economic, social and psychological factors221. According to 
Weisbach222, holding a substantial share in the firm is especially important to incentivize 
outside directors. Bhagat and Bolton even suggest that "[...] [board] ownership can be a 
good proxy for overall good governance"223, and that there is no need to use any other 
variable concerning the board. They think so, because a sufficient stake in the firm provides 
                                                      
220
 cf. Morck, Shleifer, Vishny, 1988, “Management ownership and market valuation” 
221
 cf. Bebchuck, Fried, 2006, “Pay without Performance: An overview of the issues” 
222
 cf. Weisbach, 1988, "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover" 
223
 cf. Bhagat, Bolton, 2008, "Corporate governance and firm performance", p.258 
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board members with the incentive to act independently and in the best interest of the 
shareholders. Due to the fact that I did not have access to a relevant database, examining 
the performance / CEO compensation relationship while controlling for the holdings of the 
board has to be left to future research. 
Another variable that was used in the past concerning the effectiveness of the board was 
CEO duality. Although it is commonly approved that CEO’s entrenchment increases if he also 
chairs the board, the effect on performance is subject to some discussion. On the one hand 
Fahlenbrach224 argues that CEO duality should be beneficial to the firm, because its 
insulation provides the CEO with the opportunity to invest in long-term projects without 
having to fear dismissal. On the other hand, there is empirical evidence that this very 
insulation reduces the threat of dismissal and facilitates rent extraction in the form of a 
higher and less sensitive compensation225. CEO duality is prohibited by the law in Austria and 
Germany. 
For the sake of completeness it is worth noting that the tenure of outside directors could 
also have a positive effect on performance, due to the “[…] the acquisition of firm-specific 
knowledge over time […]”226. 
7.2 Market for corporate control 
Probably the most powerful mechanism to reduce agency cost that was not separately 
included in my analysis is the threat of a takeover227. Theoretically, if a company is managed 
inefficiently, market participants will anticipate this inefficiency and the market value of the 
firm will decrease. This decrease, together with the possibility to enhance efficiency, makes 
the firm an attractive target for a takeover. Since such takeovers are regularly accompanied 
by a change in the top management team, the incumbent management is forced to manage 
the firm as efficient as possible in order to avoid being laid off. 
                                                      
224
 cf. Fahlenbrach, 2009, "Shareholder rights, Boards, and CEO compensation” 
225
 cf. Chiang, Lin, 2011, "Examining Board Composition and Firm Performance"; Yermack, 1996, “Higher market 
valuation of companies with a small board of directors” 
226
 cf. Hermalin, Weisbach, 1991, "The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm 
Performance" p.109 
227
 Two of the six provisions in the E-index address a potential decrease in takeover probability. However, to 
make any statements about the effectiveness of the market of corporate control a more detailed analysis 
would be required. 
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An especially interesting interaction in that context would be the one between the threat 
and managerial entrenchment and anti-takeover amendments. Both can insulate the 
incumbent management from this external regulation mechanism by making a takeover less 
likely228. Since managing the firm efficiently becomes less important in such a situation, a 
decrease in takeover probability tends to be accompanied by a decrease in market value229 
and an increase in compensation230. 
The threat of a takeover is lower in firms with high managerial ownership because the 
prospective buyer may need shares that are held by the incumbent management in order to 
acquire the required majority of voting rights. In the opposite direction, large shareholders 
can facilitate a takeover, if they are not satisfied with the way the company is managed. 
They have an incentive to do so, because if they do not tender, the probability of a takeover 
declines dramatically231. 
7.3 The role of debt 
In a widely recognized article in 1986, Jensen232 declared that issuing a sufficient amount of 
debt will reduce the free cash flow (FCF) under managers’ control, and thereby reduce 
agency cost. Under this paradigm he defined the FCF as the “[…] cash flow in excess of that 
required to fund all projects that have a positive net present values when discounted at the 
relevant cost of capital”233. In the extreme case, if management has to pay back debt 
obligations such that FCF is equal to zero, there won’t be any cash left for inefficient 
spending and perquisite consumption. This extreme case, however, will not be feasible to 
firms because they have to balance the marginal benefit of debt with the marginal cost of 
debt (agency cost of debt, bankruptcy cost). 
The problem is that firms would have to issue the debt before the cash flow and the 
investment opportunities are known in order to ensure that interest and principal payments 
are due at the time when the firm has excessive cash. If they issue less than the optimal level 
of debt, managers will pursue unprofitable or self-serving projects. If the level of debt is too 
high, it could lead to situations in which the management cannot fund all projects with a 
                                                      
228
 cf. Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value" 
229
 cf. Jensen, 1986, “Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers” 
230
 cf. Bebchuck, Fried, 2006, “Pay without Performance: An overview of the issues” 
231
 cf. Shleifer, Vishny, 1986, "Large shareholders and corporate control" 
232
 cf. Jensen, 1986, “Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers” 
233
 cf. Jensen, 1986, “Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers”, p.323 
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positive net present value (NPV), thereby leading to an, from the shareholders perspective, 
undesired situation called underinvestment234. Consequently, there should be an optimal 
level of debt that prevents the management from inefficient spending (overinvestment), but 
also allows to fund all profitable investments. This level can be expected to vary substantially 
with respect to industry, especially with respect to the growth potential235. 
Another factor in that context is the role of cash flow volatility. Stulz 1990236 developed a 
theoretical model that proves that firm value will increase with a decrease in CF volatility. If 
cash flows are easier to predict, shareholders will find it easier to force the management to a 
more optimal debt level in which the cash reserves left to managements’ free disposition are 
lower. 
7.4 Miscellaneous extensions 
A possible extension to this analysis would be the inclusion of strategy as a control variable. 
In a paper of 2011, Balsam, Fernando and Tripathy237 analyzed the differences in the 
compensation patterns of firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy on the one hand, and 
companies focusing on differentiation on the other hand. They found that "[...] cost leaders 
place an increased emphasis on sales, while those following a differentiation strategy reduce 
the emphasis on accounting measures"238. Differentiators do so because they want to 
encourage innovation, which is oftentimes costly. Focusing too much on accounting 
numbers would henceforth discourage managers from investing in R&D. 
Yet another possible extension is to include the organizational form in the regression. 
Usually, the more restrictive an organization is in terms of managerial discretion, the lower is 
the implied agency cost and henceforth the need to align the interests of principals and 
agents239. Although it would not make any sense to include such a variable in the analysis I 
conducted, since my sample comprised of publicly traded firms only, studying the impact of 
the organizational form on the principal-agent relationship would be worthwhile because it 
                                                      
234
 cf. Stulz, 1990, “Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies” 
235
 cf. Byrd, Parrino, Pritsch, 1998, "Stockholder-Manager Conflicts and Firm Value" 
236
 cf. Stulz, 1990, “Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies” 
237
 Balsam, Fernando, Tripathy, 2011, "The impact of firm strategy on performance measures used in executive 
compensation" 
238
 Balsam, Fernando, Tripathy, 2011, "The impact of firm strategy on performance measures used in executive 
compensation", p.187 
239
 cf. Damodaran, John, Liu, 2005, "What motivates managers? Evidence from organizational form changes" 
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will contribute to a deeper understanding of problems stemming from the separation of 
ownership and control. 
7.5 Final note 
One should be aware of the fact that the problems stemming from the separation of 
ownership and control differ substantially with respect to the country and culture a firm is 
operating in. My sample addresses only the North American market where, in contrast to 
e.g. Germany and Austria,  employee representatives are not mandatory on the board. Since 
the board has to approve major decisions (such as takeovers) it is possible that German 
managers are able to depart more from strictly maximizing stockholder value, due to the 
influence of the employee representatives (if jobs are endangered, these directors will 
probably not agree with a merger, no matter if it would generate value or not). Henceforth, 
the most effective instruments to align shareholders' and managers' interests will also differ, 
including possibly uncommon compensation practices. 
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9 Appendix - unreported tables 
 
TABLE 29 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2009, alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
TDC 0.500*** 0.395*** 0.0349*** 0.0278*** 0.0323*** 0.0278** 
 (4.20) (3.83) (5.24) (5.27) (2.78) (2.48) 
       
ceo_own 0.298*** 0.301*** 0.121*** 0.114*** 0.0145*** 0.0149*** 
 (2.67) (2.91) (11.57) (11.39) (5.12) (5.49) 
       
instprc 0.330*** 0.338*** 0.0857*** 0.0829*** 0.00844*** 0.00893*** 
 (8.56) (9.51) (21.91) (22.37) (8.66) (9.53) 
       
Top5tot -1.219*** -0.998*** -0.214*** -0.186*** -0.0388*** -0.0345*** 
 (-14.22) (-12.72) (-23.45) (-22.12) (-19.17) (-17.91) 
       
agedummy -4.619*** -4.936*** 0.0742 0.113 -0.166*** -0.167*** 
 (-3.29) (-3.72) (0.50) (0.80) (-5.15) (-5.31) 
       
size -5.775*** -5.127*** -0.263*** -0.220*** -0.193*** -0.173*** 
 (-11.95) (-11.48) (-5.31) (-4.67) (-6.62) (-6.13) 
N 16853 16853 16853 16853 16853 16853 
R
2 0.046 0.024 0.119 0.058 0.167 0.054 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 9 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); TDC ... total direct compensation (multiplied by 
1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; 
top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding; 
agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
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TABLE 30 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2009, alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC 
rE 15.51
***      
 (4.32)      
       
rE, t-1 9.138
***      
 (2.98)      
       
rel. rE  15.76
***     
  (3.90)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  7.771
**     
  (2.39)     
       
ROA   108.0***    
   (3.50)    
       
ROAt-1   -15.41    
   (-0.64)    
       
rel. ROA    79.29***   
    (2.79)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    9.211   
    (0.43)   
       
q     769.9*  
     (1.89)  
       
qt-1     653.7
*  
     (1.82)  
       
rel. q      517.1 
      (1.40) 
       
rel. qt-1      860.5
*** 
      (2.89) 
       
ceo_own -6.719 -7.266 -10.41 -9.720 -21.81 -22.22 
 (-0.51) (-0.55) (-0.79) (-0.73) (-1.45) (-1.47) 
       
instprc -20.05*** -19.71*** -19.41*** -18.43*** -22.43*** -21.93*** 
 (-3.25) (-3.20) (-3.13) (-3.00) (-3.42) (-3.36) 
       
Top5tot -5.367 -10.52 -15.22* -19.18** 16.90 11.97 
 (-0.61) (-1.23) (-1.83) (-2.37) (1.00) (0.73) 
       
agedummy 311.0 317.4 210.4 204.8 386.5 383.0 
 (1.32) (1.35) (0.88) (0.86) (1.63) (1.60) 
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Table 30 continued 
 
size 2594.6*** 2587.4*** 2526.3*** 2524.1*** 2612.6*** 2604.2*** 
 (25.90) (26.03) (26.09) (26.12) (26.29) (26.59) 
       
interlock 241.4 280.9 167.0 189.1 101.0 141.8 
 (0.29) (0.34) (0.20) (0.23) (0.12) (0.17) 
N 13802 13802 13802 13802 13802 13802 
R
2 0.142 0.140 0.135 0.135 0.171 0.168 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 10 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. TDC ... total direct compensation; 
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence 
of institutional investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total 
assets; 
 
 
 
TABLE 31 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2005, alt. specification 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
TDC 0.476*** 0.388*** 0.0318*** 0.0267*** 0.0332*** 0.0291** 
 (3.87) (3.57) (5.19) (5.12) (2.60) (2.36) 
       
ceo_own 0.449*** 0.405*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.0155*** 0.0148*** 
 (3.25) (3.15) (9.08) (9.28) (4.52) (4.49) 
       
instprc 0.415*** 0.349*** 0.0766*** 0.0757*** 0.00810*** 0.00826*** 
 (9.28) (8.39) (17.67) (18.34) (6.89) (7.22) 
       
Top5tot -1.228*** -1.055*** -0.190*** -0.167*** -0.0380*** -0.0351*** 
 (-12.42) (-11.51) (-19.41) (-18.26) (-15.61) (-14.88) 
       
agedummy -6.575*** -6.382*** 0.0283 0.109 -0.192*** -0.181*** 
 (-4.19) (-4.29) (0.18) (0.70) (-5.06) (-4.86) 
       
size -5.917*** -5.677*** -0.374*** -0.306*** -0.196*** -0.182*** 
 (-10.69) (-10.93) (-6.61) (-5.60) (-6.16) (-5.89) 
N 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 
R
2 0.050 0.027 0.113 0.052 0.169 0.055 
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Panel B (of table 31) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
TDC 0.258*** 0.174*** 0.0245*** 0.0225*** 0.0111** 0.00798 
 (2.89) (2.69) (3.95) (3.64) (1.98) (1.61) 
       
ceo_own 0.507* 0.409 0.0927*** 0.0992*** 0.0144* 0.0148** 
 (1.88) (1.64) (4.30) (4.80) (1.84) (1.98) 
       
instprc 0.360*** 0.194*** 0.0648*** 0.0696*** 0.00491** 0.00508** 
 (5.60) (3.23) (7.78) (8.81) (2.17) (2.29) 
       
Top5tot -0.719*** -0.582*** -0.195*** -0.176*** -0.0330*** -0.0305*** 
 (-5.72) (-4.91) (-11.44) (-10.92) (-10.21) (-9.78) 
       
agedummy -6.922*** -6.367*** 0.0306 0.0230 -0.234*** -0.231*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.04) (0.12) (0.09) (-3.83) (-3.78) 
       
eindex -1.325** -1.734*** -0.344*** -0.257*** -0.186*** -0.178*** 
 (-2.03) (-2.87) (-4.12) (-3.21) (-7.40) (-7.35) 
       
size -1.880*** -2.224*** -0.252** -0.211** -0.0680*** -0.0618*** 
 (-2.60) (-3.31) (-2.50) (-2.15) (-2.87) (-2.78) 
N 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 
R
2 0.058 0.023 0.126 0.074 0.163 0.047 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 11 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. Panel A shows the results of a 
regression without E-index, because including the index substantially decreases sample size (from 12,876 to 
4,347). Panel B reports the estimates if it is included. It is worth noting that the coefficient of determination 
increased in this specification. 
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); TDC ... total direct compensation (multiplied by 
1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; 
top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding; 
agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
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TABLE 32 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2005, alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC 
rE 16.20
***      
 (4.02)      
       
rE, t-1 9.471
***      
 (2.82)      
       
rel. rE  16.40
***     
  (3.59)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  8.415
**     
  (2.35)     
       
ROA   113.3***    
   (2.90)    
       
ROAt-1   -5.872    
   (-0.20)    
       
rel. ROA    92.97***   
    (2.61)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    12.57   
    (0.49)   
       
q     773.2*  
     (1.82)  
       
qt-1     743.1
**  
     (2.02)  
       
rel. q      550.4 
      (1.40) 
       
rel. qt-1      924.8
*** 
      (2.95) 
       
ceo_own -3.243 -2.475 -4.023 -3.900 -17.33 -16.88 
 (-0.20) (-0.15) (-0.25) (-0.24) (-0.95) (-0.93) 
       
instprc -24.65*** -23.12*** -22.23*** -21.75*** -24.63*** -24.09*** 
 (-3.39) (-3.24) (-3.05) (-3.00) (-3.37) (-3.34) 
       
Top5tot -9.468 -13.58 -18.21* -21.60** 15.15 10.74 
 (-0.99) (-1.45) (-1.93) (-2.39) (0.83) (0.60) 
       
agedummy 107.6 106.2 -31.49 -40.27 180.8 169.8 
 (0.41) (0.40) (-0.12) (-0.15) (0.68) (0.63) 
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Table 32 continued 
 
size 2594.0*** 2592.3*** 2528.3*** 2523.6*** 2603.3*** 2598.4*** 
 (19.99) (20.03) (19.95) (20.06) (20.44) (20.55) 
       
interlock 326.4 287.8 138.2 157.4 120.9 133.1 
 (0.39) (0.34) (0.16) (0.19) (0.14) (0.16) 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
R
2 0.123 0.121 0.115 0.115 0.156 0.153 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 12 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. TDC ... total direct compensation; 
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence 
of institutional investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total 
shares outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total 
assets; 
 
TABLE 33 
Regression results: Performance perspective 2006 - 2009, alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
TDC 0.638*** 0.452*** 0.0566*** 0.0391** 0.0135*** 0.0107*** 
 (3.87) (2.93) (3.02) (2.19) (3.98) (3.25) 
       
ceo_own -0.0579 -0.0911 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.0132*** 0.0127*** 
 (-0.43) (-0.69) (5.66) (5.62) (2.98) (2.96) 
       
bsize -0.688 -0.689 -0.132** -0.151*** -0.0280*** -0.0297*** 
 (-1.50) (-1.64) (-2.30) (-2.71) (-2.99) (-3.36) 
       
bind 0.0246 0.0428 -0.0192* -0.0123 -0.000584 0.000128 
 (0.30) (0.55) (-1.71) (-1.12) (-0.32) (0.07) 
       
instprc 0.277*** 0.285*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.0124*** 0.0118*** 
 (3.02) (3.33) (12.47) (12.29) (8.50) (8.33) 
       
Top5tot -0.947*** -0.848*** -0.258*** -0.241*** -0.0345*** -0.0319*** 
 (-5.74) (-5.47) (-11.98) (-11.91) (-11.21) (-11.07) 
       
agedummy 3.299 2.421 0.226 0.157 -0.0859* -0.0919* 
 (1.04) (0.79) (0.61) (0.43) (-1.69) (-1.87) 
       
size -3.416*** -2.997*** 0.136 0.174 -0.0969*** -0.0882*** 
 (-3.49) (-3.25) (1.12) (1.47) (-4.74) (-4.45) 
N 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 
R
2 0.046 0.019 0.192 0.101 0.215 0.070 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 13 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); TDC ... total direct compensation (multiplied by 
1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; 
instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a 
percentage of total outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log 
of total assets 
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TABLE 34 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 2006 - 2009, alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC TDC 
rE 11.90
***      
 (2.89)      
       
rE, t-1 -0.494      
 (-0.16)      
       
rel. rE  11.29
***     
  (3.01)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  -2.237     
  (-0.83)     
       
ROA   69.90**    
   (2.14)    
       
ROAt-1   -55.83    
   (-1.50)    
       
rel. ROA    41.45   
    (1.24)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -33.98   
    (-0.93)   
       
q     949.4***  
     (4.09)  
       
qt-1     -604.9
***  
     (-3.11)  
       
rel. q      670.2*** 
      (2.97) 
       
rel. qt-1      -389.6
** 
      (-2.10) 
       
ceo_own -32.11 -31.54 -33.11 -32.28 -34.94 -34.16 
 (-1.38) (-1.36) (-1.44) (-1.40) (-1.52) (-1.48) 
       
bsize -54.86 -55.94 -59.68 -57.94 -56.47 -53.10 
 (-0.83) (-0.85) (-0.90) (-0.87) (-0.86) (-0.81) 
       
bind -12.12 -12.92 -13.31 -13.93 -12.81 -13.65 
 (-0.83) (-0.88) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-0.87) (-0.93) 
       
instprc -3.565 -2.394 -1.760 -0.108 -3.982 -1.933 
 (-0.35) (-0.23) (-0.18) (-0.01) (-0.39) (-0.19) 
       
Top5tot 11.77 8.355 1.613 -0.932 10.53 6.205 
 (0.50) (0.35) (0.07) (-0.04) (0.45) (0.27) 
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Table 34 continued 
 
     
agedummy 1103.8** 1108.5** 1130.4** 1124.5** 1113.4** 1118.0** 
 (2.15) (2.15) (2.19) (2.18) (2.16) (2.17) 
       
size 2393.0*** 2395.2*** 2383.7*** 2379.5*** 2403.8*** 2394.4*** 
 (14.24) (14.24) (14.29) (14.28) (14.27) (14.26) 
N 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
R
2 0.418 0.417 0.414 0.413 0.418 0.415 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 14 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
TDC ... total direct compensation; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative 
relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
 
TABLE 35 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2005, salary excluded, alt. specification 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_os 0.480*** 0.392*** 0.0315*** 0.0264*** 0.0335*** 0.0293** 
 (3.86) (3.56) (5.18) (5.12) (2.61) (2.37) 
       
ceo_own 0.448*** 0.405*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.0155*** 0.0148*** 
 (3.25) (3.15) (9.08) (9.28) (4.51) (4.48) 
       
instprc 0.415*** 0.350*** 0.0766*** 0.0757*** 0.00813*** 0.00829*** 
 (9.29) (8.40) (17.68) (18.34) (6.91) (7.24) 
       
Top5tot -1.228*** -1.055*** -0.190*** -0.167*** -0.0380*** -0.0351*** 
 (-12.42) (-11.51) (-19.42) (-18.26) (-15.63) (-14.90) 
       
agedummy -6.552*** -6.363*** 0.0297 0.110 -0.190*** -0.179*** 
 (-4.17) (-4.28) (0.19) (0.71) (-5.02) (-4.83) 
       
size -5.856*** -5.630*** -0.368*** -0.301*** -0.192*** -0.179*** 
 (-10.73) (-10.97) (-6.55) (-5.55) (-6.33) (-6.06) 
N 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 
R
2 0.050 0.027 0.113 0.052 0.169 0.055 
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Panel B (of table 35) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_os 0.259*** 0.176*** 0.0245*** 0.0224*** 0.0113** 0.00810 
 (2.87) (2.68) (3.94) (3.65) (1.98) (1.61) 
       
ceo_own 0.507* 0.409 0.0927*** 0.0992*** 0.0145* 0.0148** 
 (1.88) (1.64) (4.30) (4.80) (1.84) (1.98) 
       
instprc 0.360*** 0.194*** 0.0648*** 0.0696*** 0.00492** 0.00509** 
 (5.60) (3.24) (7.79) (8.81) (2.18) (2.30) 
       
Top5tot -0.719*** -0.582*** -0.195*** -0.176*** -0.0330*** -0.0305*** 
 (-5.72) (-4.91) (-11.44) (-10.93) (-10.21) (-9.78) 
       
agedummy -6.909*** -6.358*** 0.0318 0.0242 -0.233*** -0.230*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.03) (0.12) (0.10) (-3.82) (-3.78) 
       
eindex -1.323** -1.732*** -0.344*** -0.257*** -0.186*** -0.178*** 
 (-2.02) (-2.86) (-4.12) (-3.20) (-7.40) (-7.35) 
       
size -1.843** -2.202*** -0.248** -0.207** -0.0666*** -0.0609*** 
 (-2.56) (-3.29) (-2.47) (-2.12) (-2.86) (-2.78) 
N 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 
R
2 0.058 0.023 0.126 0.074 0.163 0.047 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 15 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. Panel A shows the results of a 
regression without E-index, because including the index substantially decreases sample size (from 12,876 to 
4,347). Panel B reports the estimates if it is included. It is worth noting that the coefficient of determination 
increased in this specification.  
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_os ... CEO compensation without salary  
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; eindex ... E-index; size ... log 
of total assets 
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TABLE 36 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2005, salary excluded,  
alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os 
rE 16.22
***      
 (4.03)      
       
rE, t-1 9.557
***      
 (2.84)      
       
rel. rE  16.44
***     
  (3.61)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  8.511
**     
  (2.38)     
       
ROA   112.2***    
   (2.87)    
       
ROAt-1   -5.537    
   (-0.19)    
       
rel. ROA    91.34**   
    (2.56)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    13.20   
    (0.52)   
       
q     773.6*  
     (1.82)  
       
qt-1     749.7
**  
     (2.04)  
       
rel. q      549.2 
      (1.40) 
       
rel. qt-1      932.6
*** 
      (2.98) 
       
ceo_own -2.911 -2.154 -3.580 -3.429 -17.07 -16.62 
 (-0.18) (-0.13) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.94) (-0.91) 
       
instprc -25.49*** -23.97*** -22.98*** -22.47*** -25.48*** -24.93*** 
 (-3.51) (-3.36) (-3.16) (-3.11) (-3.50) (-3.46) 
       
Top5tot -8.646 -12.73 -17.66* -21.08** 16.09 11.66 
 (-0.91) (-1.37) (-1.90) (-2.36) (0.88) (0.65) 
       
agedummy 56.45 55.28 -83.08 -91.75 130.1 119.0 
 (0.22) (0.21) (-0.31) (-0.34) (0.49) (0.45) 
       
size 2446.3*** 2444.8*** 2380.1*** 2375.5*** 2455.7*** 2450.8*** 
 (18.88) (18.91) (18.80) (18.91) (19.31) (19.41) 
       
interlock 357.9 319.1 170.6 189.6 151.6 163.9 
 (0.42) (0.38) (0.20) (0.22) (0.18) (0.19) 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
R
2 0.115 0.113 0.107 0.107 0.148 0.146 
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Description to table 36 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 16 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
ceo_c_os ... CEO compensation without salary; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel 
... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 
institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 
if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
 
 
TABLE 37 
Regression results: Performance perspective 2006 - 2009, salary excluded, alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_os 0.654*** 0.459*** 0.0566*** 0.0383** 0.0141*** 0.0111*** 
 (3.87) (2.91) (2.99) (2.13) (4.09) (3.35) 
       
ceo_own -0.0593 -0.0922 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.0132*** 0.0127*** 
 (-0.44) (-0.70) (5.65) (5.62) (2.98) (2.96) 
       
bsize -0.682 -0.684 -0.132** -0.151*** -0.0278*** -0.0296*** 
 (-1.49) (-1.63) (-2.29) (-2.71) (-2.98) (-3.35) 
       
bind 0.0245 0.0427 -0.0192* -0.0124 -0.000583 0.000129 
 (0.30) (0.54) (-1.71) (-1.12) (-0.31) (0.07) 
       
instprc 0.278*** 0.285*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.0124*** 0.0118*** 
 (3.02) (3.34) (12.48) (12.29) (8.51) (8.34) 
       
Top5tot -0.947*** -0.848*** -0.258*** -0.241*** -0.0345*** -0.0319*** 
 (-5.74) (-5.47) (-11.98) (-11.91) (-11.21) (-11.08) 
       
agedummy 3.340 2.455 0.231 0.161 -0.0854* -0.0915* 
 (1.05) (0.80) (0.62) (0.45) (-1.68) (-1.86) 
       
size -3.357*** -2.947*** 0.144 0.182 -0.0962*** -0.0877*** 
 (-3.46) (-3.22) (1.20) (1.55) (-4.79) (-4.51) 
N 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 
R
2 0.046 0.019 0.192 0.101 0.216 0.070 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 17 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_os ... CEO compensation without salary 
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
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TABLE 38 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 2006 - 2009, salary excluded, 
alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os ceo_c_os 
rE 11.88
***      
 (2.92)      
       
rE, t-1 -0.383      
 (-0.12)      
       
rel. rE  11.21
***     
  (3.04)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  -2.163     
  (-0.82)     
       
ROA   65.02**    
   (2.06)    
       
ROAt-1   -52.30    
   (-1.47)    
       
rel. ROA    35.96   
    (1.11)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -30.05   
    (-0.86)   
       
q     933.8***  
     (4.14)  
       
qt-1     -580.7
***  
     (-3.09)  
       
rel. q      648.6*** 
      (2.98) 
       
rel. qt-1      -361.4
** 
      (-2.03) 
       
ceo_own -27.75 -27.17 -28.58 -27.74 -30.74 -29.96 
 (-1.21) (-1.19) (-1.26) (-1.23) (-1.36) (-1.32) 
       
bsize -64.48 -65.58 -69.30 -67.74 -65.88 -62.62 
 (-1.00) (-1.02) (-1.07) (-1.04) (-1.02) (-0.97) 
       
bind -10.85 -11.67 -12.10 -12.68 -11.52 -12.35 
 (-0.75) (-0.81) (-0.84) (-0.87) (-0.80) (-0.85) 
       
instprc -3.853 -2.641 -1.777 -0.145 -4.323 -2.278 
 (-0.38) (-0.26) (-0.18) (-0.01) (-0.43) (-0.23) 
       
Top5tot 11.16 7.636 0.539 -1.985 10.07 5.716 
 (0.48) (0.33) (0.02) (-0.09) (0.44) (0.25) 
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Table 38 continued 
 
agedummy 994.2* 999.1* 1019.9** 1013.7** 1006.2** 1010.9** 
 (1.95) (1.96) (1.99) (1.98) (1.97) (1.98) 
       
size 2245.2*** 2247.3*** 2235.5*** 2231.4*** 2256.2*** 2246.7*** 
 (13.42) (13.41) (13.46) (13.45) (13.45) (13.45) 
N 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
R
2 0.395 0.393 0.391 0.390 0.395 0.392 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 18 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
 ceo_c_os ... CEO compensation without salary; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; 
rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
 
TABLE 39 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2005, bonus excluded, alt. specification 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_ob 0.461*** 0.384*** 0.0296*** 0.0256*** 0.0342** 0.0300** 
 (3.74) (3.45) (5.15) (5.04) (2.56) (2.33) 
       
ceo_own 0.449*** 0.405*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.0155*** 0.0148*** 
 (3.25) (3.15) (9.08) (9.28) (4.52) (4.49) 
       
instprc 0.415*** 0.350*** 0.0766*** 0.0757*** 0.00817*** 0.00832*** 
 (9.30) (8.40) (17.68) (18.35) (6.94) (7.27) 
       
Top5tot -1.232*** -1.059*** -0.191*** -0.167*** -0.0383*** -0.0353*** 
 (-12.47) (-11.55) (-19.45) (-18.29) (-15.86) (-15.10) 
       
agedummy -6.548*** -6.359*** 0.0299 0.110 -0.190*** -0.179*** 
 (-4.17) (-4.27) (0.19) (0.71) (-5.01) (-4.82) 
       
size -5.711*** -5.526*** -0.358*** -0.294*** -0.186*** -0.174*** 
 (-10.74) (-10.99) (-6.43) (-5.45) (-6.49) (-6.23) 
N 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 
R
2 0.050 0.027 0.113 0.052 0.169 0.056 
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Panel B (of table 39) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_ob 0.242*** 0.172*** 0.0234*** 0.0219*** 0.0113* 0.00808 
 (2.87) (2.63) (3.99) (3.65) (1.93) (1.57) 
       
ceo_own 0.508* 0.409 0.0927*** 0.0992*** 0.0145* 0.0148** 
 (1.88) (1.64) (4.30) (4.81) (1.85) (1.99) 
       
instprc 0.361*** 0.195*** 0.0649*** 0.0697*** 0.00495** 0.00511** 
 (5.60) (3.24) (7.79) (8.81) (2.19) (2.31) 
       
Top5tot -0.722*** -0.584*** -0.196*** -0.176*** -0.0331*** -0.0306*** 
 (-5.74) (-4.92) (-11.46) (-10.94) (-10.24) (-9.80) 
       
agedummy -6.904*** -6.355*** 0.0323 0.0246 -0.233*** -0.230*** 
 (-3.13) (-3.03) (0.12) (0.10) (-3.82) (-3.78) 
       
eindex -1.337** -1.739*** -0.345*** -0.258*** -0.186*** -0.179*** 
 (-2.04) (-2.88) (-4.13) (-3.21) (-7.41) (-7.36) 
       
size -1.751** -2.154*** -0.241** -0.201** -0.0642*** -0.0592*** 
 (-2.46) (-3.23) (-2.41) (-2.07) (-2.81) (-2.75) 
N 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 
R
2 0.058 0.023 0.125 0.074 0.163 0.047 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 19 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. Panel A shows the results of a 
regression without E-index, because including the index substantially decreases sample size (from 12,876 to 
4,347). Panel B reports the estimates if it is included. It is worth noting that the coefficient of determination 
increased in this specification.  
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_ob ... CEO compensation without bonus  
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; eindex ... E-index; size ... log 
of total assets 
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TABLE 40 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2005, bonus excluded,  
alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob 
rE 15.16
***      
 (3.79)      
       
rE, t-1 9.393
***      
 (2.81)      
       
rel. rE  15.71
***     
  (3.46)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  8.443
**     
  (2.38)     
       
ROA   103.0***    
   (2.65)    
       
ROAt-1   -2.168    
   (-0.08)    
       
rel. ROA    89.04**   
    (2.51)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    11.60   
    (0.46)   
       
q     750.8*  
     (1.78)  
       
qt-1     769.1
**  
     (2.11)  
       
rel. q      536.1 
      (1.38) 
       
rel. qt-1      944.5
*** 
      (3.03) 
       
ceo_own -3.477 -2.896 -4.017 -4.086 -18.06 -17.63 
 (-0.21) (-0.18) (-0.25) (-0.25) (-1.01) (-0.98) 
       
instprc -25.55*** -24.26*** -23.07*** -22.80*** -25.98*** -25.47*** 
 (-3.60) (-3.49) (-3.25) (-3.23) (-3.66) (-3.63) 
       
Top5tot -1.724 -5.185 -10.56 -13.32 24.23 19.97 
 (-0.19) (-0.58) (-1.18) (-1.56) (1.34) (1.13) 
       
agedummy 12.94 14.14 -119.7 -127.8 92.74 82.07 
 (0.05) (0.06) (-0.47) (-0.50) (0.36) (0.32) 
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Table 40 continued 
 
size 2200.8*** 2200.7*** 2137.6*** 2133.4*** 2214.1*** 2209.3*** 
 (17.23) (17.27) (17.14) (17.25) (17.68) (17.77) 
       
interlock 394.4 357.8 217.2 234.0 192.1 203.9 
 (0.47) (0.43) (0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.24) 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
R
2 0.098 0.096 0.091 0.090 0.134 0.132 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 20 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
ceo_c_ob ... CEO compensation without bonus; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; 
rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 
institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 
if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
TABLE 41 
Regression results: Performance perspective 2006 - 2009, bonus excluded, alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_ob 0.676*** 0.476*** 0.0804*** 0.0626*** 0.0180*** 0.0147*** 
 (3.63) (2.71) (3.59) (3.00) (4.32) (3.64) 
       
ceo_own -0.0629 -0.0947 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.0132*** 0.0127*** 
 (-0.47) (-0.72) (5.66) (5.64) (2.99) (2.96) 
       
bsize -0.702 -0.698* -0.134** -0.153*** -0.0284*** -0.0301*** 
 (-1.54) (-1.67) (-2.34) (-2.74) (-3.04) (-3.40) 
       
bind 0.0172 0.0375 -0.0197* -0.0127 -0.000729 0.0000161 
 (0.21) (0.48) (-1.77) (-1.16) (-0.39) (0.01) 
       
instprc 0.275*** 0.284*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.0124*** 0.0118*** 
 (3.00) (3.32) (12.45) (12.26) (8.48) (8.31) 
       
Top5tot -0.944*** -0.846*** -0.257*** -0.240*** -0.0344*** -0.0318*** 
 (-5.73) (-5.46) (-11.99) (-11.91) (-11.18) (-11.05) 
       
agedummy 3.436 2.521 0.218 0.144 -0.0866* -0.0930* 
 (1.07) (0.81) (0.59) (0.40) (-1.71) (-1.89) 
       
size -3.374*** -2.961*** 0.0942 0.130 -0.104*** -0.0950*** 
 (-3.37) (-3.13) (0.76) (1.08) (-4.99) (-4.70) 
N 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 
R
2 0.046 0.019 0.193 0.102 0.217 0.072 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 21 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_ob ... CEO compensation without bonus 
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
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TABLE 42 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 2006 - 2009, bonus excluded, 
alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob ceo_c_ob 
rE 10.16
***      
 (2.93)      
       
rE, t-1 0.335      
 (0.12)      
       
rel. rE  10.10
***     
  (3.03)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  -1.554     
  (-0.63)     
       
ROA   62.14**    
   (2.25)    
       
ROAt-1   -39.57    
   (-1.36)    
       
rel. ROA    45.17   
    (1.63)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -26.30   
    (-0.91)   
       
q     923.1***  
     (4.29)  
       
qt-1     -551.2
***  
     (-3.12)  
       
rel. q      690.2*** 
      (3.30) 
       
rel. qt-1      -369.7
** 
      (-2.19) 
       
ceo_own -21.17 -20.65 -23.18 -22.66 -24.52 -23.82 
 (-0.96) (-0.93) (-1.06) (-1.04) (-1.12) (-1.09) 
       
bsize -31.57 -32.40 -34.57 -32.84 -32.30 -28.82 
 (-0.56) (-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.58) (-0.58) (-0.51) 
       
bind 2.063 1.345 1.127 0.569 1.624 0.791 
 (0.24) (0.16) (0.13) (0.07) (0.19) (0.09) 
       
instprc 0.543 1.557 1.249 2.415 -0.557 1.328 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.14) (0.27) (-0.06) (0.15) 
       
Top5tot 6.337 3.532 -0.830 -2.590 7.275 3.413 
 (0.29) (0.16) (-0.04) (-0.12) (0.33) (0.16) 
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Table 42 continued 
 
agedummy 904.0** 908.4** 927.7** 924.5** 918.7** 922.5** 
 (1.98) (1.99) (2.02) (2.02) (2.01) (2.02) 
       
size 2201.3*** 2204.1*** 2191.9*** 2188.9*** 2215.9*** 2207.6*** 
 (14.41) (14.39) (14.40) (14.38) (14.39) (14.37) 
N 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
R
2 0.455 0.454 0.452 0.451 0.456 0.453 
R
2 0.395 0.393 0.391 0.390 0.395 0.392 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 22 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
 ceo_c_ob ... CEO compensation without bonus; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; 
rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
 
TABLE 43 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2005, options excluded, 
alt. specification 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_oo 0.249*** 0.165*** 0.0334*** 0.0282*** 0.00265** 0.00196 
 (2.65) (2.92) (2.85) (3.11) (2.17) (1.56) 
       
ceo_own 0.450*** 0.406*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.0155*** 0.0148*** 
 (3.25) (3.15) (9.07) (9.27) (4.50) (4.47) 
       
instprc 0.411*** 0.346*** 0.0763*** 0.0755*** 0.00783*** 0.00802*** 
 (9.16) (8.28) (17.60) (18.27) (6.61) (6.98) 
       
Top5tot -1.245*** -1.069*** -0.191*** -0.168*** -0.0393*** -0.0362*** 
 (-12.59) (-11.66) (-19.49) (-18.33) (-16.36) (-15.59) 
       
agedummy -6.688*** -6.465*** 0.0167 0.0988 -0.196*** -0.184*** 
 (-4.24) (-4.33) (0.10) (0.64) (-5.13) (-4.93) 
       
size -5.079*** -4.951*** -0.337*** -0.275*** -0.121*** -0.116*** 
 (-9.99) (-10.35) (-5.97) (-5.07) (-8.67) (-8.62) 
N 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 
R
2 0.045 0.023 0.112 0.051 0.138 0.026 
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Panel B (of table 43) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_oo 0.202*** 0.127*** 0.0260*** 0.0235*** 0.00271** 0.00160 
 (3.03) (5.69) (3.62) (3.17) (2.32) (1.39) 
       
ceo_own 0.503* 0.406 0.0923*** 0.0988*** 0.0143* 0.0147** 
 (1.86) (1.63) (4.27) (4.78) (1.82) (1.97) 
       
instprc 0.354*** 0.190*** 0.0642*** 0.0691*** 0.00462** 0.00487** 
 (5.48) (3.15) (7.71) (8.73) (2.02) (2.18) 
       
Top5tot -0.723*** -0.585*** -0.196*** -0.176*** -0.0332*** -0.0307*** 
 (-5.75) (-4.93) (-11.47) (-10.95) (-10.23) (-9.80) 
       
agedummy -6.937*** -6.376*** 0.0280 0.0208 -0.234*** -0.230*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.03) (0.11) (0.08) (-3.81) (-3.77) 
       
eindex -1.403** -1.787*** -0.351*** -0.264*** -0.190*** -0.181*** 
 (-2.14) (-2.95) (-4.20) (-3.28) (-7.45) (-7.38) 
       
size -1.449** -1.920*** -0.220** -0.181* -0.0418** -0.0427** 
 (-2.05) (-2.90) (-2.21) (-1.87) (-1.96) (-2.10) 
N 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 
R
2 0.055 0.021 0.124 0.073 0.156 0.043 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 23 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. Panel A shows the results of a 
regression without E-index, because including the index substantially decreases sample size (from 12,876 to 
4,347). Panel B reports the estimates if it is included. It is worth noting that the coefficient of determination 
increased in this specification.  
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_oo ... CEO compensation without options  
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; eindex ... E-index; size ... log 
of total assets 
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TABLE 44 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2005, options excluded,  
alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo 
rE 3.243
*      
 (1.68)      
       
rE, t-1 -1.059      
 (-0.72)      
       
rel. rE  2.780     
  (1.43)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  -1.256     
  (-0.81)     
       
ROA   50.71    
   (1.54)    
       
ROAt-1   -30.13    
   (-1.30)    
       
rel. ROA    42.71   
    (1.40)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -22.59   
    (-1.12)   
       
q     111.0  
     (1.22)  
       
qt-1     -117.3  
     (-1.51)  
       
rel. q      90.34 
      (1.38) 
       
rel. qt-1      -99.00
* 
      (-1.76) 
       
ceo_own -3.299 -2.982 -4.655 -4.643 -2.265 -2.244 
 (-0.59) (-0.53) (-0.95) (-0.96) (-0.40) (-0.39) 
       
instprc -3.597 -3.153 -4.553 -4.376 -2.752 -2.725 
 (-1.04) (-0.94) (-1.15) (-1.11) (-0.82) (-0.83) 
       
Top5tot -3.108 -4.222 -0.582 -2.023 -5.436 -5.919 
 (-0.69) (-0.96) (-0.10) (-0.39) (-1.19) (-1.34) 
       
agedummy 333.2*** 328.8*** 320.2** 316.2** 319.5** 318.5** 
 (2.63) (2.59) (2.50) (2.44) (2.50) (2.47) 
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Table 44 continued 
 
     
size 1232.3*** 1229.8*** 1229.1*** 1227.0*** 1225.1*** 1224.6*** 
 (14.93) (14.99) (14.89) (15.07) (15.00) (15.09) 
       
interlock -68.78 -72.15 -99.14 -90.70 -80.10 -78.87 
 (-0.44) (-0.46) (-0.62) (-0.57) (-0.50) (-0.50) 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
R
2 0.081 0.080 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 24 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
ceo_c_oo ... CEO compensation without options; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; 
rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 
institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 
if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
TABLE 45 
Regression results: Performance perspective 2006 - 2009, options excluded, 
alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 rE rel. rE ROA rel. ROA q rel. q 
ceo_c_oo 0.506*** 0.312** 0.0458** 0.0272 0.00358 0.00138 
 (3.05) (2.07) (2.03) (1.28) (1.17) (0.46) 
       
ceo_own -0.0611 -0.0952 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.0129*** 0.0123*** 
 (-0.45) (-0.72) (5.63) (5.60) (2.90) (2.87) 
       
dirnbr -0.704 -0.697* -0.134** -0.152*** -0.0278*** -0.0295*** 
 (-1.54) (-1.66) (-2.33) (-2.73) (-2.99) (-3.36) 
       
outb 0.0229 0.0408 -0.0193* -0.0125 -0.000737 -0.0000154 
 (0.28) (0.52) (-1.72) (-1.14) (-0.40) (-0.01) 
       
instprc 0.280*** 0.287*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.0124*** 0.0118*** 
 (3.04) (3.34) (12.52) (12.32) (8.48) (8.30) 
       
Top5tot -0.955*** -0.854*** -0.259*** -0.241*** -0.0348*** -0.0321*** 
 (-5.80) (-5.51) (-12.01) (-11.92) (-11.25) (-11.12) 
       
agedummy 3.534 2.641 0.246 0.176 -0.0729 -0.0800 
 (1.10) (0.85) (0.66) (0.49) (-1.43) (-1.63) 
       
size -2.726*** -2.429*** 0.196* 0.223* -0.0700*** -0.0646*** 
 (-3.04) (-2.87) (1.68) (1.95) (-3.64) (-3.46) 
N 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 
R
2 0.044 0.017 0.191 0.100 0.211 0.067 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 25 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_c_oo ... CEO compensation without options 
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
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TABLE 46 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 2006 - 2009, options excluded, 
alt. specification 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo ceo_c_oo 
rE 8.239
***      
 (2.61)      
       
rE, t-1 0.406      
 (0.16)      
       
rel. rE  7.607
***     
  (2.72)     
       
rel. rE, t-1  0.00524     
  (0.00)     
       
ROA   47.93*    
   (1.78)    
       
ROAt-1   -37.97    
   (-1.39)    
       
rel. ROA    23.15   
    (0.83)   
       
rel. ROAt-1    -19.07   
    (-0.71)   
       
q     515.9***  
     (3.01)  
       
qt-1     -467.3
***  
     (-3.15)  
       
rel. q      325.2** 
      (2.00) 
       
rel. qt-1      -322.2
** 
      (-2.34) 
       
ceo_own -41.53*** -41.20*** -42.16*** -41.46*** -40.62*** -40.14*** 
 (-2.94) (-2.93) (-2.99) (-2.95) (-2.88) (-2.86) 
       
dirnbr -1.022 -1.123 -4.602 -3.527 -5.469 -3.834 
 (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.08) (-0.06) (-0.10) (-0.07) 
       
outb -13.22 -13.75 -14.16 -14.58 -14.49 -14.94 
 (-1.03) (-1.07) (-1.10) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.17) 
       
instprc -10.25 -9.570 -8.717 -7.391 -7.820 -6.597 
 (-1.13) (-1.06) (-0.99) (-0.85) (-0.88) (-0.75) 
       
Top5tot 11.06 9.097 3.328 1.264 3.137 0.435 
 (0.49) (0.40) (0.15) (0.06) (0.14) (0.02) 
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Table 46 continued 
 
agedummy 683.6* 687.0* 702.7* 697.3* 669.6* 672.7* 
 (1.89) (1.90) (1.94) (1.93) (1.85) (1.85) 
       
size 1643.7*** 1643.9*** 1637.6*** 1634.4*** 1642.1*** 1636.1*** 
 (15.09) (15.14) (15.22) (15.23) (15.28) (15.31) 
N 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
R
2 0.367 0.366 0.364 0.363 0.366 0.364 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table uses an alternative specification to capture the concentration of institutional holdings. Other 
than in table 26 this table uses the variable Top5tot as defined further down. 
 ceo_c_oo ... CEO compensation without options; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; 
rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
 
TABLE 47 
Regression results: Performance perspective 1993 - 2005, options only 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 trs1yr re_rel roa roa_rel q q_rel 
ceo_opt 0.602*** 0.508*** 0.0316*** 0.0265*** 0.0485*** 0.0427** 
 (3.41) (3.17) (3.84) (3.68) (2.66) (2.41) 
       
ceo_own 0.377*** 0.343*** 0.0920*** 0.0914*** 0.0128*** 0.0124*** 
 (2.73) (2.66) (8.17) (8.46) (3.76) (3.76) 
       
instprc -0.111*** -0.106*** -0.0126*** -0.00242 -0.00998*** -0.00847*** 
 (-3.18) (-3.25) (-3.59) (-0.71) (-6.96) (-6.08) 
       
Top5inst -0.629*** -0.556*** -0.127*** -0.111*** -0.0272*** -0.0253*** 
 (-10.16) (-9.76) (-21.99) (-20.29) (-16.73) (-15.87) 
       
agedummy -6.433*** -6.258*** 0.0393 0.118 -0.178*** -0.168*** 
 (-4.09) (-4.20) (0.25) (0.77) (-4.69) (-4.52) 
       
size -5.482*** -5.381*** -0.402*** -0.332*** -0.195*** -0.183*** 
 (-10.31) (-10.72) (-7.61) (-6.46) (-7.93) (-7.61) 
N 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 12876 
R
2 0.048 0.026 0.123 0.061 0.190 0.075 
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Panel B (of table 47) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 trs1yr re_rel roa roa_rel q q_rel 
ceo_opt 0.309* 0.216 0.0231** 0.0215** 0.0183 0.0133 
 (1.83) (1.61) (2.33) (2.20) (1.46) (1.21) 
       
ceo_own 0.505* 0.410 0.0923*** 0.0988*** 0.0146* 0.0149** 
 (1.88) (1.64) (4.37) (4.86) (1.88) (2.02) 
       
instprc 0.0800 -0.0376 -0.0125* 0.0000279 -0.00801*** -0.00695*** 
 (1.50) (-0.75) (-1.89) (0.00) (-3.27) (-2.89) 
       
Top5inst -0.554*** -0.499*** -0.160*** -0.143*** -0.0276*** -0.0259*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.29) (-14.39) (-13.59) (-10.48) (-10.03) 
       
agedummy -6.901*** -6.358*** 0.0271 0.0200 -0.233*** -0.230*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.04) (0.11) (0.08) (-3.84) (-3.80) 
       
eindex -1.283** -1.725*** -0.337*** -0.251*** -0.184*** -0.177*** 
 (-1.97) (-2.87) (-4.08) (-3.16) (-7.34) (-7.30) 
       
size -2.089*** -2.576*** -0.370*** -0.316*** -0.0911*** -0.0854*** 
 (-2.89) (-3.83) (-3.83) (-3.34) (-3.72) (-3.73) 
N 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 4347 
R
2 0.060 0.026 0.141 0.088 0.172 0.056 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table reports the point estimates of a regression that considers options the only component of 
executive pay.  
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_opt ... CEO compensation with options only  
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; eindex ... E-index; size ... log 
of total assets 
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TABLE 48 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 1993 - 2005, options only 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_opt ceo_opt ceo_opt ceo_opt ceo_opt ceo_opt 
trs1yr 12.91***      
 (3.65)      
       
trs1yr_t 10.51***      
 (3.44)      
       
re_rel  13.58***     
  (3.30)     
       
re_rel_t  9.653***     
  (2.97)     
       
roa   62.93***    
   (2.94)    
       
roa_t   23.47    
   (1.35)    
       
roa_rel    50.59***   
    (2.69)   
       
roa_rel_t    34.29**   
    (2.17)   
       
q     668.9*  
     (1.67)  
       
q_t     862.8**  
     (2.49)  
       
q_rel      465.8 
      (1.24) 
       
q_rel_t      1026.6*** 
      (3.41) 
       
ceo_own -0.293 0.0153 -0.175 -0.152 -14.07 -13.82 
 (-0.02) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.84) (-0.82) 
       
instprc -24.74*** -24.86*** -25.25*** -25.82*** -10.94 -12.25* 
 (-4.46) (-4.46) (-4.44) (-4.50) (-1.49) (-1.69) 
       
Top5inst -7.051 -8.258 -9.069 -10.23 18.66 16.14 
 (-0.99) (-1.15) (-1.26) (-1.42) (1.43) (1.24) 
       
agedummy -223.4 -220.6 -351.5 -356.2 -142.8 -152.6 
 (-1.03) (-1.02) (-1.59) (-1.61) (-0.64) (-0.68) 
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Table 48 continued 
 
     
size 1352.2*** 1354.0*** 1299.8*** 1296.8*** 1398.0*** 1392.5*** 
 (14.10) (14.10) (14.07) (14.10) (14.65) (14.75) 
       
interlock 382.8 346.5 227.0 236.4 230.4 238.0 
 (0.46) (0.42) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) 
N 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 10752 
R² 0.079 0.077 0.068 0.068 0.136 0.132 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table reports the point estimates of a regression that considers options the only component of 
executive pay.  
ceo_opt ... CEO compensation with options only; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; 
rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 
institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 
if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
 
TABLE 49 
Regression results: Performance perspective 2006 - 2009, options only 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 trs1yr re_rel roa roa_rel q q_rel 
ceo_opt 1.122*** 0.919** 0.104*** 0.0850** 0.0421*** 0.0370*** 
 (2.73) (2.42) (2.77) (2.44) (4.53) (4.31) 
       
ceo_own -0.109 -0.133 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.0109** 0.0105** 
 (-0.81) (-1.01) (4.84) (4.88) (2.42) (2.44) 
       
bsize -0.712 -0.718* -0.157*** -0.176*** -0.0300*** -0.0317*** 
 (-1.54) (-1.69) (-2.77) (-3.20) (-3.23) (-3.61) 
       
bind 0.0150 0.0366 -0.0165 -0.00943 -0.000372 0.000372 
 (0.18) (0.47) (-1.47) (-0.86) (-0.20) (0.21) 
       
instprc -0.114 -0.0664 -0.000374 0.000482 -0.00383*** -0.00329** 
 (-1.37) (-0.84) (-0.04) (0.05) (-2.78) (-2.44) 
       
Top5inst -0.473*** -0.432*** -0.189*** -0.180*** -0.0246*** -0.0230*** 
 (-3.02) (-2.97) (-12.47) (-12.54) (-10.79) (-10.54) 
       
agedummy 3.569 2.527 0.197 0.115 -0.0862* -0.0941* 
 (1.12) (0.82) (0.54) (0.32) (-1.70) (-1.92) 
       
size -2.444** -2.377** 0.125 0.132 -0.103*** -0.0977*** 
 (-2.44) (-2.55) (1.11) (1.20) (-5.63) (-5.53) 
N 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 3899 
R
2 0.039 0.014 0.196 0.107 0.223 0.079 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table reports the point estimates of a regression that considers options the only component of 
executive pay.  
rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; rel ... relative performance measure (individual 
performance measure - mean industry performance measure); ceo_opt ... CEO compensation with options only 
(multiplied by 1,000 for the sake of readability); ceo_own ... CEO ownership; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
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TABLE 50 
Regression results: Compensation perspective 2006 - 2009, options only 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ceo_opt ceo_opt ceo_opt ceo_opt ceo_opt ceo_opt 
trs1yr 3.829**      
 (2.31)      
       
trs1yr_t -0.568      
 (-0.43)      
       
re_rel  3.937**     
  (2.29)     
       
re_rel_t  -1.900     
  (-1.54)     
       
roa   24.48*    
   (1.70)    
       
roa_t   -15.06    
   (-0.88)    
       
roa_rel    20.86   
    (1.38)   
       
roa_rel_t    -12.07   
    (-0.72)   
       
q     443.2***  
     (3.14)  
       
q_t     -127.3  
     (-1.20)  
       
q_rel      359.8** 
      (2.50) 
       
q_rel_t      -59.60 
      (-0.57) 
       
ceo_own 11.09 11.30 10.25 10.36 7.500 7.797 
 (0.63) (0.64) (0.60) (0.60) (0.44) (0.45) 
       
dirnbr -52.11* -53.12* -52.96* -52.25* -48.20 -46.48 
 (-1.70) (-1.73) (-1.71) (-1.69) (-1.55) (-1.50) 
       
outb 0.482 0.218 0.221 0.00118 0.915 0.500 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.00) (0.21) (0.11) 
       
instprc 10.36*** 10.27*** 9.781*** 9.940*** 10.67*** 10.97*** 
 (2.80) (2.77) (2.67) (2.71) (2.87) (2.95) 
       
inst 11.84* 11.10* 11.85* 11.66* 16.75** 16.39** 
 (1.75) (1.65) (1.78) (1.75) (2.47) (2.43) 
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Table 50 continued 
 
     
agedummy 407.5 408.5 414.2 413.4 435.1 435.5 
 (1.12) (1.12) (1.13) (1.13) (1.19) (1.19) 
       
size 776.9*** 779.2*** 775.6*** 774.9*** 792.2*** 790.4*** 
 (5.98) (5.97) (5.99) (5.98) (6.04) (6.05) 
N 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275 
R² 0.180 0.180 0.179 0.179 0.187 0.185 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; t statistics in parentheses 
Note: This table reports the point estimates of a regression that considers options the only component of 
executive pay.  
ceo_opt ... CEO compensation with options only; rE ... return on equity; ROA ... return on assets; q ... Tobin's q; 
rel ... relative performance measure (individual performance measure - mean industry performance measure); 
ceo_own ... CEO ownership; bsize ... board size, bind ... board independence; instprc ... presence of institutional 
investors; top5tot ... shares held by top 5 institutional shareholders as a percentage of total shares 
outstanding; agedummy ... dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is older than 63; size ... log of total assets 
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Abstract 
 
German 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen dem Erfolg eines 
Unternehmens und der Bezahlung ihres Vorstandsvorsitzenden. Um ein möglichst 
vollständiges Bild dieser Beziehung präsentieren zu können, werden neben diesen beiden 
Variablen auch zusätzliche Größen wie etwa die Zahl der Aufsichtsräte, die Größe der Firma, 
der durch den Vorstandsvorsitzenden gehaltene Anteil des Eigenkapitals, sowie ausgewählte 
Corporate Governance Instrumente (Unabhängigkeit des Aufsichtsrates, ausgewählte Rechte 
der Anteilseigner) berücksichtigt. Darüber hinaus ermöglicht die Berücksichtigung dieser 
Variablen Aussagen über deren Effektivität als Instrumente der Einflussnahme auf die 
Unternehmensperformance und die Vergütung des Vorstandsvorsitzenden. 
Die Analyse stützt sich auf die in ExecuComp enthaltenen Daten zwischen 1993 und 2009, 
insgesamt somit 23.167 Beobachtungen von 3.010 einzelnen Firmen. Aufgrund einer 
maßgeblichen Änderung der von Seiten der betroffenen Unternehmen zu meldenden Daten 
in 2005, werden die Daten größtenteils in zwei separaten Datensätzen analysiert (1993 – 
2005 und 2006 – 2009). Diese Vorgehensweise bietet zudem die Möglichkeit, 
Zusammenhänge vor und während der Krise zu vergleichen. Beide Datensätze werden 
anfangs mittels einer multivariaten Regression untersucht. Später werden einzelne 
Komponenten der Vergütung weggelassen um Aussagen über den Zusammenhang zwischen 
den verbleibenden Teilen und der Unternehmensleistung treffen zu können. Im 
Umkehrschluss lassen sich so auch Rückschlüsse über die Effektivität der nicht 
berücksichtigten Komponente ziehen. 
Obwohl die Ergebnisse dieser Studie keinen Anspruch auf Kausalität oder soziale 
Angemessenheit der Zusammenhänge erheben können, ist es sehr wohl möglich 
Rückschlüsse über die Effektivität der in den USA gebräuchlichen Management Vergütung, 
sowie ihrer Komponenten zu ziehen. Darüber hinaus regen die Ergebnisse zu einer kritischen 
Reflexion von oft als positiv wahrgenommenen Unternehmenscharakteristika, wie der 
Unabhängigkeit des Aufsichtsrates und der Anwesenheit großer Anteilseigener, an. 
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English 
The paper at hand deals with the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
compensation. To present this relationship as thorough as possible it considers additional 
variables such as the number of seats on the board, firm size, and CEO equity ownership as 
control variables. Moreover, it analyses the interrelations between performance and CEO 
compensation on one hand, and typically corporate governance related variables such as 
board independence and certain shareholder rights on the other hand. Thereby it is possible 
to draw conclusions over the effectiveness of those variables in influencing corporate 
performance and CEO compensation. 
The analysis of this work includes data from the ExecuComp database within Standard and 
Poor’s Compustat between 1993 and 2009, in total 23.167 observations of 3010 separate 
firms. Due to a major change in disclosure requirements made by the SEC in 2005, which in 
turn affected the data collected in ExecuComp, most of the analysis is conducted on two 
subsamples (1993 – 2005 and 2006 – 2009). Splitting the dataset in those two subsamples 
additionally provides the opportunity to observe the relationships before and during the 
crisis. In a first step both subsamples are analyzed using a multivariate regression. 
Afterwards, in order to facilitate statements about the relationship between firm 
performance and certain components of CEO compensation, CEO pay is calculated in 
different ways (i.e. components of interest are omitted). Thereby I am able to draw 
conclusion about the effectiveness of the remaining components and, in turn, about the 
effectiveness of the omitted one. 
Although the results of this paper cannot raise any claim about causality or social 
acceptability of the observed relationship between firm performance and CEO 
compensation, they allow to draw meaningful conclusions about the effectiveness of 
prevalent CEO compensation practices in the U.S., and about the effectiveness of a selective 
set of components of CEO pay. In addition, they induce a critical reexamination of corporate 
governance practices that are nowadays oftentimes perceived as to have a positive effect on 
performance, such as to have an independent board of directors. 
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Hauptfächer/berufliche Fähigkeiten Betriebswirtschaft 
Name und Art der Bildungs- oder 
Ausbildungseinrichtung 
Universität Wien 
Dr. Karl-Lueger-Ring 1, 1010 Wien 
Stufe der nationalen oder 
internationalen Klassifikation 
Bachelor of Science 
  
Zeitraum September 1999 - Juni 2005  
Bezeichnung der erworbenen 
Qualifikation 
Matura 
Hauptfächer/berufliche Fähigkeiten Maschinenbau 
Name und Art der Bildungs- oder 
Ausbildungseinrichtung 
HTBLuVA St. Pölten (Höhere Technische Schule) 
Waldstraße 3, 3100 St. Pölten 
Stufe der nationalen oder 
internationalen Klassifikation 
Abitur 
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Berufserfahrung  
  
Zeitraum 01.August 2012 laufend 
Beruf oder Funktion Group Treasurer 
Wichtigste Tätigkeiten und 
Zuständigkeiten 
Fremdwährungsmanagement (Hedging, Berechnung von 
Projektkalkulationskursen) 
Sicherung der kurzfristigen Liquidität, Cashmanagement 
Bankkontenverwaltung 
Rohstoffsicherung 
Verwaltung der Cash Pools 
Financial Reporting 
Kredit- und Wertpapieradministration 
Name und Anschrift des Arbeitgebers Andritz Hydro GmbH 
Penzinger Straße 76, 1140 Wien (Österreich) 
Tätigkeitsbereich oder Branche 
 
Intercompany Banking 
Zeitraum 06. Juni 2011 - 31.Juni 2012 
Beruf oder Funktion Controller 
Wichtigste Tätigkeiten und 
Zuständigkeiten 
Planung: Erstellung von Budgets und quartalsweisen Forecasts 
monatliches Ist-Reporting sowie ad-hoc Reports 
Analyse und Plausibilisierung von Abweichungen in Soll/Ist Vergleichen 
Kostenmonitoring und Rechnungsprüfung 
Personalcontrolling 
Administration von Programmen zur Effizienzsteigerung / Kostenreduktion 
sonstige kaufmännische Prozesse: Leistungsverrechnung, Umbuchungen, 
Bestellwesen 
Name und Anschrift des Arbeitgebers Siemens Personaldienstleistungen GmbH 
Siemensstraße 90, 1210 Wien (Österreich) 
Beschäftiger: Siemens AG Österreich 
Tätigkeitsbereich oder Branche 
 
Energy Fossil Power Generation 
Zeitraum 08. September 2009 - 31. Mai 2011  
Beruf oder Funktion Werkstudent in der Personalverrechnung 
Wichtigste Tätigkeiten und 
Zuständigkeiten 
Reiseabrechnungen 
Datenpflege; insbesondere Entwicklung und Implementierung eines Systems zur 
Einspielung aktueller Währungskurse 
Erstellung von Dienstzeugnissen 
Mitarbeiterstammdatenerfassung 
Name und Adresse des Arbeitgebers Siemens Personaldienstleistungen GmbH 
Siemensstraße 90, 1210 Wien (Österreich) 
Tätigkeitsbereich oder Branche Personalbereitstellung, Personalrecruiting, Personalbetreuung 
Persönliche Fähigkeiten und 
Kompetenzen 
 
  
Muttersprache(n) Deutsch 
  
Sonstige Sprache(n) Englisch - verhandlungssicher in Wort und Schrift 
  
IKT-Kenntnisse und Kompetenzen gute Kenntnisse in: Windows 95 - 7; Office 95 – 10, DPW, SAP, 360T 
Basiskenntnisse in: STATA, 3D-Konstruktionsprogramme, SPS und C++ 
 
